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FROM THE EDITORS: Cities and Urban Politics
by Eugene Finkel, Adria Lawrence, and Andrew Mertha
B AC K TO  S U M M A RY
The COVID-19 pandemic, which began in the 
11-million-person city of Wuhan, China, has had 
a particularly severe impact on cities across 
the globe to date. At this writing, New York City, 
Detroit, New Orleans and Boston are among the 
hardest hit in the United States, and the num-
ber of cases is increasing in cities and towns 
in other parts of the world. The combination of 
poverty and pollution in densely-settled areas 
provides a particularly acute set of challenges. 
This current global crisis underscores an urgent 
need to pay attention to how the environments 
in which we live affect our politics. How do pol-
itics vary from city to town to village? How do 
urban and rural spaces affect public attitude 
and behaviors? How does space configure the 
kinds of public programs that can or should be 
implemented? How does it shape contentious 
politics? Is there a kind of politics that is spe-
cifically urban? How do urban politics differ in 
developing countries? 
The crisis we face today makes the study of 
urban settings more critical than ever before. 
When we set out to devote the current issue of 
the newsletter to this topic, the pandemic had 
not yet begun, but there were still two pressing 
reasons to reflect on cities and urban politics. 
First, there has been a growing sense of the 
substantive importance of understanding cit-
ies in the 21st century. Cities, as the authors in 
this issue note, have grown rapidly over the last 
half century, with urbanization leading to the 
concentration of population in urban centers 
in many countries.  This concentration has con-
sequences not only for issues such as resource 
use and allocation, but also for the political con-
text. Scholars and analysts have noted that an 
increase in political polarization may reflect a 
growing divide between rural and urban popu-
lations, with space affecting the ways in which 
people understand their interests. Political ide-
ology appears to differ from city to suburb to 
small town. The spaces in which we live increas-
ingly appears to configure political demands, 
identities, behaviors and policies.
The second reason we chose to highlight this 
area of research is because urban politics is 
experiencing a bit of a renaissance in the disci-
pline. Urban politics was, in decades past, rele-
gated to a small corner of American politics, but 
with the growth of urban centers and the par-
ticular challenges and promises of that growth, 
scholars in comparative politics have under-
taken new research on cities and space that as-
sesses substantive arguments using cases from 
all over the world. 
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In this issue, we turn to a group of scholars who 
are doing cutting-edge research on political 
processes that unfold in urban spaces. Our con-
tributors use a diverse set of qualitative and 
quantitative research techniques to discuss a 
wide range of well-established and emerging 
topics in the study of urban spaces and urban 
politics: housing, protests and social move-
ments, crime, informal economy, environment, 
political behavior and attitudes. 
Several contributions address housing politics, 
a paramount issue in any urban space. Maureen 
M. Donaghy focuses on the provision of public 
benefits by municipal authorities. Public ben-
efits provided by national level governments 
are at the center of social science research and 
political debates, but benefits provided by local 
governments are no less important for the sur-
vival and wellbeing of millions of urban residents 
across the globe. Zooming in on the provision of 
affordable housing and comparing Atlanta, Rio 
de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Washington, Donaghy 
highlights the importance of social movements 
and grassroot organizations for our understand-
ing of public benefits offered by cities. Yue Zhang 
also approaches urban housing policies from 
a comparative perspective. Focusing on urban 
governance issues in China, India, and Brazil 
she provides a typology of urban governance re-
gimes – integrated, pro-growth, contested, and 
clientistic. Tanu Kumar studies the impact of 
homeownership on political behavior and atti-
tudes in developing countries. The contribution 
utilizes a natural experiment in Mumbai, India, 
where citizens were assigned subsidized homes 
through a lottery. Kumar finds that homeowner-
ship increased the lottery winners’ interest and 
participation in communal and political affairs.
Governance of mega-cities is a key issue of 21st 
century politics. Focusing on the case study of 
Nanjing, Kyle A. Jaros analyzes the changes to 
the district structure of Chinese urban centers. 
Such changes, the article shows, help scholars 
to better understand the internal politics of 
China’s cities. Jaros also demonstrates how the 
authoritarian and hierarchal nature of China’s 
political system affects urban governance. 
Climate change, pollution, and other environ-
mental issues also pose governance challeng-
es to urban spaces. Yet comparative politics 
scholars, notes Veronica Herrera, largely ne-
glect city-level environmental issues and poli-
tics. Studying environmental politics in urban 
settings, the article shows, can substantially im-
prove our understanding of not only this crucial 
policy area, but also of topics such as collective 
action, mobilization, regulation and elections. 
Eduardo Moncada centers on crime and crim-
inal violence, another important political and 
governance challenge confronting cities in the 
developing world. Moncada relies on extensive 
fieldwork in Medellin, Colombia to analyze how 
citizens resist victimization by criminal groups. 
The article shows how pre-existing institutions 
and capture of police forces by criminal actors 
affect the strategies of resistance to criminal 
violence. 
Contentious politics and protests are a ma-
jor focus of urban politics scholarship. Jeffrey 
W. Paller studies protest mobilization in Africa 
and offers an analytical framework that sees 
urbanization as “a contentious political pro-
cess where population growth leads to com-
peting and often conflicting claims on a city.” 
Perceptions of urban citizenship and claims to 
urban space, Paller argues, help us to better un-
derstand mobilization processes in the Global 
South. Contributions by Tomila Lankina and 
Regina Smyth focus on urban protests in Russia 
and post-communist states. Lankina argues 
Andrew Mertha 
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for the incorporation of historical legacies into 
urban politics research. The past, she shows, 
matters for understanding present-day protest 
and non-protest in post-communist states. 
Scholars of urban mobilization ignore histo-
ry at their peril while closer attention to lega-
cies of the past can substantially improve our 
understanding of contemporary contentious 
politics. Smyth analyzes small-scale, non-po-
litical urban activism in Russia. Whereas most 
research on contentious politics and mobiliza-
tion in post-communist states centers on large 
scale political protests and revolutions, Smyth 
demonstrates how and under which conditions 
non-political mobilization targeting local level 
authorities might allow for subsequent politi-
cally oriented collective action.  
Technological innovations and changes affect 
politics not only at the national but also at the 
local levels. As Eleonora Pasotti shows, one 
effect of such innovations was the growing im-
portance of branding in urban politics. Instead 
of relying on traditional political divisions, now 
both city governments and protesters rely on 
branding to promote or fight against urban de-
velopment and growth policies. 
Understanding individuals in various urban 
contexts is another important and growing re-
search area. Chagai Weiss discusses the role of 
residential segregation in shaping intergroup 
relations. More specifically, he reviews the ex-
isting scholarship on how, why, and under what 
conditions segregation affects intergroup rela-
tions. According to Weiss, unpacking the black 
box of contact in urban spaces can substan-
tially improve our understanding of intergroup 
relations in urban settings. Hakeem Bishi and 
Shelby Grossman discuss the methodological 
issues of conducting research on participants in 
informal urban economies in the Global South. 
By drawing on their experience surveying infor-
mal market traders in Nigeria and Benin they 
discuss the limitations of the traditional sam-
pling strategies and offer two new approaches: 
“full census” and “grid + partial census,” which 
help to better analyze political attitudes and 
informal economies in the developing world. 
Finally, whereas most urban politics scholars 
focus on large cities, Jennifer Fitzgerald stud-
ies how citizens think about, relate to, and ex-
perience their local communities in the small 
towns and villages of France. Focusing on such 
communities, Fitzgerald argues, allows schol-
ars to better understand the “locally embedded 
individual,” namely the political implications of 
the ways individuals relate to their communi-
ties and processes and conditions which shape 
these individuals’ political beliefs and behavior.
These articles precede this Newsletter’s special 
feature.  Neither scholars of comparative poli-
tics nor the broader public can avoid the impact 
of the COVID-19 pandemic on individuals and 
societies. The special feature of this Newsletter 
issue is a collection of short Q&As with experts 
on topics ranging from media to military medi-
cine discussing the impact of the pandemic on 
the issues they study.   
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For nearly a century, political scientists have 
debated why some countries offer more gener-
ous welfare benefits than others. The answers 
generally revolve around democratic institu-
tions, political culture, and wealth, among other 
variables. While questions about the provision 
of public benefits continue to provide new ave-
nues of research at the national level, decisions 
around benefits at the federal level significant-
ly impact the day-to-day survival of billions of 
people living in cities. Research at the city or 
municipal level on public benefits and services 
not only serves to elucidate the influence of 
national governance systems, but also demon-
strates how local politics differ in responding 
to the needs of residents. In other words, we 
need to know not just the impact of national 
governments, but also how politics in cities, 
themselves, generate responsiveness and ac-
countability and drive the motivations of actors 
within municipal institutions.    
Whether or not we, as academics, are directly in-
volved in research on cities in the Global North 
or South, we know that too many low-income 
urban residents around the world lack the basic 
necessities of sufficient food, clean water, and 
secure shelter. The current crisis surrounding 
COVID-19 lays bare the severity of health and 
economic consequences resulting from these 
inequities. Basic services, such as trash col-
lection, schools, health care clinics, and public 
transport often remain outside the means of 
too many citizens. We also know that given the 
scale of these challenges, the state must be in-
volved in providing solutions, in terms of subsi-
dies, infrastructural development, land rights, 
and direct provision of benefits and services. 
Individuals, communities, and non-governmen-
tal organizations simply cannot meet current 
needs without public support. But how are city, 
state, and federal governments persuaded to 
prioritize low-income urban residents given the 
many demands of their constituencies?
The answer from scholars and practitioners 
across the world has often been that a strong 
civil society is needed to push government au-
thorities into meeting the needs of low-income 
communities. At the city level, however, there 
has been a long debate about whether com-
munity organizations can outweigh the force of 
coalitions formed by business and government, 
eager for profit and revenues to be had from 
urban development (for example, Stone 1988). 
More recently, though, scholars acknowledge 
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the key role that community organizations play 
in enabling the stronger, more stable growth 
that comes from increasing equity and secu-
rity among residents. A growing literature on 
urban politics finds evidence of the expanding 
role that civil society plays in providing 
information on the problems facing 
low-income residents and advocat-
ing for government interventions (for 
example, see Pasotti 2020 and Paller 
2019). As I argue below, from social 
movements in São Paulo to non-profit 
community developers in Washington, 
DC, and everywhere in between, communi-
ty organizations are fighting every day for city 
governments to provide greater resources and 
enact regulations that serve the needs of low-in-
come residents. 
More specifically, I investigate the role of civil 
society in bringing about benefits for afford-
able and secure housing. For decades a crisis 
of housing affordability had been devastating 
low-income communities in cities from Brazil to 
the United States. In this time, housing security 
has become an increasingly significant issue 
in urban politics as residents beg their govern-
ments to protect them from surging rents, home 
prices, taxes, and insecurity. In this context, 
mayors debate the merits of various policies 
and programs to promote affordable and se-
cure housing. But what is not up for debate, gen-
erally, is the scale of the challenges increasingly 
apparent to all. 
In this brief essay, I share insights on what we 
know about the strategies community organiza-
tions pursue to elicit investment from municipal 
governments and what we still need to under-
stand in terms of what works across cities that 
vary by institutions, resources, and governance. 
In particular, I focus on the provision of direct 
housing benefits and policies meant to enable 
low-income urban residents to access secure 
and decent shelter in cities across the North/
South divide. Evidence from my own research 
in cities in the United States and Brazil suggests 
that the strategies of these organizations, which 
directly reflect their ideology and their relation-
ship with the state, matter for the outcomes they 
achieve. The means of empowerment organiza-
tions pursue effects the path for accomplishing 
the grand goal of inclusive cities called for by the 
UN and “right to the city” advocates around the 
world. In the near future, however, more com-
parative research across cities will clarify the 
extent to which differing institutions, cultural 
traditions, and governance arrangements in-
fluence the reach of community organizations 
working to demand public benefits and services 
for low-income residents 
Urban Challenges
The imperative to study cities is clear to schol-
ars and practitioners of development world-
wide. Compared to rural areas, cities across the 
world hold significant promise for development, 
including gains in education, health improve-
ments, and income generation. As such, we must 
confront the many challenges facing cities in or-
der to fulfill the long-term promise of improving 
the quality of life for all. Between 1990 and 2015, 
the number of people living in cities practically 
doubled, led by growth in Asia, and followed by 
Europe, Latin America, and Africa (UN-Habitat 
2016). With this enormous growth in cities has 
come expanded challenges for providing basic 
services and infrastructure, key elements for the 
ability of cities to provide for the quality of life of 
residents and to maximize productivity among 
the population. In a study of basic services, in-
For decades a 
crisis of housing 
affordability had been 
devastating low-income 
communities.
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cluding potable water supply, sanitation, waste 
management, transportation, and energy, the 
United Cities and Local Governments found 
that as cities gain in wealth, they are better able 
to provide these services to a growing propor-
tion of the population (UCLG 2013). Significant 
variation remains between regions as to which 
cities are increasingly meeting basic needs, 
and without basic services to start, developing 
country cities are at risk of stagnation or worse. 
Alongside the inability to provide basic services 
is the growth of people living in slums and in-
formal settlements. According to UN Habitat, 
though the percentage of the urban population 
living in slums has declined over the past two 
decades, the total number of people in slums 
continues to rise, surging to close to a billion 
people in 2015 (UN Habitat 2016). Though cit-
ies in the Global South have experienced the 
greatest rise in population and influx in slums, 
cities of the Global North confront many similar 
challenges of housing insecurity and affordabil-
ity. In the United States, cities including Atlanta, 
Washington, DC, and New York have inequality 
levels, – as measured by the GINI index –  simi-
lar to developing country cities, such as Nairobi 
and Buenos Aires (UN Habitat 2016). By 2025, 
UN Habitat estimates that over 2 billion people 
across the globe will require access to adequate, 
affordable housing. Contributing to the prob-
lems of housing globally are lack of supply, lack 
of political prioritization, and ineffective policies 
and programs. The scale of these challenges has 
motivated governments to increasingly under-
take public-private partnerships, leveraging the 
resources of the private sector while often com-
moditizing basic goods and services for the pop-
ulation. But clearly more must be done to ensure 
a basic standard of living for urban dwellers.
In Latin America, and Brazil in particular, dis-
satisfaction with new democratic governments 
in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s led to a shift 
to the left in many cities, often aligned with 
social movements and non-governmental or-
ganizations oriented around housing issues. 
In the United States, evolving recognition of 
the continued role of race in housing access, 
growing frustration with income inequality, 
and reaction to gentrification pressures fueled 
the origin and revival of community-based or-
ganizations fighting for housing among low-in-
come residents. A convergence in the crisis of 
affordability across cities motivated an urban 
politics increasingly focused on the role of the 
state in meeting residents’ need for shelter. UN 
Sustainable Development Goal 11 states that by 
2030, all member nations should “make cities 
and human settlements inclusive, safe, resil-
ient, and sustainable,” with 11.1 calling for states 
to “ensure access for all to adequate, safe, and 
affordable housing and basic services” (UN-
Habitat 2016). The question is what or who will 
drive cities to meet these goals. 
Urban Community Organizations
As mentioned above, though past research 
on urban politics, particularly from the United 
States, argued against an influential role for 
community organizations, more recently schol-
ars and practitioners recognize the increasing 
impact of civil society on creating more equi-
table conditions for economic development. In 
particular, Clarence Stone, the pioneer of re-
gime theory in the US, now argues that we are 
living in “a new era” in which community-level 
actors have a greater role to play in directing 
urban policies and programs (Stone et al. 2015). 
No longer do business interests and government 
officials simply coalesce to undermine the pow-
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er of community organizations, but rather each 
increasingly recognizes the strength of local 
actors in creating more holistic, balanced de-
velopment that ultimately benefits all sectors. 
In Latin America, as well, there are numerous 
examples of organizations representing low-in-
come communities confronting the coalition of 
public officials and real estate interests to elicit 
investment that benefits the poor (see for ex-
ample, Rubin and Bennett 2015; Sandbrook et 
al. 2007). 
In addition, the debate coming out of the neo-
liberal era regarding the preference for the mar-
ket over the state to solve social challenges no 
longer drives discussions of public benefits 
provision, with acknowledgment that both the 
private and public sectors play critical roles. In 
the past two decades cities have seen a surg-
ing role for community organizations advocat-
ing for affordable and secure housing amidst 
recognition that the market cannot solve the 
crisis of affordability nor provide safe options 
for the lowest-income citizens. Still, housing in 
particular tests this notion that businesses and 
government accept the role of community or-
ganizations representing low-income citizens 
because of the direct threat to quick profits and 
revenues. As such, business interests and public 
officials still need strong incentives to preserve 
and create low-income housing (Purcell 2008). 
The question is how community organizations 
are best able to wield power to shape program 
and policy decisions and implementation. 
Recent evidence from a survey conducted by 
UN Habitat, the Global Network of Cities, Local, 
and Regional Governments, and the London 
School of Economics provides confirmation 
1. For further information, please see: https://urbangovernance.net/en/.
that civil society organizations in general have 
a largely positive influence on the decisions of 
municipal government officials to enact urban 
policies (London School of Economics 2016). 
While officials ranked elections as the most 
influential type of participation, they also iden-
tified local referenda, public consultations, pro-
tests-demonstrations, neighborhood advisory 
committees, social media campaigns, and pub-
lic hearings as wielding significant influence.1 
As the survey indicates, community organi-
zations in cities around the world have devel-
oped wide-ranging repertoires of activities to 
influence public policies and programs. While 
courts adjudicate property disputes, protests 
arouse disruption in the city, which can lead 
to enhanced incentives for officials to attend 
to the demands of protestors. Organizations 
across cities also undertake occupation of land, 
buildings, and government property, both out 
of necessity for a place to live and as a form of 
bringing the attention of government officials 
to the problems of housing insecurity. Legal 
claims, protests, and occupations may also 
coincide with public campaigns domestically 
and internationally to shame governments into 
taking positive actions. Further, collectivizing 
information, through advocacy campaigns and 
media reports builds public pressure. Together, 
all of these tactics often lead to direct negotia-
tion with government officials in face-to-face 
meetings, sometimes resulting in the promise of 
new policies and programs. 
But the debate remains as to how community 
organizations make decisions about the best 
ways to achieve their stated demands, and 
further, what works in bringing about their pre-
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ferred outcomes. In my book, Democratizing 
Urban Development: Strategies and Outcomes 
of Community Organizations for Housing 
across the United States and Brazil (2018), I ar-
gue for recognizing the importance of strategies, 
rather than tactics alone, in shaping the impact 
of community organizations in eliciting policies 
and programs to address housing needs. Sidney 
Tarrow (1998) famously argued that social 
movements adopt “repertoires of contention” 
that range from cooperative to contentious ac-
tions, choosing activities at certain times based 
on the greatest possibility for leveraging power. 
But by looking at the strategies of organizations, 
rather than repertoires, we gain a more holistic 
understanding of the goals, tactics, and targets, 
without dichotomizing the actions they under-
take as either cooperative or contentious.
Strategies involve a plan of action, which is pur-
posive, collective, and context specific (Maney 
et al. 2012). To this end, in the book I developed 
a typology of strategies the reflects the locus of 
collective efforts and the nature of the desired 
change. Inclusionary strategies are those in 
which organizations intend to influence public 
decision-making from within government insti-
tutions and enable citizen choice, while indirect 
strategies are those in which influence is me-
diated by persuasion of government officials, 
voters, or other actors. For example, inclusion-
ary strategies may involve the use of participa-
tory institutions to directly make program and 
policy proposals, often with the ability to vote 
on their adoption by the state. Indirect strate-
gies rely on public pressure, votes, or the will of 
government officials to act as the organization 
requests. Further, I identified overhaul strat-
egies as those that seek to change institutions 
2. See Lefebvre, Henri. 1995. “The Right to the City.” In Writings on Cities, eds. E. Kofman and E. Lebas, 63–181. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
or leadership, and exit strategies, which involve 
autonomous solutions or assistance external 
from the local government. The typology builds 
on Hirschman’s (1970) revered “Exit, Voice, and 
Loyalty” treatise, indicating the choices individ-
uals and groups make in the face of discontent 
with the state.
The choice of strategies, I find in my case stud-
ies of Atlanta, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and 
Washington, DC over the last decade, is largely 
dependent on two key variables: the ideology 
of the organization and its relationship with the 
state. On the ground, we see tremendous varia-
tion in the strategies organizations pursue, par-
ticularly among those that fight for the right to 
the city and those that are more conservative in 
their approach to working within existing polit-
ical institutions and structures. Organizations 
that adopt Lefebvre’s classic call for the right 
to the city in which citizens seek to re-shape 
the city to be more inclusive and reflective of 
citizens’ needs, tend to adopt inclusionary 
strategies, particularly when they enjoy a close 
relationship with the state.2 
For example, housing movements in the city 
of São Paulo, under a left-leaning mayoral ad-
ministration in the mid 2010’s, demonstrated 
a preference for inclusionary strategies as they 
sought to work within the long-fought over par-
ticipatory institutions, undertook leadership 
roles within the city government, and used judi-
cial institutions to claim the rights of citizenship. 
In Washington, DC, where housing organizations 
also benefited from a close relationship with 
Mayor Muriel Bowser and her administration, 
leaders took a different approach to eliciting 
money for government programs through ad-
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vocacy campaigns and public testimony to 
city council hearings. The constant pressure 
from groups across the two cities succeeded 
in prioritizing housing within both administra-
tions, though the outcomes looked different as 
groups in São Paulo achieved a more expansive 
institutionalized role while those in DC primarily 
won gains in funding for housing programs. Both 
outcomes were critical for assisting low-income 
residents to secure housing, but in the long run, 
I argue that community organizations need to 
be more radical in their approach to structural 
change in governance arrangements to pro-
mote long-term prioritization of housing needs.
Further, Atlanta and Rio de Janeiro represent-
ed cases in which community organizations 
fighting for low-income housing had very weak 
relationships with the city administrations. In 
Atlanta, in the mid-2010’s, housing organiza-
tions lacked the political clout, for the most part, 
to play a major role in policy making. Their ac-
tivities were limited by a lack of leadership and 
fear of disrupting the power structure. In Rio de 
Janeiro, prior to the 2016 Olympic Games, com-
munity organizations, including those fight-
ing against removal for stadium development, 
sought to circumvent the conservative adminis-
tration by seeking international attention in the 
midst of media leading up to the Games. While 
this type of “exit” strategy held some success for 
members of the community of Vila Autódromo, 
in particular, they were unable to break through 
the political structure for the long-term. 
Sustaining the momentum of community orga-
nizations to influence urban policies and pro-
grams for years if not decades takes extreme 
amounts of commitment from leaders and 
members dedicated to the fight. However, if 
cities are to be more inclusive, these organiza-
tions need to be present at the decision-making 
table, ensuring that a diversity of voices are not 
only heard but acted upon in policy making and 
implementation. 
Future Research
Perhaps never before in recent history has it 
been more important to address the well-being 
of low-income residents as we face new chal-
lenges of global depression and disease. Civil 
society will have to be at the forefront of efforts 
to make sure governments respond to the needs 
of low-income residents as they consider how 
best to re-start and re-grow global economies. 
To understand this possibility, we still need to 
know much more about how an organization’s 
ideology and relationship with the state encour-
age adoption of various strategies across cities 
that vary by regime type, cultural traditions, and 
governance arrangements. For instance, in Sub-
Saharan African cities, tribal norms concern-
ing land rights may mediate the relationship 
of community organizations with government 
officials. Comparative case studies could serve 
to identify what works – as well as where and 
when –in term of eliciting government benefits 
and services. The imperative for understanding 
these issues has never been greater, particularly 
as the world faces the increasing economic, so-
cial, and health challenges of the coronavirus, 
and millions of urban residents are already un-
able to meet their basic needs. With more con-
servative governments in power across much 
of Latin America and the United States, we also 
need to understand how politics at the city level 
adapts to these changing realities and enables 
community organizations to influence the land-
scape for local funding and implementation of 
policies and programs.   
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THE URBAN TURN IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS:  
Cities as the Anchor of Cross-Nation, Cross-Regime Comparison
by Yue Zhang
Cities have a special position in political sci-
ence. Many classics in the field are city-based 
research (Hunter 1953; Banfield 1961; Dahl 
1961). However, with its almost exclusive fo-
cus on U.S. cities and narrower selection of 
topics, the subfield of urban politics has been 
constrained by its own ethnocentrism and es-
tranged from mainstream political science for 
decades. The situation has recently changed 
as a result of two concurrent trends. First, with 
the renewed interest in subnational research in 
comparative politics, more light has been shed 
on the city level (Snyder 2001; Sellers 2005, 
2019; Gibson 2013; Eaton 2017; Giraudy, 
Moncada, and Snyder 2019). Second, 
there is an emerging scholarship that 
conducts urban politics research on a 
global scale, forging a connection be-
tween comparative politics and urban 
politics (McCarney and Stren 2003; 
Pasotti 2009, 2020; Read 2012; Zhang 
2013; Donaghy 2018; Paller 2019). The 
two trends signal a vibrant urban turn in com-
parative politics.
Cities and urban politics deserve more atten-
tion from comparativists because massive and 
rapid urbanization is one of the most significant 
challenges facing the developing world. While 
cities have long been the focal points of press-
ing political and social issues, their importance 
and relative autonomy has substantially in-
creased in the context of decentralization and 
globalization (Post 2018). Besides the com-
pelling substantive reasons for studying cities 
and urban politics, I would argue that analyzing 
politics at the city level provides an exciting 
opportunity for scholars to pursue innovative 
comparisons across nations and across re-
gime types, especially between substantially 
dissimilar political systems. This approach can 
contribute to comparative-historical analysis 
and development studies by showing that local 
conditions and multilevel governance are as 
important as national processes in shaping de-
velopment outcomes within nations (Mahoney 
2015; Duara and Perry 2018). The cross-system 
comparison, as Read (2018) argues, has the 
potential of facilitating new, thought-provoking 
theoretical and conceptual departures, echoing 
what Charles Tilly (1984) called “big structures, 
large processes, huge comparisons.” 
In the rest of the essay, I illustrate the possible 
theoretical and conceptual advances that may 
be made by cross-system comparison with ex-
amples from my forthcoming book on informal 
housing and urban governance in China, India, 
and Brazil. Specifically, I examine the produc-
tion and governance of three types of informal 
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settlement in three megacities across the three 
large developing countries. The comparison 
reveals the differentiation within the informal 
sector. It also demonstrates that what matters 
for urban governance is not only the effective-
ness of governance but also the inclusiveness 
of governance. A typology of urban governance 
regimes – integrated, progrowth, contested, and 
clientistic – is developed to describe the pat-
terns of urban governance in the three coun-
tries and beyond.  
Urbanization and the Politics of 
Informality in the Global South 
We live in a century of urbanization. While more 
than half of the world’s population are urban-
ites today, the number is expected to reach 68 
percent by 2050, and most of this expansion 
has occurred in urban centers of the Global 
South (United Nations 2019: 12). A distinguish-
ing feature of urbanization in the Global South 
is the prevalence of informal settlements that 
fall outside of government control or regulation. 
According to UN-Habitat (2003: v), one third 
of the world’s urban population, or more than 
one billion people, lives in “slums” of southern 
metropolises. The issue of informal settlements 
is worth studying on its own merits given its 
enormous scale and huge impact on humanity. 
Further, these settlements represent a unique 
urban space where political and social tensions 
are especially intense, so that they provide an 
important lens to investigate state-society rela-
tions, governance, and citizenship in the Global 
South (Davis 2017).
To be sure, poverty, inequality, and precarious 
living conditions are not unique to the Global 
South. There is a rich literature on concen-
trated poverty in urban America, with a focus 
on inner-city neighborhoods, public housing 
projects, and race and ethnicity (Zorbaugh 
1929; Hirsch 1983; Dewar and Thomas 2013). 
Nevertheless, we cannot simply apply the the-
ories developed in North America or Europe 
to the Global South due to their distinct insti-
tutional and urban contexts. First, under a de-
centralized federal system, urban politics in the 
U.S. is generally studied at the local or regional 
level. In the Global South, by contrast, national 
political institutions play a more visible role in 
urban politics, and the relations between ur-
banization and national development are more 
salient. Second, social mobilization and politi-
cal participation take different forms in new de-
mocracies and non-democratic regimes of the 
South than in well-established democracies of 
the North. Third, the definitions of urban are 
different between the North and South as well 
as between Southern countries. Given the ma-
jor divergences, it is imperative to develop new 
theoretical and methodological approaches to 
study urban politics in the Global South.  
The term “informal sector” was coined by British 
anthropologist Keith Hart in his 1973 study of 
the local economy in Ghana. Since then, schol-
ars have explored the issue of informality from 
various disciplinary backgrounds, such as eco-
nomics, sociology, and urban planning. Political 
scientists have paid keen attention to the rela-
tions between the state and informality. In his 
book on the relations between squatters and 
the oligarchs in Peru, Collier (1976) argues that 
the state encouraged the formation of squat-
ter settlements in Lima to facilitate its agenda 
of rural and urban development. Chatterjee 
(2004) developed the term “political society” to 
describe how slum dwellers in India have to use 
their votes to negotiate with political authori-
ties for access to land and services. A number 
of recent studies provide in-depth analysis of 
the clientelistic relations between the state and 
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the informal sector, including party networks 
in squatter settlements and informal welfare 
distribution for the urban poor (Holland 2017; 
Auerbach 2019). It is within this scholarly tradi-
tion that my research on the politics of informal-
ity is situated. 
Large-scale Comparison: Challenges 
and Possibilities
Before elaborating my own research design, I 
would like to discuss the methodological chal-
lenges facing comparison across developing 
countries, especially those in different world 
regions and having dissimilar systems. The first 
and foremost challenge is to find comparability 
across cases. I argue that a viable strategy is to 
use cities as the anchor of comparison. Due to 
their more manageable sizes and shared socio-
economic and spatial characteristics, cities are 
more comparable to one another than nations 
are, and it is easier to identify key variables at the 
city level than at the national level (Post 2018).  
Using the city as the unit of analysis, however, 
raises the question of generalization: how do 
findings based on cities apply to nations as a 
whole? There are two possible solutions. First, 
as Sellers (2005, 2019) stresses, the national 
context as “infrastructure” needs to be taken 
into full consideration. This calls for a multilevel 
analysis to integrate the comparison between 
cities with a comparison between the nations 
within which they are located. Second, the 
scope of arguments needs to be effectively de-
fined. According to Goertz and Mahoney (2009), 
researchers need to set limits on the scope of 
their arguments ensuring that both measure-
ment and causal relations are stable across all 
observations. These insights help illuminate 
how city-based analysis can inform our under-
standing of nations.  
Another challenge for large-scale comparison 
is to collect reliable and commensurable data 
in a cross-national context. While this is a com-
mon problem for comparativists conducting re-
search in the developing world, data collection 
is especially difficult when studying informality, 
given data scarcity and social and institutional 
complexity in the informal settings. Scholars 
have developed novel approaches to address 
this challenge, including the use of informal 
archives, worksite-based sampling, ethno-
graphic survey design, and crowd-sourced data 
(Auerbach 2018; Post et al 2018; Thachil 2018).
To develop a bigger picture on urban governance 
in the Global South, I compare the production 
and governance of informal settlements in 
China, India, and Brazil. Specifically, I choose 
one type of informal settlement in one megac-
ity of each country to address the issue. While 
the three countries are drastically different in 
terms of history, culture, and national institu-
tions and regimes, they have all experienced 
rapid urbanization alongside economic growth 
in recent decades (Figure 1); and they all have 
a high percentage of their urban population liv-
ing in informal settlements. These conditions 
make their cities ideal sites for comparison de-
spite national level differences. In all three cities, 
state intervention has taken place to regularize 
or redevelop the informal settlements; however, 
the processes and outcomes of state interven-
tion vary significantly. These variations imply 
that different modes of development and gov-
ernance are at play in the three countries.  
A Typology of Urban Governance 
Regimes
The literature on state capacity provides a 
strong theoretical foundation for understanding 
the relations between the state and informal-
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ity (Boone 2012; Slater and Kim 2015; Centeno, 
Kohli, and Yashar 2017). Specifically, in his study 
of urban development in India, South Africa, 
and Brazil, Heller (2017) brings the focus from 
the national level down to the local level, and 
argues that economic growth and social inclu-
sion are two critical dimensions for examining 
state capacity. Building on these insightful no-
tions, I develop a typology of urban governance 
regimes to explain the varied processes and 
outcomes of state intervention in the informal 
housing sector. I define an urban governance 
regime as the interrelations between the state 
apparatus and the associated nonstate net-
works. It has two dimensions: effectiveness and 
inclusiveness. Effectiveness refers to the de-
gree to which governing projects are successful-
ly implemented, whereas inclusiveness is about 
the social base of governance, or the spectrum 
of social interests that are included in the gov-
erning process. The two dimensions are shaped 
by three variables: intergovernmental relations, 
party systems, and nonstate networks. The first 
two influence the effectiveness of urban gover-
nance and the third affects the inclusiveness of 
urban governance.
As Figure 2 demonstrates, there are four types 
of urban governance regimes. An integrated 
regime is an ideal type defined by a high level 
of effectiveness and a high level of inclusive-
ness. Building on the integration and collab-
oration between different political and social 
interests, it is most likely to promote effective, 
inclusive, and sustainable development. A pro-
growth regime, characterized by a high level of 
effectiveness and a low level of inclusiveness, 
normally relies on a coalition of local state and 
business interests. While a progrowth regime 
may promote large-scale governing projects, it 
often results in unbalanced economic and so-
cial development. A contested regime, featur-
ing a low level of effectiveness and a high level 
of inclusiveness, is defined by the competition 
between different stakeholders. This model is 
built on a broader spectrum of social interests, 
but the contestation may impede policy im-
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GDP and Urbanization Level 
in China, India, and Brazil
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plementation. A clientelistic regime is formed 
around the state’s rent-seeking activities and 
characterized by low effectiveness and low in-
clusiveness. It may lead to slow and exclusive 
development.
Of these four possible regime types, three types 
of urban governance regimes – progrowth, clien-
telistic, and contested – describe the patterns 
of urban governance in China, India, and Brazil, 
respectively. The following section explains how 
these urban governance regimes work in the 
three countries. 
State Intervention in the Informal Space: 
A Tale of Three Cities
To explain how the urban governance regimes 
work in China, India, and Brazil, I select one type 
of informal settlement in a megacity of every 
country and examine state intervention in the 
selected settlements. Each type of settlement 
represents an important informal housing 
1. China has implemented a household registration system since 1958 as an approach to control internal migration. Under the sys-
tem, every citizen’s household status, or hukou, is classified as either urban or rural. A person’s welfare and housing benefits are 
strictly associated with their location of origin. 
practice that the city is known for. A megacity 
is defined as a metropolitan area with a total 
population of over ten million people. There 
are currently thirty megacities in the world, and 
two-thirds of them are in the developing world. 
They are not only the magnets for much of the 
urban growth in developing countries but also 
epitomize the challenges facing the urban world 
(United Nations 2014: 13-14). The three cities are 
all rising global cities and major national eco-
nomic, financial, and trade centers. They have 
all attracted large numbers of migrants and ex-
perienced a high level of inequality. There is a 
high percentage of each city’s population living 
in informal settlements.  
Urban Villages, Guangzhou
Guangzhou is in the forefront of China’s eco-
nomic reform and opening-up. Among its 14.5 
million residents, 38% of them – primarily rural 
migrants – live in urban villages. This is a type of 
informal settlement produced by the govern-
ment’s selective land expropriation. After ex-
propriating a large amount of agricultural land 
for new development, the government leaves 
alone villagers’ homesteads to reduce the cost 
of land expropriation. Villagers build multi-story 
apartment buildings on their collectively owned 
homesteads and rent the units to migrant work-
ers, who are otherwise ineligible for affordable 
housing in cities due to their lack of local house-
hold status.1 The construction and management 
of rental housing in the villages is not subject to 
any government regulation. Every urban village 
has a complex set of self-governing institutions 
including the village committee, the party com-
mittee, the village shareholding company, and 
clan networks, with overlap between the various 
Figure 2: 
A Typology of Urban 
Governance Regimes
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leaderships. These institutions are responsible 
for the provision of infrastructure and services 
in the villages.
Under the support of the central party authority, 
Guangzhou began the redevelopment of urban 
villages in 2009. This was part of the central 
government’s agenda of economic restruc-
turing, which aims to build high-tech and high 
value-added industries and replace labor-in-
tensive processing industries. The Municipal 
Bureau of Urban Renewal was created to super-
vise the redevelopment. The redevelopment 
projects were monopolized by a few large devel-
opment companies. State-owned enterprises 
had more advantages because of their close 
ties with the government.
While village committees represented villagers 
in choosing developers, developers needed to 
negotiate with villagers house by house to de-
cide the compensation. The common model of 
redevelopment is to demolish the entire village 
and rebuild on the village land. Developers pro-
vide free housing to villagers as compensation, 
and every family can receive multiple condo 
units. The rest of the land is reserved for devel-
opers to build market-rate housing and com-
mercial facilities in order to finance the projects. 
The density of development is usually extremely 
high and breaks the zoning and density regula-
tions of the local government.
The progrowth coalition between the local state 
and developers has generated dramatic chang-
es in urban China. Slum-like urban villages have 
been replaced by luxury condominiums, glob-
al hotel chains, and upscale retail spaces. The 
redevelopment projects have had a narrow 
social base and provide insufficient channels 
of participation. While the projects brought a 
substantial increase in income to villagers and 
village collectives, migrant tenants were sim-
ply expelled from the villages and their need for 
housing was never addressed. Despite the fact 
that the Chinese government prioritizes urban-
ization as a major strategy of development, what 
it has promoted is primarily an urbanization 
of land, not an urbanization of people. The ur-
ban-rural divide has been reproduced through 
the redevelopment of urban villages. 
Squatter Settlements, Mumbai 
Mumbai is the economic capital of India. It has a 
population of 12.4 million, and 42% live in squat-
ter settlements, commonly known as slums. 
These are unauthorized and illegal structures 
built on public or private land where inhabitants 
do not have a legal title to the land. The areas 
lack basic infrastructure and services and are 
characterized by the prevalence of unsanitary, 
squalid, and overcrowded conditions. The pro-
liferation of slums is closely related to a series 
of restrictive rent control and land use policies 
that Mumbai has implemented since the 1960s. 
These policies disincentivized the private sec-
tor from creating rental and affordable housing 
units. Meanwhile, due to the large number of in-
habitants, slums have become political parties’ 
“vote banks.” To capture the votes of slum dwell-
ers, politicians helped them register as voters 
and provided services during election seasons, 
thus institutionalizing the existence of slums.
Slum redevelopment was launched in Mumbai 
in 1995 under the leadership of the Slum 
Redevelopment Authority, a state-level agency 
chaired by the chief minister of the Maharashtra 
State. This model of redevelopment entails de-
molishing slums and providing free housing to 
slum dwellers who have arrived in the areas 
before January 1, 2000. The scheme of redevel-
opment resulted from party politics. Shiv Sena, 
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the long-time dominant party of Mumbai, made 
a campaign promise to provide free housing to 
slum dwellers during the state assembly elec-
tion in 1990 as an effort to obtain their votes 
(Mukhija 2003).
The scheme of redevelopment provided in-situ 
allocation to slum dwellers, allowing them to 
stay on the same land after redevelopment, be-
cause politicians did not want to lose their “vote 
banks.” The standard size of rehabilitation unit 
is rather small, only 269 square feet per house-
hold regardless of the size of the family. Many 
rehabilitation buildings are poorly designed and 
constructed and have become “vertical slums.” 
Developers have used the rest of the slum 
land to construct market-rate housing. Some 
of Mumbai’s most prominent real estate proj-
ects were built through this model on slum land. 
Owners of these multi-million-dollar homes live 
next to the shabby apartments of former slum 
dwellers. The two worlds are separated by a wall.
Under a clientelistic urban governance regime, 
slum redevelopment in Mumbai has been ex-
tremely slow and many projects have stagnat-
ed for years. While the redevelopment led to 
the formalization of property rights for former 
slum dwellers, it has not reduced their political 
dependency on political parties. They need to 
rely on party officials for building maintenance 
and service provision after redevelopment, 
leaving clientelistic relations intact. In an effort 
to eliminate informality, slum redevelopment 
has generated a polarized housing market and 
has reinforced spatial and social inequalities in 
India.  
Movement Occupation, São Paulo 
São Paulo concentrates a large share of the 
Brazilian GDP. The city has a population of 12.2 
million, and a large proportion of its people 
lives in self-built informal settlements, known 
as favelas, or substandard tenements called 
cortiços. Meanwhile, in the historic city center 
of São Paulo, where seventy percent of jobs are 
concentrated, the rate of under-occupation 
and vacancy is around thirty percent. Radical 
housing movements started in São Paulo in the 
early 1990s, during which time working-class 
families who worked in the city, but could not 
afford a place to live, mobilized to occupy va-
cant buildings in the city center. From 1997 to 
2012, a total of 120 buildings were occupied by 
housing movements. As of May 2018, 70 build-
ings remain occupied and have become home 
for more than four thousand families.
Different from other types of informal housing 
practice, housing movements in São Paulo have 
actively used legal and institutional devices to 
negotiate with the state. Thanks to the urban re-
form movements in the 1980s, Brazil has one of 
the most progressive legal systems in the world. 
The 1988 Constitution recognizes the “right 
to housing” and emphasizes that the city and 
urban property should fulfill social functions. 
Movement leaders have made frequent refer-
ence to law in meetings and interviews, empha-
sizing that housing is a constitutional right and 
that the lack of adequate housing is a violation 
of citizenship rights. Movement leaders are part 
of the constitutionally mandated municipal 
housing council created in 2002, and they have 
used the council as a platform to delay eviction 
(Donaghy 2018).
Despite the fact that movement occupations 
are a breach of property rights, the legitimacy 
of the housing movements has been acknowl-
edged by officials at different levels of the state. 
Under the leadership of the Workers’ Party 
Mayor Fernando Haddad, the city passed pro-
gressive property tax policies on unutilized 
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properties. It also expropriated a number of oc-
cupations in the city center and converted them 
into social housing and approved plans for more 
social housing construction. However, partisan 
politics has slowed down the implementation 
of these progressive policies and resulted in a 
stalemate between the movements and the 
state.
Housing movements in São Paulo have revealed 
a contested pattern of urban governance, 
through which different actors and interests 
competed with one another and the policy pro-
cess was shaped by the contestation and ne-
gotiation between different stakeholders both 
inside and outside state institutions. Meanwhile, 
the housing movements have demonstrated 
a rights-based approach of social movements 
under the banner of the “right to the city.” The 
rights-based approach opened up new space 
of collective mobilization and provided new dis-
course and tools for disadvantaged citizens to 
carry out their struggle.  
Conclusion 
China, India, and Brazil have different urban 
governance regimes, which play a major role in 
shaping the processes and outcomes of state 
intervention in their informal settlements. This 
comparison has a number of implications for 
understanding state, governance, and urban-
ization in the Global South. First, the informal 
housing sector is highly heterogenous, so that 
we need to move beyond the simplified notion 
of “slums” in order to better understand the 
politics of informality. Different forms of infor-
mal settlements are spatial manifestations of 
different state-society relations. Second, state 
capacity and urban governance need to be un-
derstood in terms of both effectiveness and in-
clusiveness. Unless the governing project is built 
upon a broader spectrum of social interests, 
the effort to formalize the informal may gen-
erate more informality and increase inequal-
ity.  Third, urbanization is not a linear process. 
The definition of the “urban” is contested and 
contextualized in the state’s broader agenda of 
development.
As the old saying goes, all politics is local. And, 
yet, analyzing politics at the local level yields 
insights into politics at higher levels. Since cit-
ies are more comparable to one another than 
nations are, city level analysis can facilitate 
cross-nation and cross-regime comparison, 
and thus contribute to theory development. 
Moving forward, there are two issues that schol-
ars conducting comparative urban politics re-
search should keep in mind. For one thing, after 
scaling down, it is critical to scale back up, so 
that city-based analysis can help us better un-
derstand national and global phenomena and 
address big questions. For another, political sci-
entists need to have greater engagement with 
urbanists in other disciplines in order to be part 
of the broader debate on urban issues and to 
advance a more dynamic understanding of cit-
ies and urban politics.  
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THE ORGANIZED SECTION IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS 
OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
SUBSIDIZING HOMEOWNERSHIP BUILDS WEALTH, 
CHANGES ATTITUDES, AND GENERATES URBAN  
CIVIC PARTICIPATION: Evidence from India 
by Tanu Kumar  
B AC K TO  S U M M A RY
Today, over half of the world’s population lives in 
cities. While low- and middle-income countries 
remain predominantly rural, urbanization is ex-
pected to add 2.5 billion people to the global 
urban population by 2050, with 90% of this in-
crease slated for Asia and Africa. India alone is 
expected to contribute 404 million individuals 
to this figure (UN World Urbanization Prospects 
2015). As demand for living space increases, 
governments have attempted to increase the 
formal housing supply by encouraging private 
developers to build and by constructing housing 
themselves.1
One common policy is the subsidized sale of 
homes to lower-middle class households. Such 
policies exist in cities in many countries, in-
cluding India, Brazil, Uruguay, Nigeria, Kenya, 
Ethiopia, and South Africa. Even while the stated 
reason for these policies is most often a short-
age of housing, the subsidies actually constitute 
wealth transfers to beneficiaries experienced in 
1. These attempts are distinct from policies attempting to solve problems associated with illegal settlements or housing on a city’s 
outskirts to which public services may not yet extend. Solutions to these problems include land titling (see e.g. Di Tella et al. 
2007; Feder and Feeny 1991; Field 2005; Galiani and Schargrodsky 2010) and the extension of services (see e.g. Burra 2005; 
Gulyani and Bassett 2007; Imparato and Ruster 2003). These interventions mostly help alleviate problems of informality faced 
by a city’s poorest residents, but low housing supply affects members of higher socio-economic strata, too.
some combination of three payout structures: 
1) a stream of in-kind benefits for those who 
choose to live in the subsidized home; 2) cash 
benefits among those who choose to rent it 
out; 3) or lump-sum through resale. Aside from 
transferring wealth directly, the programs also 
facilitate the purchase of an asset that forms 
the cornerstone of wealth accumulation for 
many families. This wealth accumulation will 
be largest for those who live in cities with rising 
home prices.
The programs are, in some ways, reminiscent 
of homeownership subsidies that have been 
in place in many high-income countries since 
World War II. Examples of relevant policies in-
clude Britain’s Right to Buy program and both 
targeted and universal mortgage subsidies in 
Japan, Canada, and the United States. These 
programs are consequential not only because 
they have transferred wealth, but also because 
they have turned the relevant countries into 
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nations of homeowners. Jordá, Schularick, and 
Taylor (2014), for example, find that mortgage 
subsidies increased homeownership from 
40% in the 1930s to nearly 70% by 2005 (and 
to about 65% in the wake of the 2008 housing 
crash) in the United States, with 
similar changes seen in the United 
Kingdom.
We also know that homeownership 
affects political behavior in these 
contexts. A home is a large asset 
comprising, in the modal situa-
tion, most of a family’s wealth. Homeownership 
therefore leads households to engage in behav-
ior that improves their most immediate neigh-
borhoods to maximize the value of the home 
(Fischel 2001). Studies of homeownership in 
the United States have focused on a resulting 
“not-in-my-backyard” mentality (NIMBYism) 
that leads homeowners to defect from city-lev-
el public goods such as landfills and homeless 
shelters due to the costs they impose on local 
communities (Portney 1991; Dear 1992; Fischel 
2001; DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999). To the ex-
tent that wealth affects political participation 
(Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995), the asset 
accumulation generated by homeownership, 
particularly in cities, may also affect political 
behavior. By increasing rates of homeownership 
in the US and UK, subsidies have thus affected 
local-level politics in these countries as well.
How, then, do subsidized housing programs af-
fect local politics and political behavior in low 
and middle-income countries? It is not clear 
whether findings from the US translate to ur-
ban India, where political participation is often 
correlated with fixed aspects of one’s religion 
or caste (e.g. Chandra 2004). Could a simple 
wealth transfer change decision-making that 
has often been described as tied to identity? 
The existing literature’s focus on identity might 
just be a result of the fact that it tends to focus 
on voting. Studying voting behavior does little 
to reveal citizens’ preferences and their expec-
tations of government, mainly because turnout 
and vote choice are one-dimensional measures 
of a decision based on numerous factors. To tru-
ly understand how the wealth transfer changes 
political preferences, I study what comprises a 
large portion of everyday local politics in urban 
India: demands to improve services, such as 
piped water and sanitation, one aspect of what 
Kruks-Wisner (2018b) calls “claim-making.”
The program
I investigate this relationship in Mumbai, India 
by exploiting a natural experiment wherein 
applicants were assigned subsidized homes 
through a lottery system in 2012 and 2014. 
Such programs have been spearheaded in all 
major Indian cities by state-level development 
boards created by India’s Second Five Year 
Development Plan (1951-1956) that provided 
central government funding to states to devel-
op low-income housing (Pornchokchai 2008). 
This same development plan advocated coop-
erative citizen ownership in all sectors of the 
economy; as a result, the housing boards de-
veloped apartments that would be sold, rather 
than rented, to individuals and buildings that 
would be collectively maintained by all owners 
(Ganpati 2010; Sukumar 2001). The policy of 
construction for ownership continued even as 
the central government’s development plans 
moved towards policies favoring the facilita-
tion of private construction after the economic 
liberalization of the 1990s. Moreover, in 2015, 
India’s federal government claimed a housing 
shortfall of over 18 million to motivate a plan, 
Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana (P-MAY), to build 
20 million affordable homes by 2022. Grants to 
Winners were about 29 
percentage points more 
likely than non-winners 
to report attending local 
municipal meetings.
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subsidize the construction and sale of low-in-
come housing by local municipal boards remain 
a central component of this policy.
I studied an instance of the program implement-
ed in Mumbai by the Maharashtra Housing and 
Area Development Authority (MHADA). Every 
year, MHADA runs subsidized housing programs 
for economically weaker section (EWS) and 
low-income group (LIG) urban residents who 
1) do not own housing, and 2) who have lived 
in the state of Maharashtra for at least 15 con-
tinuous years within the 20 years prior to the 
sale. Winners have access to loans from a sta-
teowned bank, and most take out 15-year mort-
gages. Households are not permitted to sell the 
apartments for 10 years, but they can rent them 
out.
The lottery homes were sold at a “fair price” 
that government officials claim was 30-60% 
of market prices at the time of sale. Winners 
could eventually hope for large gains; 3-5 years 
after the lottery, the difference between the 
apartment purchase price and list price for old-
er MHADA apartments of the same size in the 
same neighborhood lies anywhere between 
Rs.661,700 (about $10,300 at 2017 conversion 
rates) to Rs.2,869,015 (about $45,000).2
The yearly lotteries are advertised in newspa-
pers (Figure 1), on the internet, over the radio, 
and through text messages. Applicants can 
apply online or in person at the MHADA offic-
es, and need only an Aadhaar card, personal 
account number (PAN) card, a passport photo, 
mobile number, email, and cancelled check.3 
2. Data collected from magicbricks.com in 2017.
3. An Aadhar card is part of India’s biometric identification program. A PAN card is used for most formal financial 
transactions.
Most of these items, particularly the Aadhaar 
card and PAN card, are required for most for-
mal transactions; possession of the application 
materials thus forms a low bar to entering the 
program. The 200 INR (3-4 USD) application fee 
is nominal, and most applicants reported ap-
plying for the lottery year after year, with no real 
expectation of ever winning.
From the perspective of an applicant, the pro-
gram is an opportunity to completely change a 
family’s life and economic trajectory. The lottery 
apartment buildings are close together, densely 
populated, and stamped with the implement-
ing agency’s logo (Figure 2), but interviewees 
rarely seemed worried about any social stigma 
associated with living in the homes. “People 
who win these homes have the chance to make 
their lives better, everyone knows that,” replied 
one applicant when asked about how the apart-
ments are perceived. “It’s the chance to win a 
home in this extremely expensive city. I could 
never dream of that otherwise, and it would 
make me feel more financially secure than any 
job ever could. If things keep on going the way 
they have in Mumbai, maybe I can sell it for a 
high price one day and become comfortable, 
even wealthy,” answered another.
Nevertheless, the program is not targeted at 
the poorest households in a city. Winners must, 
after all, be able to pay a down payment and 
15-year mortgage. The sample of applicants I 
surveyed was at about the 63rd percentile for 
mean years of education in Mumbai based on 
the India Human Development Survey- II, which 
was conducted in 2010 (Desai and Vanneman 
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Figure 1: 
An ad for the 2014 lotteries 
included in the study.
2016). Roughly half of each family was em-
ployed, compared to about 42% for Mumbai 
overall (2011 Census). At the time of application, 
most already lived in dwellings with permanent 
floors and roofs. This housing was often a chawl, 
or cheap apartment with shared taps and toilets 
– extremely common throughout the southern 
part of the city. I thus describe the applicant 
pool as lower middle-class and upwardly mo-
bile. Citing experience from Latin American cit-
ies, Alan and Ward (1985, 5) similarly find that 
public housing interventions generally do not 
benefit a city’s poorest citizens, as they simply 
cannot afford the requisite rent or mortgage.
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Data collection
Because this program, like most others run by 
state housing boards, allocates apartments 
through a randomized lottery system, a study 
of winners (treated) and non-winning (con-
trol) applicants is a randomized experiment. 
Estimation of treatment effects requires that I 
observe outcomes for both treated and control 
units. For the 2012 and 2014 MHADA lotteries, I 
received from MHADA 1,862 phone numbers and 
addresses for winners and a random sample of 
applicants.4 I then mapped these addresses us-
ing Google Maps and removed those that were 
incomplete, outside of Greater Mumbai, or could 
not be mapped. This left 531 and 532 control and 
treatment households, respectively. From this 
sample, I randomly selected 500 households 
from each treatment condition to interview with 
the help of a Mumbai-based organization.
The data collection process entailed using 
phone numbers and addresses that were 3-5 
years old to track down respondents. Friends 
and neighbors assisted in the cases that respon-
dents had moved away. After 9 months, we were 
able to contact 834 of the 1000 households, 
4. There are more than 300,000 economically weaker section applicants for roughly 300 spots. 
5. More details on the estimation strategy can be found in Kumar 2019.
with 413 of the surveyed households in the con-
trol condition and 421 households in the treated 
condition. There was balance on a number of 
fixed or pre-treatment covariates specified in 
the pre-analysis plan for this project.
Findings
I estimate effects on local political participa-
tion as measured through this survey.5 I find 
that winners were about 29 percentage points 
more likely than non-winners to report attend-
ing local municipal meetings where they met 
with representatives and discussed community 
improvements. During the time of the survey, 
these meetings surrounded the Mumbai Draft 
Development program, which addressed land 
use issues in the city. Winners were particularly 
concerned about the use of parks and gardens 
near their apartments and wanted to protect 
them from encroachment by squatters and 
hawkers. They were also 11 percentage points 
more likely to report approaching bureaucrats 
and representatives to make complaints about 
community issues, particularly the arrival of 
water and electricity in the hot summer months 
preceding the monsoon. This reported action 
was accompanied by demonstrated changes 
in knowledge, as winners were 11 percentage 
points more likely to be able to correctly name 
their local elected municipal officials. These 
municipal officials had been elected just six 
months prior to the survey, suggesting that win-
ners were quick to learn new information rele-
vant to their neighborhoods.
It might be possible that these effects were 
driven by winners relocated to new neighbor-
hoods that were simply more politically active. 
Yet this political participation was not confined 
Figure 2: 
Examples of the buildings 
in which lottery apartments 
are located.
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only to those living in the new apartment build-
ings. Winners were not required to move to the 
homes, but could rent them out. Nevertheless, 
those who rented out the homes might have 
wanted to participate in local politics to improve 
communities to increase the rental or resale 
values of the homes. Fifty-nine percent of land-
lords traveled over an hour to the lottery homes 
to participate in weekly neighborhood meetings 
in the communities in which they owned homes 
but did not live (Figure 3). When they could 
not make this trip, they participated through 
WhatsApp and video calls. This effort suggests 
strong incentives for organizing separate from 
the effects of social norms within a communi-
ty. Also, rates of reported demand-making and 
knowledge about politicians were similar across 
winners who live in the homes and those who 
rent them out.
Why do we observe these changes in behav-
ior? One explanation is that winning the home 
made recipients feel wealthier and altered their 
time horizons. Recent work (e.g. Mani et al. 2013; 
Haushofer and Fehr 2014) finds that the stress 
created by poverty can make it difficult to focus 
on long-term goals and lead to short-sighted 
behavior. Positive income shocks can increase 
psychological well-being, happiness, and time 
horizons, thereby reducing the cognitive or time 
related cost of action. In my qualitative inter-
views, I similarly found that winners reported 
feeling “less stressed” on a daily basis and had 
more time to think about making their futures 
more comfortable.
In line with this explanation, I estimate that win-
ners were 19 percentage points more likely than 
non-winners to claim to be “happy” with the fi-
nancial situation of the household. They also ap-
peared to believe they would pass on their good 
fortune to their children, as they were roughly 12 
percentage points more likely than non-winners 
to say “yes” when asked if their children would 
have better lives than them. Their predictions 
might be supported, as youth from winning 
households had higher rates of secondary school 
completion than those from non-winning house-
holds, even though on average, lottery homes 
were in neighborhoods with worse schools than 
the non-lottery homes. Winners were further 8 
percentage points more likely than non-winners 
to respond that they “would never leave” when 
asked if would ever consider relocating from 
Mumbai, suggesting increased time horizons. 
Multiple interview respondents reported being 
less worried about having to return to their “na-
tive places,” or the villages from which the mi-
grated to the city, in the case of a job loss.
Figure 3: 
A weekly meeting to discuss 
neighborhood improve-
ments. Many of the attend-
ees are landlords who do not 
live in the lottery apart-
ments but rent them out.
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A subsidized home may also affect political 
behavior by altering a beneficiary’s perception 
of her own status. In July 2018, The Hindustan 
Times ran a story documenting the pride and 
satisfaction reported by members of 13 house-
holds in Mumbai that had fulfilled their dreams 
of homeownership (Hindustan Times (2018)). I 
also estimate an 8.9 percentage point increase 
in the likelihood of respondents selecting “No,” 
when asked “Do you/people like you need to 
listen to what leaders in the area say?” I inter-
pret this effect as an increase in respondents’ 
perceptions of their own status or efficacy. As 
stated by one of the winners, “[Beneficiaries] 
now have some status. The sarkar [government] 
needs to listen to us now.”
Finally, as demonstrated by the literature on 
NIMBYism, subsidized homeownership can 
create interest groups of beneficiaries who are 
particularly motivated to work together to pro-
tect their benefits. To illustrate this mechanism, 
I also measure effects on stated motivations 
for another form of local political participa-
tion, namely voting in local elections. Relative 
to nonwinners, I estimate that winners were 22 
percentage points more likely to state neighbor-
hood problems as a reported reason for voting, 
thus supporting increased interest in local prob-
lems as a mechanism for my findings. As one 
winner stated, she “looked for politicians who 
made an effort in improving the water, clean-
liness, and squatter situation in the neighbor-
hood.” In contrast, a non-winner said he voted 
for “those who help people like us.”
Implications for the study of compara-
tive politics
These results differ from existing comparative 
politics research on political behavior in im-
portant ways. First, I focus not on voting behav-
ior, but demands for service improvement. In 
cities in the developing world, the demand for 
services such as water and electricity can far 
outstrip supply. This leads to uneven service 
access and service quality across a municipali-
ty. Oftentimes, communities must secure these 
services through negotiation with politicians 
(Auerbach 2016), brokers (Stokes et al. 2013), 
or other intermediaries (Jha et al. 2007, Krishna 
2011). Much is written about politicians’ strate-
gies for allocation among different individuals 
or groups (see Golden and Min 2013). We know 
less about when and why citizens will prioritize 
improvements to public service delivery over 
other demands.
Second, in an attempt to learn about the causes 
of this behavior, I move away from the literature 
on clientelism, which focuses on ethnicity and 
reciprocity between politicians and citizens. 
Instead, I focus on citizens’ capacity and aspi-
rations to make new demands (Kruks-Wisner 
2018a, 29). I show that government benefits 
might actually alter how beneficiaries think and 
what they want, thereby motivating and en-
abling citizens to improve their communities. 
These important determinants of individual 
political behavior may change over time in spite 
of fixed characteristics such as ethnicity or reli-
gion, particularly in response to changing eco-
nomic fortunes.
I also demonstrate the importance of home-
ownership subsidies, which remain relatively 
unstudied outside of the US, to urban politics 
all over the world. The research shows that the-
ories of urban politics based on evidence from 
the US will be enriched by the study of low- and 
middle-income countries. US-based studies, for 
example, emphasize the negative externalities 
of homeownership that occur when homeown-
ers defect from city-level public goods such as 
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landfills and homeless shelters due to the costs 
they impose on local communities (Portney 
1991; Dear 1992; Fischel 2001; Schively 2007; 
Hankinson 2018). They describe a collective ac-
tion problem wherein homeowners defect from 
land use policies that are of general benefit to a 
municipality because they impose costs (in the 
form of land depreciation or externalities such 
as crowds and pollution) on the very local com-
munities in which individuals own homes.
But cities in India experience variation in ser-
vice quality rarely seen in cities in countries like 
the United States or United Kingdom. The home-
owners I interviewed in India were rarely fighting 
for better views or schools, but rather hoping for 
regular water service, covers for open manholes, 
and effective sewage drainage during the mon-
soon months. Thus, if homeownership leads to 
the improvement of these vital community-level 
public services, then it has the potential to gen-
erate positive externalities at the community 
level not possible in cities with more uniformly 
high levels of service provision. This is not to say, 
of course, that homeownership cannot have 
negative NIMBY-type externalities in urban 
India as well. Many have documented, for exam-
ple, the urban middle class’s attempts to clear 
slums and “beautify” cities; such actions likely 
share the same underpinnings as NIMBYism in 
that they benefit homeowners at the expense 
of others in the city (Fernandes 2006; Heller, 
Mukhopadhyay, and Walton 2016).
The point is that homeownership subsidies are 
wealth transfers, and wealth both confers pow-
er and motivates people to exercise power. As 
cities grow, these subsidies will only become 
more consequential because of both the grow-
ing potential for home value appreciation and 
the increasing number of people city politics will 
reach.
The study of comparative urban and local pol-
itics will thus benefit from the further study of 
this common policy initiative. One important 
avenue of future research is to see whether pol-
icies in other contexts affect political behavior 
in similar or other ways. Another is to under-
stand why governments pursue such initiatives. 
Formal housing programs may be particularly 
appealing to governments for political reasons. 
Alan and Ward (1985, 5-6) claim that public 
housing serves three main functions in society: 
it provides visual evidence that the government 
is providing for the poor, construction creates 
jobs, and it provides homes for government sup-
porters and officials. Leaders may also, as we 
have seen in the case of the UK and US, be ideo-
logically motivated to promote homeownership 
and/or civic participation. Ultimately, home 
subsidies remain an important cause and effect 
of political processes across and within many 
different countries, and there is still a great deal 
to be learned about them.  
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REMAKING URBAN GOVERNMENT IN CHINA:  
District Restructuring as a Window onto  
Territorial Politics
If the governance of swelling mega-cities is cen-
tral to the politics of the 21st century, there are 
few settings where the stakes are higher than 
China. China is home to dozens of multi-mil-
lion-person metropolises — both national cen-
ters like Beijing and Shanghai, and regional hubs 
like Wuhan and Nanjing.1 For an autocratic par-
ty-state, managing these cities represents a key 
political challenge and balancing act. Large cit-
ies are China’s most important economic growth 
engines, centers of innovation, and gateways to 
the global economy (Jaros 2019). But large cit-
ies also strain the party-state’s governance ca-
pacity. On the one hand, they represent latent 
threats to regime stability, with their potential 
for concentrated social unrest (Wallace 2014). 
On the other hand, big cities face a host of more 
routine — though no less serious —  policy chal-
lenges, such as providing public services to di-
verse and demanding populations, reconciling 
economic growth with inclusive development, 
and managing environmental pressures (Saich 
2008). In moments of crisis like the COVID-19 
pandemic, both sides of this urban governance 
challenge become vivid.
One of the most fundamental, yet most difficult 
aspects of metropolitan governance in China 
—  as in other national settings —  is the question 
of how to administratively organize sprawling 
urban areas. Around the world, the architecture 
of urban government varies widely. We find di-
versity in the pattern of power devolution, the 
degree of administrative fragmentation, and 
the blend of territorial and functional gover-
nance. Comparative scholarship makes it clear 
that these varying metropolitan governance ar-
rangements have important consequences for 
development and politics. Among other things, 
metropolitan government structures affect 
the distribution of economic and social oppor-
tunities (Frug 1999; Freemark et al 2020), the 
dynamics of political power and participation 
(Myers and Dietz 2002; Lassen and Serritzlew 
2011), and the efficiency of administration 
(Zhang 2013; Blom-Hansen et al 2016). 
In China, where the entities called “cities” (shi) 
are often much larger than their counterparts 
abroad, and where the party-state penetrates 
virtually every aspect of political, economic, and 
social life, the structure of urban government 
would seem especially significant. Yet, despite 
extensive research by political scientists and 
other scholars on urban issues in China, there 
has been relatively little attention to the internal 
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structure and workings of urban government. It 
is clear that in recent decades, China’s big cities 
have existed in a state of near-constant institu-
tional flux as the party-state has tried to adapt 
its structures of rule to manage popu-
lation growth, land expansion, and eco-
nomic restructuring (Chung and Lam 
2004; Hsing 2010; Rithmire 2015; Cartier 
2015). However, many key questions 
about China’s urban government sys-
tem remain only partly answered: How, 
and on what basis, is the territory of 
cities divided into different sub-units? 
In what ways does the urban district structure 
shape the political, economic, and social life of 
cities? When and why do territorial-administra-
tive arrangements in cities change, and how do 
such changes affect political elites and ordinary 
residents alike? Answering these questions is 
important not only for making sense of urban 
politics in China, but also to add a crucial dimen-
sion to comparative debates about the deter-
minants of effective metropolitan governance.  
To help address this gap in the literature, my 
current research examines the changing forms 
and workings of big-city government in China. 
As one element of this research, I examine cases 
of urban “administrative division reform” (xing-
zheng quhua gaige) (ADR), or changes to the 
district structure of cities, to better understand 
the evolving nature of urban governance and 
the complex internal politics of China’s metrop-
olises. Urban district restructuring has occurred 
frequently in recent decades, reshaping the ter-
ritory and governance arrangements of many 
Chinese cities. Though officials speak of ADR in 
technocratic terms as a way to enhance urban 
competitiveness, spatial coordination, and ad-
ministrative efficiency, such reform is ultimate-
ly a manifestation of territorial politics within 
Chinese cities. Urban ADR reflects pent-up ten-
sions and political divisions within urban govern-
ment, and it produces clear winners and losers. 
In what follows, I use the case of the 2013 ADR 
in Nanjing, Jiangsu Province as a window onto 
the multifaceted territorial politics of a large 
Chinese city. As I discuss below, ADR in Nanjing 
highlights accumulating strains within the gov-
ernance system of a fast-growing provincial 
capital and reveals conflicting interests be-
tween different groups of urbanites, different 
government units, and different urban priori-
ties. Indeed, by examining changes to the urban 
district structure, the underlying significance of 
this structure becomes clearer. Urban districts 
in China are as large as municipal units in oth-
er settings, and are responsible for many of the 
same functions. In Nanjing, we find some of the 
same types of horizontal conflicts among dif-
ferent urban districts—and their residents—that 
might be observed between neighboring cities 
in other national contexts. But we also see how 
the hierarchical governance system of China’s 
party-state raises the stakes of conflicts over 
urban territory. 
Urban district structure and  
restructuring in the Chinese metropolis
The territorial units designated as cities in 
China are less like municipalities in other con-
texts than city regions or provinces: their ad-
ministrative boundaries encompass densely 
populated urban cores but also suburbs, sat-
ellite cities, and large rural hinterlands. Four of 
China’s largest cities, Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, 
and Chongqing, have populations in the tens of 
millions, land areas of several thousand square 
miles, and province-level administrative rank. 
Even prefecture-level cities, of which there are 
currently over 290, are typically home to several 
Hierarchical governance 
system of China’s party-
state raises the stakes 
of conflicts over urban 
territory.
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million people and comparable in land area to 
small American states. 
Based on province-level and prefecture-lev-
el cities’ size alone, their internal administra-
tive structures have important consequences 
for development and governance. Indeed, the 
administrative divisions of prefecture-level 
Chinese cities are large units in their own right. 
In addition to any remaining rural counties or 
county-level cities in their jurisdictions, pre-
fecture-level cities contain one or more urban 
districts—administrative units with county-lev-
el rank that play a major governance role as the 
lowest full-fledged level of local government in 
urban areas. Urban districts have populations 
ranging from a couple hundred thousand to up-
ward of one million, and are themselves sub-di-
vided into dispatched organs called street 
offices (jiedao ban). Urban districts are highly 
heterogeneous in character: in large Chinese 
cities, older core urban districts tend to be 
smaller and more densely populated than erst-
while suburban areas that have subsequently 
turned into districts. Additionally, both urban 
and suburban districts often differ strikingly 
from districts formed through cities’ annexation 
of outlying counties or county-level cities, units 
that are often much larger in land area and large-
ly rural in character (Lam and Lo 2010). Urban 
districts are often overlaid by special functional 
areas, including development zones of different 
types, ranks, and sizes, further complicating the 
territorial structure of urban governance.
With multiple local government units and lev-
els of administration and dramatic variation in 
local conditions found within a typical Chinese 
municipality, it is natural for different political 
and economic interests to collide. Frictions of-
ten emerge at the boundaries between different 
urban sub-units, and significant tensions can 
accumulate within cities over time. Although the 
lively territorial politics at play within China’s cit-
ies often stay unreported and out of public sight, 
political fault lines erupt into view at times of 
change—particularly during moments when the 
structure of urban government itself is altered. 
For contemporary New Yorkers, it would be al-
most unthinkable for the Bronx and Staten Island 
to suddenly cease to exist as separate boroughs 
and instead be absorbed into Manhattan and 
Brooklyn. But sweeping changes of this sort oc-
cur frequently in large Chinese cities, and more 
generally as well, large-scale “reterritorializa-
tion” is a regular feature of China’s subnational 
governance system (Cartier 2015). For China’s 
major cities, in particular, the past decade-plus 
has seen a major wave of changes to urban ad-
ministrative divisions, with far-reaching con-
sequences for the territorial make-up of cities 
and for authority relations, resource allocation, 
and state-society dynamics in the metropolis. 
In 2009 and the years following, many major 
cities, including Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, 
Nanjing, and Ningbo, altered their district struc-
tures. Like earlier municipal restructuring in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, ADR over the past 
decade has included various cases in which 
outlying counties and county-level cities have 
been converted into districts and incorporated 
into the city proper of Chinese metropolises. 
There has also been a growing number of cas-
es of urban district mergers and more complex 
rearrangements of urban territory (Yin and Luo 
2013). In some cases, such as in Nanjing (2013) 
and Ningbo (2016), multiple changes to a city’s 
territorial configuration have occurred at once.
Some scholars have viewed recent cases of 
ADR as a product of practical considerations 
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like ensuring sufficient space for new urban 
development and growth, improving public 
service delivery through larger jurisdiction size, 
and reducing administrative costs (Yin and Luo 
2013; Lin and Yang 2017). But ADR is also deeply 
political in the way it redraws territorial author-
ity relations and changes the distribution of 
resources across different parts of the metrop-
olis, and it must therefore be understood as an 
outgrowth of urban territorial politics. Along 
these lines, Cartier (2015) emphasizes the cen-
tral party-state’s ultimate control over ADR and 
its use as a tool of party-state power to achieve 
political and developmental objectives. Power 
asymmetries in the party-state hierarchy be-
come reinforced through reforms that expand 
the boundaries and resource bases of politically 
privileged territorial units. Lu and Tsai (2017), for 
example, note how provincial capitals are more 
successful than other cities in annexing wealthy 
counties.
Overall, however, the politics of ADR in urban 
China remains a rich and little studied topic. 
As I discuss below in my analysis of the case of 
Nanjing’s 2013 ADR, municipal restructuring 
brings together multiple aspects of urban terri-
torial politics and provides important clues into 
the conflicts playing out between different state 
actors, economic interests, and societal groups.
Nanjing’s 2013 big bang-style ADR 
Of the many instances of ADR across China 
over the past decade, the 2013 reorganization 
of Nanjing, the provincial capital of Jiangsu 
Province, was one of the most far-reaching. On 
February 20, 2013, with little prior public warn-
ing, authorities in Nanjing announced that 
the city had received approval from the State 
Council and Jiangsu to carry out a significant 
territorial restructuring. The city’s two remain-
ing rural counties, Gaochun County and Lishui 
County, would be converted into urban districts, 
bringing their territory under more direct mu-
nicipal oversight. In addition, two pairs of core 
urban districts would be consolidated to form 
larger, more populous units. Gulou District, a 
densely populated and dynamic central city 
area home to Jiangsu’s provincial government 
and party headquarters, would be merged with 
neighboring Xiaguan District to form a New 
Gulou District. And Qinhuai District, a com-
mercial and residential area with a rich history, 
would merge with adjacent Baixia District to 
form a New Qinhuai District. This ADR thus in-
volved 6 out of Nanjing’s 13 sub-units, areas ac-
counting for 29.7 percent of Nanjing’s land area, 
38.7 percent of its population, and 36.4 percent 
of its GDP. 
This sweeping change to Nanjing’s administra-
tive geography was intended by city authorities 
to enhance Nanjing’s economic competitive-
ness, spatial coordination, and government ef-
ficiency. First, authorities noted, the goal of 
economically integrating Lishui and Gaochun 
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Counties with the rest of the city had been 
hindered by the counties’ underdeveloped in-
frastructure and public services. Converting 
counties to urban districts would allow for 
upgraded infrastructure and public service 
standards and would simplify administrative re-
lations between the municipal government and 
erstwhile counties. Second, Nanjing authorities 
pointed to a lack of space for new development 
in “cramped” central-city districts like Gulou 
and Qinhuai. By consolidating core districts, 
economies of scale in urban development and 
improved planning coordination would result, 
while cost savings could be reaped (Zhang and 
Zhang 2013). 
During March and April 2013, Nanjing mobi-
lized municipal- and district-level leaders for 
a fast-paced implementation effort. The city 
established a leading small group and subor-
dinate working groups to oversee district re-
organization, issued a series of policy notices 
to guide the merger process, and launched a 
propaganda campaign and party discipline en-
forcement efforts to ensure smooth progress 
and to pre-empt backlash from affected district 
officials or residents. By early May 2013, new 
district leaders and departments were in place 
and open for business (Yong 2017, 196-197). Still, 
the work of district restructuring was far from 
over, as harmonization of institutions and pol-
icies in newly established or merged districts 
would be phased in over several years. Lishui 
and Gaochun, which as counties had enjoyed 
greater fiscal and administrative autonomy 
than urban districts, were reassured that they 
could retain most of these privileges for another 
five years (Ibid., 203). Meanwhile, the city prom-
ised a tailored approach to administration of 
the newly merged core districts. There would be 
no fundamental changes to district-level poli-
cies during 2013, while gradual harmonization 
of practices across formerly separate districts 
would begin in 2014 (Ma 2013).
Involving several of Nanjing’s sub-units, the 2013 
ADR significantly affected the contours of the 
city as a whole and the average characteristics 
of its districts, as shown in Table 1. By annexing 
two rural counties, Nanjing achieved —  statisti-
cally at least —  a major expansion in urban land 
area, urban area population, and urban area 
GDP. By eliminating two sub-units, Nanjing fur-
ther consolidated its administrative geography. 
With these changes, the average population, 
land area, and GDP of Nanjing’s urban districts 
increase substantially.
The four central-city districts saw more dramat-
ic changes. Merged districts differed from each 
other in terms of population, land, and econom-
ic indicators, and the resulting new districts also 
differed in important ways from their predeces-
sors. Table 2 compares indicators of the New 
Total of 
urban districts
Average of 
urban districts
Resident population 2012 (mn) 7.323 0.666
Resident population 2013 (mn) 8.188 0.744
Land area 2012 (sq km) 4,728 429.8
Land area 2013 (sq km) 6,587 598.8
GDP 2012 (bn CNY) 465.1 42.3
GDP 2013 (bn CNY) 617.0 56.1
Table 1: 
Nanjing’s district indicators 
before and after February 
2013 restructuring
Data source: Nanjing 
Yearbook and Nanjing 
Statistical Yearbook.
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Gulou District with those of the former Gulou 
District and former Xiaguan District. At the out-
set, Gulou was a more populous and densely 
populated district with a larger overall econo-
my and higher per-resident endowments of fis-
cal revenue and social resources than Xiaguan. 
Relative to the former Gulou, New Gulou had a 
substantially larger resident population of 1.29 
million (first among Nanjing’s sub-units) and 
GDP of 79.14 bn CNY (rising from fourth to sec-
ond ranked among Nanjing’s sub-units) and 
almost twice its original land area. Although its 
large size ensured it would have a high political 
profile, New Gulou had lower per-resident en-
dowments of fiscal revenue and social resourc-
es than its predecessor.
District restructuring and urban  
territorial politics
While Nanjing’s restructuring was justified by 
authorities in technical terms, this and other 
cases of ADR are intensely political in practice. 
As one media account acknowledged, a “change 
to administrative divisions is to some extent the 
reallocation of power and the readjustment of 
interests,” and authorities saw the potential for 
serious political difficulties (Zhang and Zhang 
2013). Indeed, on closer examination, Nanjing’s 
ADR highlights several aspects of urban territo-
rial politics that normally remain hidden behind 
a façade of technocratic urban governance.
First, and most basic, this reform in Nanjing, 
like cases of ADR elsewhere, calls attention to 
the frictions that can arise between neighbor-
ing urban districts and between districts and 
city-level authorities. China’s urban districts are 
often written off as mere “vassals” of the munic-
ipality, and sometimes not even regarded as a 
full-fledged level of local government (Lam and 
Lo 2010). But, as noted above, districts are large 
entities in their own right—comparable to major 
cities in other national settings. The fact that 
authorities go to great trouble to alter district 
boundaries makes clear that these boundaries 
matter significantly in the first place. Like city 
limits in other national settings, district bound-
aries are important for urban economic devel-
opment and social governance as well as for the 
provision of many public services, such as pri-
Gulou District
(2012)
Xiaguan District
(2012)
New Gulou District  
(2013)
Resident population (mn) 0.839 (2nd/11) 0.451 (8th/11) 1.291 (1st/11)
Land area (sq km) 24.65 (9th/11) 28.35  (8th/11) 54.18 (9th/11)
GDP (bn CNY) 44.56 (4th/11) 25.36 (8th/11) 79.14 (2nd/11)
Local fiscal revenue (bn yuan) 5.14 (3rd/11) 1.67  (10th/11) 7.51 (3rd/11)
Local fiscal revenue per resident  
(bn yuan)
5974 (6th/11) 3703 (10th/11) 5812 (10th/11)
Residents per sq km 34,049 (1st/11) 15,901 (4th/11) 23,850 (1/11)
Middle school teachers per 10000 
residents
27.1 (3/11) 19.4 (10/11) 24.5 (9/11)
Hospital beds per 10000 residents 116.64 (1/11) 32.59 (8/11) 103.12 (1/11)
Table 2: 
Indicators for Gulou District, 
Xiaguan District, and New 
Gulou DistrictData source: 
Nanjing Yearbook and 
Nanjing Statistical Yearbook.
Data source: Nanjing 
Yearbook and Nanjing 
Statistical Yearbook.
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mary and secondary education and basic urban 
welfare. And, though some urban districts are in-
deed tightly controlled by city-level authorities, 
other districts enjoy considerable autonomy in 
fiscal and administrative matters. Coordinating 
economic and spatial planning and public ser-
vice provision across district boundaries is of-
ten a challenge for city-level authorities, a fact 
underscored in recent interviews with munic-
ipal officials in Nanjing (Author’s interviews, 
2019). As Hsing (2010) notes, China’s municipal-
ities have achieved a measure of territorial con-
solidation over the past few decades and work 
hard to present a unified face to the outside 
world, they remain internally divided entities in 
which district governments and other territori-
al players (e.g., development zone authorities, 
major state-owned enterprise units, etc.) con-
tinue to exercise considerable sway, resulting 
in frequent turf battles over development and 
governance.
Second, Nanjing’s 2013 ADR highlights the dif-
fering priorities of city-level authorities and 
higher-level state actors when it comes to urban 
governance arrangements. Although ADR has 
been a recurring phenomenon across China’s 
major cities, it is by no means easy to accom-
plish. Changes to China’s county-level adminis-
trative divisions require State Council approval 
and must pass through the provincial level first. 
Gaining official authorization to conduct such 
reforms is a fraught, multi-year process. Even 
the 2013 Nanjing ADR, not a particularly con-
tentious one, involved years of advance discus-
sion and planning as well as a nearly year-long 
intergovernmental approval process. Following 
lengthy informal consultations with higher-lev-
el authorities, Nanjing’s government submit-
ted its proposal for restructuring to the Jiangsu 
Provincial Government on April 17, 2012. In late 
June, Jiangsu province gave its tentative sup-
port to the proposal and relayed it upward to the 
State Council. Final State Council approval for 
the proposal did not come until February 8, 2013, 
and formal provincial guidelines for the ADR 
were not issued until February 19, 2013. In the 
interim, Nanjing officials engaged in a lengthy 
negotiation with higher-level officials, during 
which the latter expressed concerns about 
Nanjing undertaking such a large restructuring 
in one-off fashion and suggested more piece-
meal changes instead (Yong 2017, 192-193). 
The difficulty of securing higher-level approv-
al for such changes speaks to the conflicting 
priorities of officials at different levels of the 
party-state hierarchy: While city authorities 
were intent on using administrative reforms 
to enhance the city’s economic strength and 
competitiveness, central authorities were more 
concerned with maintaining stability and or-
der in the city’s governance arrangements. In 
this case, the provincial level of government, 
which likely perceived benefits in the economic 
strengthening of its capital city, was supportive. 
However, in many other such cases provincial 
support is withheld, thwarting cities’ efforts 
to change their administrative geography. For 
Suzhou, another major city in Jiangsu that has 
historically been on strained terms with provin-
cial authorities, it took years to gain approval for 
a similar administrative restructuring in 2012. 
Even then, the city had to make significant con-
cessions to the province to get what it wanted 
(Cartier 2016; Jaros 2019, 216-218). 
Third, Nanjing’s ADR brings into sharper focus 
conflicts between municipal authorities and 
subordinate district and county leaders over re-
sources and territory. For the leaders of outlying 
rural counties, “upgrading” to district status is a 
decidedly mixed blessing. Although district sta-
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tus confers higher standards of public service 
provision and infrastructure, it can compromise 
the administrative and fiscal autonomy coun-
ties enjoy. In the case of Nanjing’s 2013 merger, 
the existence of such concerns and pushback 
on the part of county leaders from Gaochun 
and Lishui can be inferred from the assurance 
given that existing powers and special policies 
enjoyed by the counties would not be changed 
for five years and by the fact that incumbent 
county leaders were left in place through the 
transition. In Nanjing’s central city, by contrast, 
we see the greater ability of municipal authori-
ties to flex muscle over district authorities. The 
elimination of existing districts and reorgani-
zation of their staff and territory gave city-level 
leaders an opportunity to dislodge entrenched 
district-level actors and to redraw districts in a 
way compatible with municipal development 
and governance priorities. During the process 
of consolidating four central urban districts 
into two, existing district governments were 
disbanded, and new leadership lineups and 
staffs were chosen. Unsurprisingly, there were 
concerns about potential grievances and push-
back from affected personnel amid this major 
shake-up, and great care was taken to ensure 
a smooth reorganization. On the one hand, 
Nanjing carefully managed official discourse 
and public opinion around the district restruc-
turing and placed heavy emphasis on enforcing 
party discipline throughout the process (Zhang 
and Zhang 2013). On the other, the effectively 
city co-opted several leaders of the abolished 
districts. After the Gulou-Xiaguan merger, for 
example, the former directors of each district 
were appointed as party secretary and director 
of New Gulou district, respectively, while the 
former party secretaries were reassigned to 
city-level leadership positions. 
Fourth and finally, Nanjing’s ADR lays bare the 
conflicting interests of different groups of urban 
residents. Insofar as significant cross-district 
disparities exist in the social resources and pub-
lic services districts, restructuring of districts af-
fects how resources are shared and influences 
the relative privilege of different territorial con-
stituencies. During the Gulou-Xiaguan merger, a 
fiscally strong district with high-quality public 
services (Gulou) was paired with a district that 
lacked a comparably strong fiscal base and 
high-quality public services (Xiaguan). Many 
Xiaguan residents saw benefits in a merger that 
would help them access the superior amenities 
of Gulou. But some Gulou residents, including 
elderly residents receiving minimum-income 
guarantee (dibao) payments, feared their ben-
efits would be diluted by merging with a poorer 
district (Wang et al 2013). The Gulou-Xiaguan 
merger and others like it also have major con-
sequences for urban real estate prices, which 
affect different territorial constituencies and 
socioeconomic groups unevenly. Xiaguan’s av-
erage real estate prices were roughly 6,000 CNY 
cheaper per square meter than Gulou’s prior to 
the merger but were poised to appreciate quick-
ly after the announcement, given the upgrad-
ing of district brand as well as public amenities 
(Zhang 2013). While this would benefit home-
owners in Xiaguan and economic elites able to 
invest in Xiaguan real estate development, the 
district merger was less beneficial for Gulou 
owners, who saw some of their district’s privileg-
es reduced. 
Similar dynamics have been documented 
during district mergers in other cities. In the 
month following the April 2019 announcement 
of a merger between Shanghai’s Nanhui District 
and Pudong New Area, for example, real estate 
prices rose over 10 percent in the less-devel-
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oped Nanhui (Tian 2009). Whereas urban res-
idents in China have limited recourse to fight 
district mergers (indeed, they typically only 
learn of them once they are underway), merg-
ers redistribute resources across different res-
ident groups and between ordinary residents 
and those with the economic clout or political 
connections to financially speculate on news of 
such changes.
Conclusion
During moments when the administrative 
structures of large cities are in flux, observers 
get a glimpse into the multifaceted territorial 
politics of urban China. As discussed above, the 
case of Nanjing’s 2013 ADR shows the politically 
charged nature of municipal restructuring and 
highlights different dimensions of territorial in-
terest conflict and intergovernmental bargain-
ing. Given the frequency with which Chinese 
metropolises undergo such reorganizations and 
the variety of approaches taken, there is ample 
scope for research to clarify the political-eco-
nomic drivers and consequences of ADR. Such 
work promises new insights into the evolving ur-
ban government system and patterns of urban 
politics in China, and will also offer an instruc-
tive counterpoint to studies of metropolitan 
governance restructuring in Western settings.  
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THE CASE FOR STUDYING URBAN ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLITICS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 
by Veronica Herrera
The Urban Turn in Comparative Politics 
Comparative politics scholars are increasingly 
turning their attention to subnational and urban 
politics in developing countries. There are many 
reasons to study city politics in the Global South. 
Over half of the global population lives in cities, 
and this figure is projected to rise to over 65% by 
2050, with 90% of this increase taking place in 
Asia and Africa, as Latin America is already over 
80% urbanized (UN DESA 2018).  Urban popu-
lation growth and decentralization trends have 
created more policy arenas for which local gov-
ernments are responsible, and thus more spac-
es for citizen demand-making on government 
and ensuing political contestation. Political 
science scholarship focused on cities in devel-
oping countries has broken new ground on, for 
example, political order and urban violence, 
clientelism, and public services provision (see 
Post 2018), but has neglected a critical urban 
policy arena that is increasingly politically con-
tested: the environment. 
Despite growing attention to global environ-
mental governance (Hale 2020), comparative 
politics scholars have been slower to examine 
this fertile area of research, and this neglect has 
been even more pronounced at the city level. 
Yet climate change mitigation planning is inti-
mately linked to city leadership and multi-lev-
el governance (Bulkeley and Betsill 2013), and 
pollution is responsible for one quarter of glob-
al deaths, most of which occur in low-income 
countries (WHO 2016), which are increasingly 
urban. Indeed, environmental problems perme-
ate the lives of many residents in Global South 
cities (Hardoy et al. 2001), and comparative pol-
itics has not done enough to study this growing 
reality. Environmental issues are a key policy 
arena that drive politics at the subnational level 
and require study. For this to happen, however, 
we must overcome outdated assumptions that 
environmental politics is not politically salient 
or that it is too difficult to study in weak institu-
tional environments like those that character-
ize much of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. 
There are many lenses through which to study 
the environment in the Global South, but exist-
ing research suggests that any environmental 
law, standard, or institution with real authority is 
such because of sustained pressured from col-
lective citizen action. While social mobilization 
has played a big role in environmental policy-
making worldwide, the role of organized citizen 
pressure in environmental institution building 
has been particularly pronounced in the weak 
institutional setting of the Global South. Thus, 
comparativists can draw important lessons 
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about the relationship between social account-
ability and institution building by examining 
political conflicts over environmental issues in 
these spaces.
Environmental Concern in the Global 
South and its Politics 
Perhaps because of Inglehart’s famous post-ma-
terialist thesis (1990; 1995) much of the scholar-
ship on local environmental issues in developing 
countries has developed outside of political sci-
ence. Inglehart argued that only countries that 
enjoy economic security will undergo a “value 
change” towards environmentalism, making 
environmental concern a “post-material” issue 
developed only in advanced industrial 
economies. Inglehart assumed that en-
vironmental concern would be visible 
only through formal institutions such 
as political parties, leading political sci-
entists to associate a lack of ecological 
parties with low environmental concern 
and perhaps conclude that the environment 
was not politically salient and thus irrelevant for 
study in developing countries. 
Other scholars outside of political science reject 
the post-materialist thesis, and have probed 
the varied manifestations of environmental 
concern around the world. Some have found 
that environmental concern is even higher in 
low-income nations (Dunlap and Mertig 1997) 
and that we should expect to see mobilization 
around slow harms that are framed as “claims of 
vulnerability” such as when a community’s eco-
nomic livelihood is at stake (e.g. Martinez-Alier 
2002; 1991). In contrast, ethnographic research 
has documented the propensity for low-income 
communities to be faced with resignation and 
“environmental suffering” and thus fail to mobi-
lize (Auyero and Swistun 2009; Lora-Wainwright 
2017). Recently, comparative politics literature 
has turned its attention to the rise in socio-en-
vironmental conflicts in some non-urban set-
tings, such as political conflicts over extractives 
(Jaskoski 2014; Amengual 2018; Falleti and 
Riofrancos 2018; Arce 2014; Eisenstadt and 
Jones West 2017), forest protection (Kashwan 
2017; Milmanda and Garay 2019; Andersson 
2013) and conservation policy (Steinberg 2001). 
Thus, although political scientists have begun to 
revisit the uptick of environmental concern in 
developing countries, the focus has not been on 
how these dynamics shape city politics.
Yet this reality is ripe for change. Comparative 
politics scholars interested in cities and devel-
opment can look to the environmental policy 
arena as a fertile area of study. Urban govern-
ments typically have authority over key policy 
arenas within which environmental goods are 
provided, regulated or consumed (although this 
authority may be shared between multiple tiers 
of government). These responsibilities might 
include regulating building codes; regulating 
industrial pollution; allocating land use permits; 
regulating environmental impacts from water 
and sanitation provision, landfills, incineration, 
and transportation; managing forests, parks, 
and waterfronts; and responding to environ-
mental disasters such as flooding, landslides, 
and wildfires. 
Environmental policy arenas in cities allow po-
litical scientists to study themes central to the 
discipline in new empirical terrain. First, envi-
ronmental institution-building is tightly linked 
to social mobilization, and students of civic 
participation and collective action will be able 
to fruitfully link these bodies of research with 
conflicts over local policymaking in response to 
Environmental policy 
arenas in cities allow 
political scientists to 
study themes central to 
the discipline.
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climate change. Second, regulatory politics, in-
cluding issues of state capacity and firm-state 
relations, is also an arena that plays out in urban 
environmental policymaking and can be further 
probed in both democratic and nondemocratic 
settings. Third, similar to the study of clientelism, 
political scientists are well poised to study the 
relationship between electoral cycles and envi-
ronmental goods provision and regulation. This 
is an area of great interest to the interdisciplin-
ary study of climate change. Finally, many local 
governments enjoy autonomous authority over 
public services provision, which have important 
environmental causes and consequences that 
merit further study. 
The Role of Citizen Mobilization: New, 
Existing and Future Research
In my research on environmental policymaking 
in Latin American cities, I have found that citi-
zen collective action has been critical for build-
ing state capacity for enforcing environmental 
regulations. By focusing on slow moving harms, 
such as water and land pollution, my research 
highlights environmental problems that be-
come part of the everyday landscape in many 
urban communities and thus become stymied 
by citizen and political inaction. For instance, 
my research with Lindsay Mayka focused on 
the role of litigation for social accountability in 
Bogotá, Colombia, which put urban river remedi-
ation on the policymaking agenda (Herrera and 
Mayka 2019). In another work, I argue that the 
historical legacies of pre-existing social move-
ments—such as the human rights movements 
in South America—can create an infrastructure 
of institutions, NGOs and frames—that can is-
sue-link with environmental issues, providing 
policy entrepreneurs a pathway towards slow 
harms remediation, as was the case in Buenos 
Aires, Argentina (Herrera 2020).
My research builds on earlier work on social mo-
bilization around environmental issues.  For ex-
ample, in Brazil civil society groups have always 
had environmental expertise and created pres-
sure on the state, moving between state agen-
cies and NGOs (Hochstetler and Keck 2007). 
This is seen clearly in the alliance building be-
tween popular movements and technocrats to 
clean up “Death Valley” or Cubatão, Brazil which 
was once one of the most contaminated places 
in the world (De Mello Lemos 1998; Hochstetler 
and Keck 2007). More recently, scholarship on 
social mobilization around the environment 
has focused on litigation as a demand making 
strategy, for example in China (Stern 2013; Van 
Rooij 2010), Argentina (Botero 2018) and Brazil 
(McAllister 2008). 
Political scientists interested in social mobi-
lization have a rich tapestry of empirical de-
velopments to choose from when studying 
environmental movements in the Global South. 
Combining findings from environmental justice 
literature (Bullard 2000; Hofrichter 2002) with 
other political and social movements litera-
ture, comparative politics scholars can further 
interrogate the collective action underpin-
nings of mobilization surrounding environment. 
Framing, alliances, the role of NGOs, material 
resources, and prior organizational strategies 
are some factors that can be explored for move-
ment formation in new waves of environmental 
contestation in Global South cities. Some of this 
existing work that focuses on the utility of envi-
ronmental justice framing in the Global South 
context (Urkidi and Walter 2011; Carruthers 
and Rodriguez 2009; Diez and Rodríguez 2008) 
could be combined with questions central to 
comparative politics. For example, research 
could focus on how movements impact policy 
change, whether they depend on political par-
ties or mayoral leadership, or how they navigate 
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multi-tiered governance agendas in climate 
change mitigation planning spaces. Another 
area of research is the relationship between 
national or urban regime change and environ-
mentalism. Future research could build on 
how, for example, environmental movements 
expand after shifts from authoritarian rule, as 
was the case of Brazil (De Mello Lemos 1998) 
and Argentina (Herrera 2020), or how local en-
vironmental protests might contribute to na-
tional democratization movements as research 
on Taiwan and South Korea illustrate (Haddad 
2015).
Future Research: Regulatory Politics, 
Electoral Cycles, and Public Services 
Provision
Regulatory politics at the urban level have been 
underdeveloped, despite the political influence 
of urban growth machines in Global South cities 
(Molotch 1976). Urban growth machines, wheth-
er real estate development or industrial plants, 
create structural challenges for environmental 
protections. Recent work by Kent Eaton reveals 
the tensions between politically connected 
land interests in Bogotá, Colombia, and efforts 
to regulate them in order to protect peri-urban 
natural reserves (K. Eaton 2020, 7–9). Social-
political conflicts between real estate devel-
opers and urban environmental protections in 
the Global South is a fruitful venue for future re-
search, particularly as these conflicts increase 
and become co-opted by partisan interests. 
Research suggests that social mobilization can 
sometimes provide a countervailing pressure to 
urban growth machines. 
For example, research on agro-industrial plant 
pollution in Santa Fe, Argentina shows that reg-
ulatory enforcement “was made possible by a 
mobilized community group that put pressure 
on the plant and developed linkages with reg-
ulators” (Amengual 2016, 164). Indeed, regula-
tion as a coalition-building project in the Global 
South, requiring the support of both engaged 
citizens and non-state actors, deserves more 
scholarly attention, in particular for identifying 
the conditions under which such strategies are 
successful. How these dynamics play out in au-
thoritarian settings, where social mobilization 
is likely to be more muted, also merits further 
study. New work could build on existing research 
focused on the explanatory role of centralized 
or decentralized institutional configurations 
for environmental compliance in China (Van 
Rooij et al. 2017; Kostka and Nahm 2017), and 
the role of citizen-led litigation (Stern 2013; Van 
Rooij 2010), and connect these types of insti-
tutional and citizen variables to urban political 
leadership.
A promising new area of research involves po-
litical cycles and environmental outcomes, 
focused largely on China. Local leaders experi-
ence high turnover as they are promoted in line 
with central directives, reflecting short time 
horizons that are at odds with implanting envi-
ronmental policies in line with China’s top down 
model of environmental authoritarianism (S. 
Eaton and Kostka 2014). Indeed, scholars have 
documented a “political business cycle” where 
local leaders selectively enforce environmental 
regulations to reduce local industries produc-
tion costs or attract new firms, generating pol-
lution increases leading up to leader turnover 
(Cao, Kostka, and Xu 2019). More work on these 
dynamics in China will reveal how political cy-
cles shape environmental goods provision in 
authoritarian settings. Extending this research 
to electoral cycles in democratic settings 
would be an excellent area for future research. 
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Scholars should continue to build on the logic 
of prior clientelism studies and find innovative 
ways to measure the relationship between elec-
toral cycles and local environmental goods pro-
vision and regulation. This allows researchers to 
harness concepts and tools developed within 
political science to contribute to the interdis-
ciplinary field of climate change politics, while 
also using environmental issues to address ev-
ergreen themes within political science.  
Finally, comparative politics scholars could 
pay more attention to the environmental con-
sequences of different types of public services 
provision arrangements in cities in the Global 
South. While the research on the politics of ur-
ban public services provision has increased (e.g. 
Herrera 2017; Post, Bronsoler, and Salman 2017; 
Auerbach 2016), few researchers focus on their 
environmental dimensions. Public services 
such as water and sanitation depend on water 
pollution mitigation strategies and regulation 
of over-extraction that could be more system-
atically incorporated into political analysis of 
these types of services (e.g. Keck 2002). Cities’ 
political authority also includes waste manage-
ment, where landfills generate methane gas, 
and thus more could be done to study the pol-
itics of waste governance and climate change 
mitigation planning, the same goes for transpor-
tation, city governance, and CO2 emissions. As 
cities adopt climate change mitigation planning 
and local battles ensue about which subsectors 
will be targeted for greenhouse emissions re-
duction campaigns, important political battles 
will ensue. Distributional conflicts are likely to 
arise, for example, over urban greening projects 
that help in the fight against climate change but 
also disadvantage low-income communities 
(Wolch, Byrne, and Newell 2014), suggesting 
that conflicts over equity and representation 
will characterize environmental goods provi-
sion, not so dissimilar from dynamics political 
scientists have identified in the social welfare 
literature.  
In sum, political scientists are well positioned to 
use concepts and methods developed to study 
topics as far ranging as civic participation, in-
stitutional design, coalition building, electoral 
cycles, regulatory politics, and social welfare 
equity, when contributing to an urgently needed 
literature on environmental politics in the plac-
es where most of the world lives.  
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CITIES, CRIMINAL GOVERNANCE AND  
SUBNATIONAL RESEARCH IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS
by Eduardo Moncada 
Scholars increasingly use a subnational ap-
proach to study longstanding areas of inquiry 
in comparative politics.1  Subnational research 
refers to an analytic focus on “actors, organi-
zations, institutions, structures, and process-
es located in territorial units inside countries, 
that is, below the national and international 
levels” (Giraudy et al. 2019, 7). Cities are fertile 
terrain in this subnational turn. Over half of the 
developing world’s population currently resides 
in cities, and the majority of future popula-
tion growth will take place in the urban Global 
South (Montgomery 2008). Decentralization 
has imbued cities with political power, finan-
cial resources and administrative responsibil-
ities, while global cities now fulfill some of the 
functions in the international arena normally 
reserved for nation-states (Nijmann 2016). 
Issues long at the center of the comparative 
sub-field exhibit rich variation both across and 
within cities, including linkages between voters 
and politicians (Auerbach and Thachil 2018; 
Oliveros 2016; Paller 2019), the political econo-
my of social welfare (Eaton 2020; Herrera 2017; 
Holland 2016; Post et al. 2018), the regulation 
1. The number of studies that use a subnational approach published in top-ranked political science journals and academic presses 
has increased over the last two decades (Sellers 2019).
2. See Post (2018) for an overview of comparative urban politics research.
3. Moncada, Eduardo. Resisting Extortion: Victims, Criminals and Police in Latin America (under contract, Cambridge University 
Press).
of land markets (Rithmire 2015), the politics of 
preservation (Zhang 2013), redevelopment and 
gentrification (Pasotti 2020; Donaghy 2018), 
the fortunes of political regimes (Wallace 2014), 
and experiments in participatory democracy 
(Goldfrank 2007; Wampler 2010).2  
The vibrancy and density of developing world 
cities, however, also makes them epicenters of 
criminal violence (Davis 2012; Moncada 2013). 
Across the developing world, diverse criminal 
actors govern everyday life in the territories 
they control. Emerging research identifies ar-
rangements between criminals and state actors 
– including police, bureaucrats, and elected offi-
cials – that impact modalities of violence as well 
as electoral campaigns, civic life, and economic 
markets (Albarracín 2018; Arias 2017; Durán-
Martínez 2018; Magaloni et al. 2020; Wolff 2015). 
My current research builds on this work by bring-
ing victims of criminal violence into the analysis 
and studying how victims of similar forms of 
criminal extortion resist victimization in strik-
ingly different ways throughout Latin America.3 
While much research on crime in the region 
focuses on illicit drug markets, most people 
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experience organized crime, not through spec-
tacular acts of drug violence, but through every-
day victimization under criminal extortion. In 
2017, over half a million Mexican firms 
reported being the targets of extortion 
– a figure that is most likely an underes-
timate given the challenge of underre-
porting.4 Furthermore, a recent study 
provocatively concluded that criminal 
extortion was so widespread in Central 
America that it had become “embedded in the 
[region’s] culture” (GIATOC 2019, 3).
Classic studies of extortion focus on the ex-
traction of money in return for protection (Blok 
1974; Gambetta 1996; Varese 2001; Volkov 
2002). Studying the economics of extortion 
is undoubtedly important. But my current re-
search reveals that extortion entails more than 
the forced extraction of money. Extortion is the 
foundation for criminal governance in Latin 
America. First, criminal actors use extortion to 
make local populations legible and thus opti-
mize informal taxation. Everyday interactions 
with victims enable criminals to gain knowl-
edge that is otherwise not easily observable, 
such as whether a person has family members 
sending remittances back from abroad or the 
profitability of an informal business. Second, 
these interactions also generate information 
on who among victims might be inclined to de-
nounce criminals to their rivals or to the state. 
As in wartime settings (Kalyvas 2006), this in-
formation is key for the ability of armed groups 
to sustain territorial control. Third, the subor-
4. Reforma. “Extorsiones en México, Régimen Feudal.” December 19, 2018. Available at: https://www.reforma.com/aplicacionesli-
bre/articulo/default.aspx?id=1567664&md5=ecebf6c8bde97e2bcdb7e3a08fd2fb57&ta=0dfdbac11765226904c16cb9ad1b2e-
fe. Accessed on March 1, 2019.
5. On obedience as a civilian behavior in wartime settings, see Arjona (2017) and Wood (2003).
6. On protection rackets as central to both state building and organized crime, see Tilly (1985).
dination of victims obtained under sustained 
extortion reduces the potential threat to other 
criminal activities in the territory, such as drug 
trafficking, the sale of black-market weapons, or 
the commercial sexual exploitation of minors.5 
Finally, regularly physically traversing territory 
during extortion also enables criminals to mon-
itor for incursions by potential rivals or state 
actors. These insights advance our growing 
understanding of criminal groups as dynamic 
and complex actors that, while not necessarily 
the precursors to states, do exhibit a range of 
state-like behaviors.6 Attention to extortion as 
the foundation of criminal governance also in-
vites us to complicate how we study victims and, 
more broadly, relations between criminals and 
victims.
In my current research, I use data collected in lo-
calities where the state is unwilling or unable to 
enforce the rule of law in Colombia, El Salvador 
and Mexico to analyze why victims of similar 
forms of extortion pursue different strategies 
of resistance. By resistance, I mean publicly 
observable strategies outside of the rule of law 
that victims direct at criminals to end or nego-
tiate victimization. These strategies vary in their 
level and form of collective action, as well as 
state involvement, and range from one-on-one 
negotiations with criminal actors in Medellin, 
Colombia, episodic coordination with individu-
al police to selectively assassinate criminals in 
parts of El Salvador, and forms of collective vigi-
lantism against criminals in Michoacán, Mexico. 
Analyzing these outcomes builds on growing re-
Extortion is the 
foundation for criminal 
governance in Latin 
America.
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search on the politics of extra-legal responses 
to crime in the developing world (Bateson 2013; 
Jung and Cohen 2020; Moncada 2017; Smith 
2019). To explain this variation, I build a theory 
showing how criminals’ time horizons, the na-
ture of the pre-existing institutions available 
to victims, and whether police are captured by 
criminal actors combine to shape the strategies 
of resistance that victims pursue.
This essay draws on evidence from my fieldwork 
in Medellin to show how analyzing criminal ex-
tortion in urban settings can generate insights 
into three aspects of criminal governance with-
in cities: the segmentation of urban space along 
invisible borders, the strategies that criminal 
actors use to sustain criminal governance, and 
the ways that victims resist. This case consists 
of  several hundred vendors in a large informal 
market who were extorted by a criminal gang 
that was part of a larger drug trafficking orga-
nization. The police that patrolled the informal 
market were captured by the gang, who paid the 
police to turn a blind eye to their illicit opera-
tions. Over the course of five months between 
2015 and 2019, I carried out semi-structured 
interviews, focus groups and other methodol-
ogies to map the dynamics of extortion in this 
locality and the vendors’ strategy of resistance. 
Invisible Borders and the Segmentation 
of Urban Space 
Criminal governance within a city can be seg-
mented when multiple and competing criminal 
actors enforce invisible borders behind which 
they govern aspects of everyday life (Moncada 
2016, 24).7 The resulting segmentation has 
7. See Kalyvas (2006) and Staniland (2012) on how control over territory influences civil war dynamics.
8. Frye (2002, 574) makes a similar point in a study of private protection organizations (PPOs) in Russia and Poland.
9. Magaloni et al. (2019) identify similar patterns in studying extortion by drug trafficking organizations in Mexico.
implications for urban politics. More criminal 
competition is associated with greater levels of 
lethal violence (Friman 2009). Disorder, in turn, 
makes it politically perilous for local incum-
bents to move beyond hardline politics because 
of voter demand for order in the short-term and 
the potential for political opponents to paint in-
cumbents as soft on crime (Moncada 2016, 24). 
While researching the politics of criminal ex-
tortion, I found that threats to equilibriums in 
segmented territorial control reconfigure crim-
inals’ time horizons and, in turn, how they car-
ry out extortion and how victims experience it. 
We can see this by comparing the dynamics of 
extortion before and after increased criminal 
competition in Medellin. Initially the informal 
vendors that I studied welcomed protection by 
the criminal gang because of the high levels of 
crime and violence in the city center. Here, gang 
members treated vendors with respect and 
vendors paid them for a valuable service where 
the state failed to do so.8
However, in 2013 a fragile city-wide informal pact 
between rival criminal organizations in Medellin 
broke down and catalyzed violent micro-level 
turf wars. Extortion became predatory as the 
time horizons of criminal actors shortened: the 
amount of money demanded from the vendors 
increased, payment was made obligatory under 
punishment of violence, and the promise of pro-
tection became an empty one.9 As I detail in the 
next section, gang members began purposefully 
using disrespectful language and other forms of 
public humiliation as part of extortion while fail-
ing to provide protection. 
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Increased criminal competition thus upended 
the equilibrium of segmented territorial con-
trol and prompted change in how the criminal 
gang ruled and how victims experienced extor-
tion. This is akin to a shift from Olson’s (1993) 
stationary to a roving bandit and, more broadly, 
invites us to complicate the notions that rela-
tions between criminals and victims are either 
static or always predatory. The evidence I col-
lected from Medellin indicates that micro-level 
relations between criminals and victims are 
dynamic and sensitive to shifts in broader mac-
ro-level contexts.  This shows that the invisible 
borders imposed by criminal actors within cities 
is a fertile unit of analysis with which to generate 
insights into a foundational aspect of criminal 
governance. 
Strategies of Criminal Governance
Coercive capacity is necessary but insufficient 
to tax populations (Levi 1989, 13). I find that, 
much like political rulers, criminal actors also 
use social and political strategies of domination 
to sustain material extraction. Thus a focus on 
the material dimensions of criminal victimiza-
tion, while necessary, is insufficient to under-
stand the full scope of how criminals govern.
Through interviews and focus groups I conclud-
ed that the criminal gang used practices of social 
domination to keep vendors from challenging 
its informal authority. This included regularly 
verbally humiliating vendors by insulting their 
lack of hygiene and old clothes, or simply vocal-
izing widely held notions of informal vendors as 
“disposable” social groups that sit outside main-
10.  Focus group participant (MDE_FG2_720), July 2016.
11.  Interview, informal vendor (IV_MDE_1010), July 2016.
stream society. As one vendor noted during a 
focus group: “[The criminal actors] just say what 
everyone in society already thinks about us.” 10 
Aligning with James Scott’s (1990, 188) concept 
of “symbolic taxes,” these and other practices 
of social domination fostered a loss of self-re-
spect among vendors that constrained the will-
ingness to contest criminal rule.
I also found that criminal actors invest substan-
tial amounts of time in political domination to 
encourage victims to “accept their role in the 
existing order of things” (Steven 1974, 11). Gang 
members regularly told victims that the state 
had abandoned them and that key state ac-
tors, such as the local police, were more likely to 
work for them than for the vendors. Sometimes 
these strategies substituted for the costly use 
of coercion. One vendor recalled what a gang 
member told him after he hesitated to pay the 
informal tax: “He smiled at me because they are 
all descarados [shameless]. And he said to me, 
‘Of course, you could call the police, but even if 
they show up, it’s more likely that they work for 
us than that they’ll work for you.’”11 
Conceptualizing criminal victimization as 
asymmetric but contentious power relations 
reveals processes that get overlooked when 
we conceive of crime, particularly violent crime, 
solely as a one-time physical offense (Moncada 
2019). At the same time, unpacking extortion in 
a micro-level urban space unearths productive 
analytical links between criminal governance 
and broader realms of research on relations be-
tween subordinate and dominant actors.  
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Resistance and the Politics of Criminal 
Victimization
The ways in which populations respond to crim-
inal rule vary across space and time. Unpacking 
this micro-level variation can add to our under-
standing of the politics of criminal victimization 
within, but also beyond, cities. Existing research 
on fear of criminal victimization shows that peo-
ple self-segregate in privately guarded housing 
developments (Caldeira 2000), while others 
mobilize to stop criminal groups from taking 
over their territories (Mattiace et al. 2019). I 
complement these analyses by theorizing how 
populations already under criminal rule resist it. 
The vendors in Medellin engaged in “everyday 
resistance” (Scott 1989). This entailed using 
subtle individual-level practices to negotiate 
extortion in ways that bypassed traditional rule 
of law institutions. To resist material taxation, 
vendors appealed to the very asymmetry in 
power between themselves and their victim-
izers. This echoes Scott’s (1990, 18) point that 
the “safest and most public form of political 
discourse is that which takes as its basis the 
flattering self-image of elites.” For example, ven-
dors would sometimes tell gang members that 
because they were the authorities in the market 
they should show benevolence by being lenient 
in their taxation. Reductions in material taxa-
tion were not always granted and, when allowed, 
were marginal: criminals sometimes told ven-
dors they could skip a week’s payment or pay 
only half the normal tax. Everyday resistance 
can mitigate but not end criminal victimization.
12. Interview, informal vendor (IV_MDE_899), July 2016.
13. Focus group participants (MDE_FG8_1112), (MDE_FG7_101) and (MDE_FG7_1212), March 2017.
14. Interview, informal vendor (IV_MDE_911), July 2016.
Vendors also used rhetorical practices to resist 
social domination by quietly but firmly urging 
gang members to stop insulting them because 
society viewed both of them as deviants.12 And 
vendors contested political domination by pub-
licly talking about their state-sanctioned rights 
to work and live dignified lives exactly when the 
criminals arrived to collect the tax.13 Vendors 
did not affirm their relationship to specific state 
institutions, but instead to the abstract notion 
of constitutionally-sanctioned rights.14 This ex-
emplifies how the “myth of rights” (Scheingold 
1974) can provide a catalyst for resistance to 
victimization. Vendors strategically chose to 
verbalize these rhetorical tools to remind the 
criminals that they were not the only authority 
in the vendors’ lives.  
Taken together, these dynamics belie the con-
ventional notion of criminal victimization as a 
one-sided affair where criminals impose their 
will on helpless victims. In my broader research, 
I identify and study further empirical variation 
in the strategies and practices that victims use 
to resist criminal extortion across diverse spac-
es. Comparing criminal-victim dyads within and 
across cities can be a fruitful strategy to unearth 
contentious politics that may otherwise go un-
noticed by a macro-level focus on the city as the 
unit of analysis. Centering on the criminal-vic-
tim dyad also enables us to compare features 
and change in criminal victimization across 
distinct territorial contexts, including the tra-
ditional rural-urban divide. This is particularly 
important given the understudied prevalence 
of different forms of crime, including criminal 
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extortion, across rural settings in Latin America 
and other parts of the developing world.
Conclusion
Subnational research in comparative politics 
builds on and extends the insights, concepts 
and theories developed through traditional 
cross-national comparisons. Cities offer gener-
ative spaces for studying diverse political issues 
within this subnational turn. Critical among 
these issues is the politics of crime.  This essay 
used a case of resistance to criminal extortion 
in a major developing world city to generate 
insights into the segmentation of urban space 
through the imposition of invisible borders by 
criminal actors, the dynamics of criminal gover-
nance, and the surprisingly contentious nature 
of criminal victimization.  
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THE CONTENTIOUS POLITICS OF URBANIZATION:
Insights from Africa 
by Jeffrey W. Paller 
On January 21, 2020, residents of Tarkwa Bay in 
Lagos, Nigeria awoke to gunfire. The Nigerian 
Navy forcefully removed nearly 4,500 residents 
from their homes in the informal settlement 
along the waterfront, following an “order from 
above.” The NGO Justice & Empowerment 
Initiatives estimate that more than 2.3 million 
Nigerians have been forcefully evicted from 
their homes in the past twenty years (Kazeem 
2020). But residents are not passive bystanders: 
they protest the evictions, demand account-
ability from their political representatives, bar-
gain with traditional authorities and landowners, 
and take governments to court. These political 
dynamics in African cities disrupt the 
national political landscape by instigat-
ing legal and policy reforms, pressuring 
government representatives to action, 
and emboldening opposition parties 
and other non-state actors.
This contentious political process is 
happening across Africa as rising ur-
banization places population pressure on cities 
and raises property values. The forms of conten-
tious politics differ across distinct historical and 
institutional contexts, challenging dominant 
social science paradigms that treat urbaniza-
tion as a linear process associated with eco-
nomic modernization and bureaucratization. In 
this essay, I outline a framework to understand 
urbanization that sets relevant political factors 
in motion, treating cities and urban neighbor-
hoods as receptacles of social interaction and 
“active sites of creation and change” (McAdam 
et al. 2003, 22).
My research contributes to a growing literature 
that applies political economy analysis to urban 
politics in the Global South. Groundbreaking 
books uncover the importance of ethnic de-
mography and political participation in Ghana 
(Nathan 2019), the role of neighborhood orga-
nizations in demanding development in India 
(Auerbach 2019), and the calculations of polit-
ical elites in Colombia and Peru (Holland 2017). 
These political economy approaches to urban 
development uncover the diversity of political 
forms both within and across cities in the Global 
South. My approach draws from these insights, 
but adds an overlooked dimension: the role of 
urban citizenship and claims to urban space. 
I suggest treating urbanization as a contentious 
political process where population growth leads 
to competing and often conflicting claims on a 
city. Drawing from Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, 
and Charles Tilly’s insights in Dynamics of 
Contention, contentious politics are “Episodic, 
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public, collective interaction among makers of 
claims and their objects when a) at least one 
government is a claimant, and object of claims, 
or a party to the claims and b) the claims would, 
if realized, affect the interests of at least one of 
the claimants” (2003, 5). A focus on processes, 
episodes, and mobilization better captures the 
dynamic political struggle that urban growth 
entails, as well as the particular trajectory of 
urban political development that emerges. This 
follows in the tradition of other comparative 
politics scholarship that considers social and 
political processes like religious fundamen-
talism and foreign policy decision-making as 
nonlinear (e.g. Tabaar 2019; Hintz 2018). This 
switches the focus from a static cross-sectional 
approach to politics that treat actors, institu-
tions, and interests as fixed and unchanging to 
one where resistance, bargaining, and partici-
pation can change the political landscape.
Africa provides a useful backdrop to uncover the 
set of interactive mechanisms that spur mobi-
lization and episodes of contention during the 
process of urbanization. Unlike urbanization 
elsewhere, Africa is urbanizing without large-
scale industrialization. Violent conflicts, faulty 
agricultural policies, failing state institutions, and 
centralized political development and econom-
ic investments spur African urbanization – not 
the pull of manufacturing jobs. It is also the last 
region to experience widespread urban growth. 
In 1970, only 18 percent of Africans lived in cities; 
this number increased to 40 percent by 2018. 
According to the United Nation’s population di-
vision, 472 million Africans are now estimated 
to live in cities, with the number increasing each 
day. The region’s 3.5 percent urbanization rate 
is the fastest in the world today with 21 of the 30 
fastest growing cities in Africa. 74 urban agglom-
erations have more than 1 million people.
Throughout Africa’s past, cities experienced 
skewed land allocation, invasions and squatting, 
immigrant and population expulsions, demoli-
tions, exclusive urban planning and the forma-
tion of parallel governance structures (Klopp 
and Paller 2019). Migration and the growth of 
non-native populations in cities can contribute 
to new social conflict, either in the formation of 
new identities or the politicization of ethnic and 
indigenous identities. As urbanization contin-
ues, there is new pressure on land acquisition, 
leading to multiple claimants of property, which 
contributes to winners and losers. But Africa’s 
urban history is also one of creativity, coopera-
tion, bargaining, deliberation, and debate.
The essay proceeds as follows. First, I outline 
the relevant mechanisms that characterize the 
contentious politics of urbanization. Second, I 
compare four cities in Africa – Accra (Ghana), 
Cape Town (South Africa), Nairobi (Kenya), and 
Lagos (Nigeria). Third, I illustrate the conten-
tious politics of urbanization in these four cases, 
using examples of forced evictions and demo-
litions to illustrate the argument. Finally, I con-
clude with the implications of this approach to 
the study of urbanization and urban politics.
Mechanisms of contentious 
urbanization
In Dynamics of Contention, McAdam et al. ad-
vance a theory of social movements based on 
collective political struggle and the dynamism 
of political action. By setting conventional theo-
ries of social movements in motion, the authors 
blur the lines between institutionalized and 
noninstitutionalized politics. They uncover im-
portant environmental, cognitive, and relational 
mechanisms that lead to transformations in so-
ciety. This societal transformation is spurred by 
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a political process made up of episodes of con-
tention, or “continuous streams of contention 
including collective claims making that bears 
on other parties’ interests” (McAdam et al. 2003, 
24).
Typically, urbanization is viewed as a static 
environmental mechanism that sets the polit-
ical process in motion (Lipset 1959; Inglehart 
1997). By contrast, I suggest that urbanization 
(defined as the shift from a rural to urban so-
ciety) – through the movement of people from 
rural to urban areas, the designation of rural 
areas to urban, or natural population increase 
in cities – is a contentious political process in-
volving new and competing claims to space 
and territory. While an environmental mecha-
nism that is exogenous to demographic change 
might trigger the process, contentious politics 
unfolds through mechanisms including new 
attributions of threat and opportunity, the so-
cial appropriation of existing organizations, 
framing and reframing of identities, innovative 
forms of collective action, and brokerage. For 
example, urbanization can create speculative 
investment opportunities for the business and 
political elite but also spur the reemergence of 
nativist claims to urban space by traditional au-
thorities and indigenous groups. Residents find 
innovative strategies to claim rights to the city 
by forming new alliances with NGOs and engag-
ing in relationships with political patrons. By ex-
amining urbanization as a contentious political 
process, we gain a more empirically accurate 
picture of what urbanization entails, and how it 
manifests across time and space.
Table 1: 
Mechanisms of 
contentious urbanization
Threats to political control
New attributions of threat and opportunity Threat of urban displacement
Opportunities for land speculation
Reemergence of ethnic associations
Social appropriation of existing organizations Reemergence of traditional authorities
Membership in human rights organizations
Framing and reframing of identities
Construction of insider-outsider; host-migrant;  
native-newcomer identities
New entitlements to urban citizenship
Innovative forms of collective action
Protests
Construction of slum dweller associations
Land occupations
Brokerage
Political clientelism
Diaspora connections
NGO capture
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Cases of African urbanization
Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa make 
good case comparisons because they vary along 
key dimensions that social scientists suggest 
should explain political outcomes: state capac-
ity, extent of democracy, and degree of urban-
ization. Ghana and South Africa are two of the 
most urbanized countries in Africa, 56 percent 
and 66 percent respectively. Nigeria became 
50 percent urban in 2018, with Kenya lagging far 
behind at 27 percent (these estimates are re-
ported by country, and not standardized across 
countries). Ghana and South Africa score high 
on democracy, rule of law and governance indi-
cators, with Kenya lagging behind. Nigeria falls 
toward the bottom on most indicators. Despite 
these varying degrees of state capacity and ex-
tent of democracy, all countries have notable 
episodes of contention that illustrate the ur-
banization process (see Table 2, below).
All four countries look to their major cities to 
drive the economy. Governments and planners 
desire to build “world class” cities, and aim to 
attract massive investment from foreign gov-
ernments or multinational companies to build 
sports stadiums, modern central business 
districts, gated communities, and entirely new 
satellite cities. To make way for these high-end 
developments, cities engage in what some 
scholars have called “urban cleaning,” where 
government forces including the police and mil-
itary destroy “illegal” slum settlements (Raleigh 
2015). Evictions and displacements have oc-
curred in Zimbabwe (2005, 2007), Angola 
(2007), Kenya (2008, 2009, 2010), Nigeria 
(2000, 2009), Sudan (2005), South Africa 
(2010), Ethiopia (2011, 2017), Uganda (2011), 
and many other countries.
Forced evictions are also inherently political. 
For example, demolitions in Kenya were used to 
curb popular dissent, as well as a way to punish 
Table 2: 
Summary of cases 
and documented episodes 
of contention
Ghana South Africa Kenya Nigeria
Degree urbanization 2018 56% urban 66% urban 27% urban 50% urban
Fragile States Index 2019 
 (100=Most fragile)
65.9 71.1 93.5 98.5
Government Effectiveness 2018 
(Worldwide Governance Indicators)
-.21 .34 -.41 -1.02
Rule of Law 2018 (Worldwide Gover-
nance Indicators)
.07 -.10 -.41 -.88
Accra Cape Town Nairobi Lagos
COHRE documented evictions 
(1995-2008)
5 3 12 18
AllAfrica episodes of contention 
2018-2020
5 52 59 13
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opponents and reward loyal followers (Klopp 
2008). Urban construction provides politicians 
numerous opportunities to engage in corrup-
tion and rent seeking. Traditional authorities, 
especially those who claim ownership or cus-
todianship of urban property, flex their mus-
cles and profit from skyrocketing land prices. 
Governments justify evictions and demolitions 
as a way to curb public health outbreaks, fight 
criminality, and prevent flooding. The urban 
poor are forced to rely on innovative forms of 
collective action to confront evictions, demoli-
tions, and removal.
I developed a media events database to iden-
tify “episodes of contention” in Accra, Nairobi, 
Lagos and Cape Town between 1995-2020. I 
defined episodes of contention as incidents of 
competing or conflicting claims to urban space 
that lead to the actual or threat of eviction, dem-
olition, or forced displacement. These episodes 
also include the response from neighborhood 
residents, politicians, and municipal authori-
ties. I drew from AllAfrica.com newspaper arti-
cles between 2018-2020 (a sub-section of the 
database) and the Center on Housing Rights 
and Evictions, a Geneva-based nongovern-
mental organization’s Forced Eviction surveys 
7-11 (1998-2008). While these sources did not 
document all episodes of contention that occur 
during this period, they offered a systematic ac-
counting of episodes.
Progressive housing policies: Ghana and 
South Africa
Ghana and South Africa are both urbanized 
societies with high levels of democratic en-
gagement and rule of law, which have contrib-
uted to progressive housing policies. But South 
Africa’s history of socio-economic disparities 
and protest contributes to far more episodes 
of contention today. South Africa is notable for 
its progressive constitution that includes the 
right to adequate housing and protects against 
unlawful eviction. The governing ANC claims 
to have built 3.2 million homes between 1994-
2018. While Ghana does not have positive rights 
in place for housing in its constitution, it has de-
vised a National Urban Plan, National Housing 
Policy, and National Spatial Development Plan, 
which include protections for the poor.
However, both countries struggle to overcome 
historical legacies of spatial inequalities due to 
colonial zoning policies and residential segrega-
tion. Cape Town has a long history of political and 
social exclusion dating back to the 17th century, 
which deepened during British and Afrikaans 
rule. Between the 1960s-1980s, the government 
used the Group Areas Act to remove blacks, co-
loureds, and Indians from the city. Accra grew 
from a small fishing village made up of the Ga 
ethnic group, to a heterogeneous city that is 
inhabited by people from dozens of different 
groups. Throughout colonial rule and indepen-
dence, the integration of migrants into the city 
contributed to new disputes between insiders 
and outsiders. The importance of international 
organizations like the World Bank and aid orga-
nizations in urban planning shifts incentives on 
the ground, and provide new sources of funding 
for infrastructure upgrading.
Despite progressive legal policy and democrat-
ic politics, housing and urban space is limited 
in both cities, contributing to competing claims 
over land and housing. In the early 2000s, the 
City of Cape Town evicted shack dwellers from 
their homes to make way for a large housing 
project, a World Cup stadium, and a private de-
velopment. In Ghana, the government ordered 
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30,000 people living in an informal settlement 
to vacate their land, evicted veterans from their 
homes, removed traders from a large market, 
and demolished structures to clear waterways.
In both cities, similar mechanisms are at work, 
including new attributions of threat and oppor-
tunity, social appropriation of existing organiza-
tions, framing and reframing of identities, and 
brokerage. For example, residents without land 
titles are framed as criminals and barriers to de-
velopment. Developers then take advantage of 
these tenure insecurities and seek new oppor-
tunities for real estate development and land 
speculation. In Ghana, indigenous Ga organiza-
tions socially appropriated the chieftaincy in-
stitution to claim ownership and governance of 
neighborhoods, and framed migrants as squat-
ters or “trespassers in the city.” In response, 
non-profit organizations emerged to protect 
the urban poor, serving as brokers between mu-
nicipal authorities and residents on the ground. 
Adding to the contention, major political parties 
like the ANC, New Patriotic Party, and National 
Democratic Congress politicized these rela-
tionships over time.
In the last two years, Accra has relatively few 
episodes of contention (5 in total). Various mu-
nicipal authorities have demolished structures 
along waterways to curb the annual flooding 
that affects the city. Political parties continue 
to serve as important brokers and contribute to 
the persistence of informal settlement growth, 
which I document in Democracy in Ghana: 
Everyday Politics in Urban Africa (Paller 2019).
In contrast, episodes of contention are en-
grained in the fabric of Cape Town everyday life. 
I identified 52 episodes of contention in the last 
two years in the townships and suburbs of Cape 
Town. Most are shack demolitions, subsequent 
rebuilds, service delivery protests, and gather-
ings at court when eviction notices are served. 
Residents frame their activity as “land occupa-
tions,” and have support from the social move-
ment organization Reclaim the City, as well as 
the news outlet GroundUp. In response, the City 
of Cape Town formed an Anti-Land Invasion Unit 
that in 2009 to stop people from illegally occu-
pying land and is the city’s biggest law enforce-
ment operation.
The framing of identities is important in this 
struggle: the residents use the term occupiers, 
while the city uses invaders. Landlords hire 
“red-ants” – private security agents – to demol-
ish shacks on private land. Most of these demo-
litions occur after court-ordered eviction letters 
are granted, though there are many disputes 
over the process. Organizations use innovative 
forms of collective action. For example, Reclaim 
the City partnered with the world-famous gue-
rilla activists The Yes Men and staged a “zombie 
rally” after sending out a press release spoof 
stating that the city agreed to all of their de-
mands (Wayland and Geffen 2019). Cape Town’s 
population growth is part and parcel of a con-
tentious political process that has its roots in a 
long history of racial segregation and exclusion.
Urban land regimes and authoritarian 
legacies: Kenya and Nigeria
Kenya and Nigeria have long histories of ex-
ploitation, marginalization, and segregation. 
These histories of authoritarianism shape vio-
lent government responses to urban growth and 
development today. Colonial authorities found-
ed Nairobi in 1899 as a railway depot. British 
authorities settled in the “leafy” areas, while the 
black laboring poor settled informally in low-ly-
ing environs nearby employment opportunities. 
Landlord-tenant agreements developed into 
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entrenched patron-client relationships be-
tween politicians and residents, as well as eth-
nically defined residential patterns.
Lagos Island was originally inhabited by sev-
eral villages of Yoruba people, who developed 
a growing trade network with other Africans, 
Portuguese, and freed slaves from Brazil. The 
legal system institutionalized the authority of 
indigenous landowners after independence, 
giving them considerable control over land. 
Kenya became a multi-party democracy in 2002, 
while Nigeria overcame its military government 
in 1999. The legacy of authoritarian rule in urban 
Nigeria and Kenya is still felt today. The number 
of COHRE-recorded episodes of contention 
between 1995-2010 is significantly higher than 
Ghana and South Africa, as both countries had 
weak legal protections. Lagos had 18 episodes, 
and Nairobi experienced 12. Dating back to 1996, 
Lagos State identified 11 slums for eviction, set-
ting the stage for contention for years to come. 
They evicted fisher folk from waterfront com-
munities, traders from markets, students from 
universities, and shack dwellers from at least 
eight informal settlements.
Informal settlements in both cities provide sig-
nificant opportunities for land speculation. In 
Nigeria, most informal settlements are water-
front communities, making them some of the 
most valuable property in the city. Residents 
in Kenyan neighborhoods also face the threat 
of urban displacement, giving politicians more 
power to serve as a powerful voice and protec-
tor of their livelihoods. For example, Nairobi City 
County Governor Mike Sonko declared after one 
demolition, “I will be the first to die before you 
are evicted. We don’t want that nonsense. God 
knows why you are living in slums. It is not your 
choice.” (Ndonga 2019).
These eviction threats spur counter-mobiliza-
tion: social appropriation of existing organiza-
tions and innovative forms of collective action. 
Slum dweller associations emerged with the 
help of the international alliance Slum/Shack 
Dwellers International. Muungano wa Wanavijiji 
in Nairobi and Justice & Empowerment 
Initiatives in Lagos became social movements 
and political actors in their own right, reframing 
slum dweller rights as human rights, with the 
support of Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch.
Between 2018-2020, there were 59 episodes of 
contention in Nairobi. Many of these episodes 
took place in August 2018 and were the result 
of the National Environmental Management 
Authority’s directive to demolish all “illegal 
structures” on riparian lands. Politicians quickly 
politicized these demolitions. In addition, gov-
ernment companies and agencies like Kenya 
Railways, Kenya Pipeline Company, and Kenya 
Urban Roads Authority evicted thousands of 
people, including 20,000 people in Kibera to 
make way for a highway. Many demolitions took 
place in the middle of the night – called “mid-
night demolitions” – and residents claim they 
did not receive proper notice, despite court 
orders.
Unlike Nairobi, Lagos did not engage in a large-
scale demolition campaign. There were 13 
notable episodes of contention that includ-
ed demolishing buildings that were not up to 
code, removal of stalls from markets, and the 
demolition of homes to make way for a mod-
ern bus terminal. The most contentious dem-
olition occurred in Tarkwa Bay, introduced in 
the beginning of this essay. The Nigerian Slum/
Informal Settlement Federation led protests 
against these evictions. Nonetheless, broker-
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age continues to play an important role in Lagos’ 
development, as powerful traditional families 
like the Elegushi partner with politicians to grab 
land and displace slum dwellers; the diaspora 
invests in gated communities; and NGOs bro-
ker the relationship between poor communities 
and municipal government.
Implications for the study of 
urbanization
Recent studies demonstrate that community 
organizations and social movements devise 
strategies beyond protests and demonstrations 
to secure urban housing, protect tenure security, 
and implement pro-poor policies (Mitlin 2018; 
Donaghy 2018). But evidence from the media 
events database suggests that contentious 
politics in Africa’s largest and most important 
cities still shapes the urbanization process and 
requires attention in the study of urbanization. 
These urban political dynamics have the po-
tential to disrupt national politics across the 
continent, but this essay demonstrates how the 
outcomes will vary across contexts.
The comparative method sheds light on the po-
litical mechanisms underlying urbanization. In 
Nairobi, Cape Town, and Accra parties and pol-
iticians play important roles in protecting and 
representing the poor – but are also accused 
of engaging in corruption and land grabbing. 
Politicians are quick to paint certain groups as 
threats, while claiming to protect others from 
imminent eviction (Klaus 2020). In Lagos and 
Accra, indigenous landowners are important 
brokers in the urban development process. In 
all four cases, international organizations have 
reframed slum rights as human rights, drawing 
new attention to urban citizenship.
In addition, historical legacies of inequali-
ty – many of which are direct outcomes of co-
lonialism and Apartheid – continue to shape 
public policy. Framing the urban poor as dirty 
and criminal is a political tool that has its roots 
in colonial-era urban planning, and is used to 
legitimize slum removal and renewal schemes. 
Finally, the politics of belonging underlies the 
contentious politics of urbanization, resulting in 
tension between host and migrant populations. 
These insights from Africa extend far beyond 
the continent, demonstrating that urbanization 
across the world is a contentious process, con-
tributing to episodes of competing claims, the 
assertion of urban citizenship, and the emer-
gence of new and the reaffirmation of old politi-
cal actors and identities.  
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PROTEST IN SPACE, AMONG SOCIAL GROUPS AND 
IN TIME: Towards an Historically Informed Agenda  
of Studying Urban Discontent in Autocracies 
by Tomila Lankina
Urban protest has been a subject of burgeon-
ing scholarship on regime vulnerabilities and 
resilience in autocracies (Onuch 2015, 2014; 
Lorentzen 2013; King et al. 2013; Rød and 
Weidmann 2015; Beissinger 2013; Little et al. 
2013; Tucker 2007; Robertson 2011; Harris and 
Hern 2019; Plantan 2014; Frye and Borisova 
2019). In this essay, I discuss how careful atten-
tion to historical legacies of social structure that 
are spatially varied, could further enrich the 
recent empirical and conceptual innovations 
in the study of protest. Specifically, I sketch out 
how and in what ways history matters for under-
standing present-day protest and non-protest; 
in what ways lack of sensitivity to historical lega-
cies can hamper understanding of discontent in 
post-communist societies; and how my ongoing 
historically-grounded research contributes to 
this research agenda. Although the discussion 
largely concerns protest in Russia and other 
post-communist states, the arguments are ap-
plicable to a variety of settings. They sensitize 
us to broad patterns of historical conditioning 
of the political economy of sub-national urban 
spaces and social structures underpinning vari-
eties and intensities of mobilization. 
Recent contributions: Space, Issue 
Salience and Time
Before I outline how history matters for under-
standing urban street contention in post-com-
munist states, I will highlight recent data 
innovations and contributions to the study of 
protest. I then proceed to illustrate how the rich 
data contributions could be fruitfully analysed 
in conjunction with historical source materials.
The global wave of high-profile colour revolu-
tions has highlighted the significance of urban 
street contention to effect pivotal change in 
political institutions and regimes. These rare 
events, often limited to national capitals and a 
handful of metropolises, do not by themselves 
provide a window into the long-term dynamics 
of the germination of grievances, incentives 
and accumulation of tangible and intangible 
protest-supportive resources, processes that 
may or may not culminate in a successful up-
rising (Robertson 2013). Understanding the 
dynamics of the singular high-profile event re-
quires unpacking the hidden inter-connected 
mechanisms structuring contention across 
issue areas, across space and in time (Lankina 
and Tertytchnaya 2019). Building on cross- 
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national data generation efforts (Banks 2011), 
researchers have begun to assemble sub-na-
tional over-time event data disaggregated by 
issue area, activist base and locality (Rød and 
Weidmann 2014; Weidmann and Rød 
2019; Lankina 2018; Daxecker et al. 
2019; Robertson 2011).1 These data 
may be instrumental in revealing the 
patterned nature of the articulation 
of grievances in urban politics. These 
are intrinsic not only to types of issues 
and causes people care about, but 
also to locality-specific structures of 
patronage, clientelism, social control. In turn, 
theorizing into authoritarian resilience informs 
us that these sub-national political-institution-
al features of authoritarian regimes constitute 
bottom-up support structures for national in-
cumbents (Hale 2015). 
Furthermore, spatial variations in institution-
al-political landscapes within an autocracy may 
crucially affect not only citizen propensity to 
engage in civic and contentious street acts, but 
the type of activism that is “permitted,” “safe” or 
tactically desirable from the point of view of pro-
testers’ goals. For instance, sub-national data 
for Russia reveal that even in the more politi-
cally liberal metropolitan urban conglomerates 
outside of the high-profile electoral protests or 
other intensely politicised mass contentious 
acts, the bulk of protest events will concern 
variants of post-material engagements. Some 
examples are protests against illegal construc-
tion, street activism concerning the destruction 
of parks, nature reserves, children leisure facil-
ities (Lankina and Tertytchnaya 2019; Smyth 
2020). These apparently harmless forms of dis-
content constitute however crucial channels of 
1. For an overview of the various datasets, see (Rød and Weidmann 2014).
engendering political constituencies for protest. 
Indeed, studies have shown that the same indi-
viduals assume leadership roles, are active in, 
and instrumental in the spurring of, politicised 
discontent when political opportunities change 
(Greene and Robertson 2019; Lankina 2015). 
The Lankina Russian Protest-Event Dataset 
(LAruPED) (Lankina 2018) is sensitive to these 
inter-connected possibilities in that it distin-
guishes between civic, social, economic, polit-
ical types of activism across space and in time. 
The data allow scholars to track shifting issue 
salience and its relevance for building author-
itarian challenges in the long run. The data 
also show heterogeneity in the types of protest 
that citizens in the various localities habitually 
engage in. In some regions, strikes and labour 
activism around bread and butter issues are 
prevalent. Elsewhere, individuals routinely en-
gage in protest around civic causes, something 
that facilitates political forms of contention 
when opportunities open up at the national 
level. 
The focus in much of the literature has been on 
identifying temporally-proximate causal mech-
anisms related to the intricacies of immediate 
politics, tactics and resources of activists and 
political actors. Yet, I argue that spatial hetero-
geneity in mobilizational dynamics with crucial 
implications for national-level contention and 
authoritarian regime erosion could be best 
understood with reference to the broader his-
torical processes of regional economic devel-
opment shaping social structure, resources and 
incentives. Below I discuss how sensitivity to 
the historical underpinnings of regional political 
economies would help us develop a more fine-
Spatial heterogeneity in 
mobilizational dynamics 
could be best understood 
with reference to the 
broader historical 
processes. 
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grained and textured knowledge of spatial-tem-
poral variations in protest.
The political economy of sub-national 
protest
Most scholars would concur that the econom-
ic dimension of citizen grievances, incentives 
and opportunities, is of pivotal importance for 
understanding spatial heterogeneity in urban 
protest in autocracies. Nevertheless, we need 
a better understanding of the mechanisms 
linking social rebellion or compliance to the 
broader, spatially varied political and eco-
nomic legacies associated with distinct forms 
of economic development, urbanization and 
industrialization. In post-communist autocra-
cies, significant chunks of the urban workforce 
remain corralled in state-owned or state-de-
pendent enterprises—a legacy of state socialist 
planning. Economic dependencies and vul-
nerabilities also affect the conduct of public 
sector workforce employed in schools, medi-
cal facilities, tertiary institutions. Furthermore, 
historically “old” towns with a long history of 
pre-communist development ought to be dis-
tinguished from “new” monotowns built around 
one or a handful of industrial giants (Zubarevich 
2011). In the latter-type of urban environment, 
a large proportion of citizens depend on one 
mega-employer. The social life of families and 
communities and services are also structured 
around employer-provided infrastructure 
and welfare. In such socialist-legacy industrial 
monotowns, dismissal from work is a harsh sen-
tence, far more so than in historical towns with 
a much more plural, fluid and dynamic employ-
ment ecosystem. Even during nationally-prom-
inent mobilizations challenging authoritarian 
rule, citizens in such towns may be less willing 
to join in the broad cross-territorial movement. 
This, in turn, consolidates the cleavage between 
the “sophisticated urbanites” in large metrop-
olises and the equivalent of the communist 
rust-belt of left-behind towns. Workforce de-
pendencies dis-incentivize salaried employees 
from challenging autocrats at the ballot box or 
in the streets. They also encourage patterns of 
complicity in actively undermining street activ-
ism—again, using the toolkit of worker, student, 
peer dismissals, harassment and shaming (Frye 
et al. 2014; Lankina and Libman 2019). 
History also matters from the point of view of 
types of modernization and the contexts in 
which it has been pursued. In classic moderniza-
tion theorizing (Lipset 1959), educated, urban 
white-collar workforce is often associated with 
“progressive” causes and, in autocracies, lower 
tolerance for regimes that trample on citizen 
rights. Rare revolutionary events may of course 
feature cross-class participation of a motley 
assemblage of citizens of varied political orien-
tations, demographic cohorts and socio-eco-
nomic status (Beissinger 2013). Nevertheless, 
whether considering politicised acts of dissent 
or more routine forms of civic protest, urban dis-
content is often a middle-class phenomenon. 
Yet, as Bryn Rosenfeld demonstrates, the “mid-
dle class” itself needs to be urgently unpacked 
in contexts where a large share is “incubated” 
within the confines of the autocracy’s public 
sector (Rosenfeld 2017). Rosenfeld’s work dove-
tails with earlier and more recent contributions 
problematizing the “bourgeoisie” or the middle 
class in iconic works on democratic origin and 
resilience. Not only may the middle class es-
pouse economic or other incentives to support 
autocratic rule (Foa 2018; O’Donnell 1973; Slater 
2010; Greene and Robertson 2019), but it may 
choose to “deliberately disengage” in the face 
of authoritarian manipulations and crackdowns 
(Croke et al. 2016). 
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The bigger question however - which has not 
been addressed prominently in recent studies 
of urban mobilization in autocracies - is the 
historical conditioning of the types of depen-
dencies that Rosenfeld writes about. Neglect 
of this question risks skewing the explanatory 
framework towards the policies, employment 
and economic structures of present-day autoc-
racies. In fact, as my analysis shows, these pat-
terns may be rooted in developmental policies 
of a distinct, prior, regime type, or even several 
regimes. There is also the question of the likeli-
hood of cross-class mobilization transcending 
social cleavages within the urban middle class. 
For toppling or effectively challenging autocrats 
may require wider alliances between the large 
metropolitan centres where much of the activ-
ism occurs and smaller towns or rural areas. The 
latter types of settlement however are often 
not only dormant when it comes to protest but 
constitute the backbone of authoritarian resil-
ience building. Put simply, just as urgently as un-
derstanding incentives to join in, derived from 
immediate status in the employment arenas 
of an autocracy, we ought to unpack the longue 
durée aspects of the construction of the stra-
tum broadly bracketed under the “bourgeoisie” 
or “middle class” umbrella. 
Several decades ago, the Chicago economist 
Bert Hoselitz argued that an ideal-type of “au-
tonomous” development is one where “all de-
cisions affecting economic growth are made by 
individuals other than those holding political 
power” (1965: 97). Hoselitz contrasted those pat-
terns with settings where “all economic growth… 
would be strictly induced, that is, provided for 
and planned by a central authority” (1965: 98). 
Following Hoselitz, Robert Dahl linked the more 
autonomous developmental patterns to pro-
cesses of the maturation of a pro-democratic 
constituency, as distinct from the more hege-
monic/ induced policies of an autocracy like the 
Soviet Union or China that fabricate the middle 
class as part of state-led industrialisation (Dahl 
1971). These insights acquire added salience 
in the present time. Increasingly, scholars are 
turning toward explaining current global politi-
cal regime trends with reference to legacies that 
may have survived over long periods of time 
and across distinct regime types (Simpser et al. 
2018; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017; Lussier and 
LaPorte 2017). 
Present-day studies of protest could benefit 
from incorporating these insights into analyses 
of the incentives, possibilities, values of distinct 
sets of urban constituencies. These may be 
shaped by legacies that are perpetuated within 
urban communities. Post-communist contexts, 
in particular, constitute fertile terrain for dis-
secting variations within the broad “middle class” 
stratum. Here, we see how a more “organic” pro-
cess of the genesis of an entrepreneurial, profes-
sional, educated citizenry prior to communist 
rule may coexist with a new state-dependent 
intelligentsia rapidly engineered in an “induced” 
way. In analysing class in communist societies, 
the Hungarian sociologist Iván Szelényi pre-
sciently distinguished between economic au-
tonomy and political authority (Szelényi 1988). 
Experience of navigating the market and high, 
intergenerationally transmitted human cap-
ital endowments, enhance citizen autonomy. 
These endowments also structure possibilities 
to gravitate away from state-dependent arenas 
of employment as “cadre” / “apparatchik.” The 
latter status may bestow authority but not per-
sonal autonomy. In the post-communist period, 
inherited values and human capital may create 
broader possibilities for private entrepreneur-
ship or high-status jobs less dependent on state 
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resources and sanction. Furthermore, broader 
historical cleavages among the distinct groups 
not only structure the types of activism they are 
willing to engage in, but cognitive orientations 
towards other groups (Smyth and Oates 2015; 
Greene and Robertson 2019). 
The ongoing work of this author and collabora-
tors illustrates the utility of going beyond con-
ventional survey categories and incorporating 
those that are more attuned to the historical 
conditioning of values, structural opportunities, 
incentives. In a recent body of work, Lankina et al. 
sought to tease out the historical conditioning 
of attitudes towards protest among the middle 
class in Russia, a large post-communist autoc-
racy, and in ways that transcended the conven-
tional “urban-rural,” demographic (age) and 
occupational survey categories (Lankina 2019; 
Lankina et al. 2019). We approached middle 
class formation from the point of view of its or-
igin under distinct political regimes—pre-com-
munist and communist. We also assumed that 
there will be inter-generational dependencies 
in the pathways of the post-communist middle 
class from the point of view of employment and 
career trajectories. Our intention was to gauge 
how the genesis of the middle class under a 
more “organic” versus a more “induced” order 
shapes oppositional attitudes—specifically 
when it comes to protest. One conceptual inno-
vation that we injected into debates about the 
genesis of middle class in communist societies 
is to draw attention to pre-communist structure 
of estates. 
In Russia, we identify the urban estates of mesh-
chane and merchants in particular, as indeed 
the nobility and clergy as the educated urban 
proto-bourgeoisie. Preliminary analysis of the 
survey that we commissioned from Russia’s 
leading polling agency, Levada, revealed in-
triguing awareness of pre-Revolutionary estate 
among respondents. We also found co-variance 
between self-reported ancestry of belonging-
ness to the proto-bourgeoisie and proclivities 
to support protest. One possible interpretation 
of these patterns that we offer is that middle 
class values are transmitted across genera-
tions within communities, neighbourhoods and 
families—a transmission channel analysed in 
a number of studies of communist societies 
(Wittenberg 2006; Peisakhin 2013; Charnysh 
2019). Another interpretation is that the high 
human capital pre-communist strata were able 
to transmit educational advantage, profession-
al and market orientations to the next genera-
tion (Lankina et al. 2019). These endowments 
and value orientations in turn enhance em-
ployment possibilities beyond the public sector, 
engendering personal autonomy, institutional 
pluralism and diversity in economic landscapes 
(McMann 2006). 
History matters also if we consider another im-
portant question animating recent research 
into protest in autocracies. Notably, it is relevant 
from the point of view of the cognitive aspects of 
exposure to events that may have public order 
connotations. Recent analyses of protest have 
moved beyond exploring the drivers of mobi-
lization to more systematically analysing what 
it is that episodes of intense, national, rebel-
lions against autocrats achieve when it comes 
to public opinion (Frye and Borisova 2019; 
Tertytchnaya 2019; Greene and Robertson 
2019). In these analyses, whether the ruler is 
dislodged or not becomes secondary to broader 
questions of how bystanders’ incentives to join, 
opinions towards oppositional activism and 
broader political orientations may be shaped in 
the process of, and consequential to, exposure 
to dramatic and rare protest events. The shift 
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towards the public opinion moulding propen-
sities of protest in autocracies is non-trivial for 
two reasons. One reason is the capacity of rul-
ers to deploy modern forms of communication 
to manipulate information on discontent in 
ways that would not have been possible during 
historical revolutionary episodes in the past 
(Huang and Huang 2019; King et al. 2013; Koesel 
and Bunce 2013; Lorentzen 2014; Treisman and 
Guriev 2015; Plantan 2020; Chen and Xu 2015). 
Another dimension is repression and violence 
(Daxecker et al. 2019). Again, given the modern 
communications toolkit, both autocrats and 
ordinary citizens are quick to disseminate in-
formation on violence. Autocrats could always 
shift the blame on protesters for inciting blood-
shed. Additionally, ordinary people may either 
feel outrage or shy away from involvement, 
whether or not blame for inciting clashes is at-
tributed to the regime or protesters (Lankina 
et al. 2020; Lorentzen 2013). Carefully studying 
how violence shifts public opinion thus allows 
for a sober assessment of not only the “tipping 
point” aspects of incentives to join in (Kuran 
1995; Lohmann 1994), but also the possibility 
of turning off bystanders from engagement in 
activism that may have unpleasant public order 
connotations. 
In autocracies like Russia or China, many citi-
zens have been previously exposed to trauma, 
violence and dispossession associated with the 
20th century communist experiment. Here the 
“bourgeoisie” has been targeted on grounds of 
ideology—and even slated for extermination as 
a class. Some studies have revealed that expe-
rience of incarceration in the notorious Gulag 
labour camps may have had positive effect on 
democratic values. One plausible causal chan-
nel is exposure of citizens to the worst crimes 
of an ostensibly benign regime (Lankina and 
Libman 2017; Kapelko and Markevich 2014). At 
the same time, individuals with personal or fam-
ily experience of trauma and violence may be 
particularly careful in endorsing contentious 
politics. Modern-day autocrats are skilful at 
manipulating public information on discontent 
as when pro-democracy protests are portrayed 
in the media as leading to cataclysmic upheav-
al, bloodshed and social dislocation associated 
with a Bolshevik Revolution-type event (Lankina 
et al. 2020; Lankina and Watanabe 2017).
Our own survey revealed that self-reported de-
scendants of pre-communist bourgeoisie may 
in fact eschew supporting protest if it has conno-
tations of violence and public disorder (Lankina 
et al. 2019). Specifically, we observe that those 
who report pre-Revolutionary ancestry which 
we bracket under the rubric of the “educated 
bourgeoisie” are significantly more likely to ar-
ticulate support for protests, both events that 
are sanctioned and unsanctioned. These con-
stituencies also tend to eschew a preference of 
voting for Putin if there were a Presidential elec-
tion coming up. The survey also reveals never-
theless that when asked about participation in 
unsanctioned, or violent protests, self-reported 
descendants of the pre-Revolutionary bour-
geoisie are significantly less likely to report that 
they endorse street contention. We attribute 
these responses to the legacies of Soviet re-
pression and harassment targeting “bourgeois 
elements,” “former people” and other “unde-
sirables” in the context of post-Revolutionary 
witch-hunts. These legacies, we surmise, did 
not necessarily suppress latent pro-democracy 
attitudes. Rather, they engendered adaptation 
skills that may lead to a cautious attitude to-
wards events that may be perceived as carrying 
safety risks.
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Summary and agenda for future 
research
The tentative findings from recent research beg 
for a new, historically informed, agenda of study 
of the spatially and temporally heterogeneous 
social class dimension of urban protest atti-
tudes, dynamics and outcomes in present-day 
autocracies. They warrant a shift in focus from 
the temporally-proximate interactive dynam-
ics between autocrats and citizens as these 
respective sets of actors devise new toolkits 
to resist and subvert (Koesel and Bunce 2013; 
Ambrosio 2010). My research draws on inno-
vations of other scholars. Following Rosenfeld 
(Rosenfeld 2020, 2017), my collaborators and 
I argue that our analysis ought to be sensi-
tive to shades within the category that is most 
prominently associated with anti-authoritar-
ian protest—namely, the urban middle class. 
Furthermore, as LAruPED (Lankina 2018) re-
veals, citizens across sub-national territories 
may engage in different types of protest. 
Where I inject nuance into extant studies is to 
more forcefully bring into discussions the long 
historical process of socio-economic channel-
ling of opportunities accounting for protest or 
non-protest depending on the legacies of indus-
trial development, urbanization, central state 
planning. I also highlight the need to develop a 
better understanding of the historical- develop-
mental underpinnings of citizen proclivities to 
engage in specific types of activism—from the 
more “bread and butter” type concerns that may 
vary between urban mono-towns versus eco-
nomically more plural settings. Additionally, a 
more careful study of the historical conditioning 
of possibilities for cross-social, cross-class alli-
ances among the various urban constituencies 
is warranted. The legacies of trauma, violence 
and repression against specific groups as in-
flicted by 20th century dictatorial regimes also 
matter. Finally, we need to better understand 
the historical conditioning of values, resources 
and opportunities of citizens conventionally 
bracketed under an “urban” or “middle class” 
umbrella.  
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EXPLAINING URBAN PROTEST IN ILLIBERAL  
REGIMES: An Emphasis on Russia
by Regina Smyth 
For the past decade, the study of societal de-
velopment contemporary autocracy has largely 
focused on two dynamics: the drivers of individ-
ual-level regime support and participation in 
large-scale protest events, or urban revolutions. 
These approaches overlook the near-universal 
rise in small-scale collective action—or urban 
movements—aimed at rectifying local govern-
ment policy failures or providing public goods. 
This new work refocusing attention on building 
block or precursors of social organization and 
movement formation, constitutes a new and 
challenging focus of research in comparative 
politics. By ignoring these actions, political 
scientists are missing a key mechanism of so-
cietal change in illiberal or transitional regimes. 
Studying contemporary urban activism re-
quires theoretical innovation and data collec-
tion. These efforts should link social movement 
theory, urban activism, and social theory across 
disciplines to explore how individuals who lack 
experience, language frames, or repertoires of 
action come to see politics as relevant for their 
everyday lives and identities. 
In this essay, I consider urban activism in the 
post-Soviet space, although the framework is 
adaptable to local protest in small towns and 
villages. Defined as grassroots movements 
that are neither formalized nor institutional-
ized (Castells 1983), local and regional protests 
continue to increase across post-Communist 
states such as Poland, Romania, Kazakhstan 
and Russia, regardless of regime type. While 
much of the work on urban activism has devel-
oped with the confines of urban studies and 
ethnographic work in anthropology, geography 
and sociology, the challenge of explaining col-
lective action in authoritarian urban contexts 
presents and interesting puzzle for political 
scientists (see Jacobsson 2015). These studies 
focus on what many participants call non-polit-
ical activism: actions taken to redress concerns 
of everyday life without challenging existing 
structures or leaders. This distinction explains 
that the context and model of mobilization – 
and not the actions – often, but not always, deal 
with contesting locally defined grievances, re-
source allocations and economic, cultural, and 
political policies and decisions. Urban actions 
address suddenly imposed grievances that dis-
rupt everyday life, social structures, or mean-
ings, such as plans to revise local schools, close 
a beloved park, or allow infill construction in a 
neighborhood. 
The goal of this essay is to highlight new theo-
retic innovation and data collection that define 
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a research program which explains the emer-
gence of activism among disengaged or non-po-
litical citizens of illiberal states. Using simple 
game theoretic models of coordination, I dis-
tinguish between collective action (or political 
protest) where high costs of engagement make 
free-riding or non-engagement a dominant 
strategy, and coordination (non-political pro-
test) in which the relatively low (or nonexistent) 
costs of participation and multiple equilibria 
provide a very different challenge to mobiliza-
tion. These games provide some insight into 
patterns of activism, the effect of authoritarian 
responses, and the distinctions between politi-
cal and non-political action. 
Why Urban Mobilization?
The legacy of modernization theory concen-
trated attention on urban centers as engines 
for social, economic and political change. 
Urbanization, industrialization and wealth ac-
cumulation, together with education, provided 
a structural framework for the development 
of democracy and a shift in social values. The 
urban middle class provided ballast against 
the inequality desired by the wealthy and the 
redistribution demands of the poor to sustain 
democracy development. Urban citizens not 
only had greater resources, but they also a va-
riety of grievances including construction and 
infill, land use, transport, service provision and 
historic preservation. These demands arose 
because of the level of services and complexity 
of everyday life that mark urban life. They also 
inevitably shaped expectations about regime 
responsiveness and effectiveness. 
Interdisciplinary studies of urban activism cat-
alogue the structural mechanisms that make 
large cities the likely centers of collective action 
(Wallace 2013). In post-communist states, ur-
ban centers are the hub of neoliberal develop-
ment creating new inequalities and grievances, 
and demands for services. Development also 
attracts educated, engaged, and resource-rich 
residents. Population density increases com-
munication and information transmission. 
Finally, urban spaces are imbued with meaning 
and linked to personal histories and family nar-
ratives (Sun and Huang 2020, Tilly 2000). These 
spaces provide opportunity for repertoire inno-
vation to gain popular and state attention.
In East-Central Europe and the Baltic states, ur-
ban movements focus on local actions designed 
to prioritize local preferences for housing, bike 
paths, historic and environmental protec-
tion over European Union imposed economic 
development (Ekiert and Kubik 2014). These 
actions, called non-political protest by those 
who engage in it, focus on solving collective 
problems within the context of everyday experi-
ence. These types of local action include recent 
Russian protests against toxic garbage inciner-
ation that began in the Moscow region. These 
micro-movements are rarely institutionalized, 
because they lack resources, hold narrow goals, 
or prefer to retain a more communitarian, infor-
mal focus (Aidukaite and Frolich 2015). 
New data collection projects demonstrate that 
increasing activism poses a significant chal-
lenge to Russian leaders. Based on an initiative 
by the Institute of Collective Action, Kleman, 
Myrisova and Demidov (2010) showed the 
increase in grassroots movements, some of 
which were connected within cities and across 
the Federation. As discussed in her contribu-
tion to the Newsletter, Tomila Lankina (see 
also Lankina and Tertytchnaya 2020) refined 
and expanded a crowd sourcing data project, 
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Namarsh  (To the March), into the Lankina 
Russian Protest-Event  Dataset (LAruPED). This 
dataset tracks urban protest between 2007 
and 2016. In 2018, Andrei Semenov 
presented his Contentious Politics 
in Russia (CPR) dataset, document-
ing regional protest between 2012 
and 2014 at the Indiana University 
Russian Studies Workshop. All of 
these sources illustrate the rise in 
both political and non-political pro-
test in Russia between 2010 and 2019. This 
model is being replicated in other cases. Dustin 
Gamza and Pauline Jones have collected event 
count data of local and regional activism across 
the Central Asian states between 1991-2016 (ex-
cept Turkmenistan). 
Understanding Variation in Protest 
Events: Collective Action and 
Coordination in Autocratic Regimes
Despite the prevalence of non-political urban 
actions, research and theory development has 
focused largely on political protest and revo-
lutionary regime change. In the comparative 
context of post-Communist regions, political 
protest is illustrated by the colored revolu-
tions begun in Serbia in 2000 and repeated in 
Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, and – 
most recently –  Armenia. In Russia, as in many 
authoritarian states, this distinction between 
the everyday actions and anti-regime protests 
provides a stark dividing line between social 
understandings of activism. Political activism 
demands political change: power shifts, insti-
tutional reform, or regime or leadership change. 
To understand the distinction in political and 
non-political protest, I draw on simple game the-
oretic models that underscore different mobili-
zation dilemmas and how they can be overcome. 
These models described in Figure 1 underscore 
the differences in strategic context—uncertainty, 
costs and benefits, and –in which citizens make 
their decisions to join collective action.
The Collective Action game on the left maps the 
dilemma of political protest that challenges the 
nature of the regime. The solution to the game 
(or the obstacle to collection action) focuses 
on the relative value of costs and benefits, with 
the assumption that costs are extremely high 
and no one potential participant can secure 
the benefits. To forestall protest, authoritarian 
regimes continue to raise the costs of protest 
by engaging in a wide range of repressive acts, 
developing state proxies to carry out repres-
sion, and forging new militarized riot troops 
especially trained to quell protest. Authorities 
also signal costs through permitting systems 
that distinguish between acceptable action and 
illegal actions or to cordon protest actions into 
remote areas of the city. Because the popular 
response to repression is uncertain and costly, 
Collective Action Game Pure Coordination Game
Cooperate Defect Cooperate 1 Cooperate  2
Cooperate
B – C
B – C 
– C
B
Cooperate 1
B
B
0
0
Defect
B 
– C 
0
0
Cooperate 2
0 
0 
B
B 
Figure 1: 
Cooperation Games: 
Collective Action vs. 
Coordination
Despite the prevalence 
of non-political urban 
actions, research and 
theory development 
has focused largely on 
political protest. 
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authoritarian  regimes increasing rely on less 
violent means of repression and tools to induce 
self-censorship, including: counter-movements 
that express “majority” views, disinformation in 
the form of media reports that misrepresent 
protest as radical, and smart city technology 
such as facial recognition software.
These games have one dominant strategy, all de-
fect, predicting limited collective action. As Bo 
Rothstein (2015) notes, many of the solutions to 
collective action rely on prior forms of collective 
action: existing institutions, hierarchies, norms, 
and even elements of social capital such as trust 
or reciprocity. For example, existing social and 
civic groups can promote collective action by 
applying social or solidary sanctions. History or 
repeated interaction can provide the informa-
tion that transforms the interaction as expec-
tations of future action provide incentives for 
cooperation. This focus on previous experience 
and structures underscores why large-scale col-
lective action is more difficult in illiberal or tran-
sitional societies where these building blocks 
are underdeveloped and citizens lack experi-
ence with activism.
In contrast, the coordination game has two po-
tential equilibria, both predicting cooperation. 
The dilemma in this game is to understand how 
potential participants coordinate on the same 
action. Figure 2 unpacks this dilemma. A solu-
tion to coordination means resolving two types 
of uncertainty, an understanding of what the 
other will do when faced with two strategies or 
actions to take, and the efficacy of each of these 
actions. As Figure 2 shows, potential partici-
pants need to understand which game they are 
playing, defined by the best strategy to achieve 
shared goals.  
A good example of a similar dilemma is illustrat-
ed by a common challenge in rapidly changing 
post-Soviet cities. If a construction company 
has decided to tear down a historic building or 
develop a beloved park, communities members 
agree they should act. Yet, they are conflicted 
over how to act: should the community block 
the entrance of the potential construction 
site (Game 1) or petition political authorities 
to intervene and limit development (Game 2). 
Importantly, the solutions common to collec-
tive action (such as iteration) may not work to 
solve coordination dilemmas. They also demon-
strate the critical role that framing theory plays 
in generating coordination (Benford and Snow 
2000). Trusted leaders can define the most 
efficacious action, prompting coordination on 
that strategy. Similarly, local ties can foster the 
creation of common knowledge that provides 
information about societal preferences and the 
expectations of other behaviors (Chwe 2013). 
Figure 2: 
Coordination and 
Uncertainty
Game 1 
(prob = p)
Game 2 
(prob = 1 – p)
Cooperate 1 Cooperate  2 Cooperate 1 Cooperate  2
Cooperate 1
B
B
0
0
Cooperate 1
0
0
0
0
Cooperate 2
0 
0 
0
0 
Cooperate 2
0 
0 
B
B 
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Cooperate 1 Cooperate  2
Cooperate 1
(p)B
(p)B
0
0
Cooperate 2
0 
0 
(1-p)B
(1-p)B 
As I demonstrate below, this model is consistent 
with the nature of grassroots urban action in 
Russia where local ties, shared ideas and history, 
and everyday life disruptions can provide im-
portant information about social preferences.
Thinking about a factor (p) such as the informa-
tion about strategies available to make claims 
on government defines the likelihood that ur-
ban residents will choose strategy 1 or 2. The 
choice is determined in part by shared agree-
ment that the strategy will work. This possibility 
is illustrated in Figure 3.
As the level of information about the efficacy of 
protest increases so does the probability of co-
ordination on a single strategy. For the purposes 
of this analysis, we can think of p as a function of 
regime type. In democracies, open opportunity 
structures, potential partners, and well-defined 
paths for social input in government define 
strategies of engagement, although some un-
certainty remains. In contrast, in illiberal con-
texts many factors obscure both the creation of 
common knowledge and the understanding of 
the efficacy of different strategies. The blurred 
boundaries between the regime and other elite 
actors, the prevalence of informality instead of 
institutions, and variation across different lev-
els, branches, and regions, all obscure informa-
tion about the range of possible strategies and 
their likelihood of success.
Figure 4 demonstrates this relationship. 
Complete uncertainty, defined as a .5 prob-
ability that either 1 or 2 is a winning strategy, 
diminishes the likelihood of protest. This situ-
ation describes hybrid and autocratic regimes 
with poorly defined formal institutions. It also 
demonstrates how regime signals, such as 
granting protest permissions or announcing 
their interests in social demands articulated at 
an action, can shape actions by pushing activ-
ists toward or away from particular strategies. 
Finally, state response to past actions provide a 
strong indication of future responses, illustrat-
ing the potential subsequent action.
While very simple, these theoretic constructs 
can define the challenges inherent in different 
collective action dilemmas. They also explain 
why some actions can emerge at the local lev-
el, even in the context of disengaged publics. 
Finally, the models provide insight into the po-
tential reciprocal links between the two types 
of protest and how the boundaries between the 
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might be breached to cause seemingly sponta-
neous challenges to regime stability.   
The Political Science Focus: Post-
Election Protest and Regime Change
The study of Color Revolutions, Arab Spring, and 
Occupy Central Movement in Hong Kong rein-
vigorated the focus on individual-level mobili-
zation in comparative politics. These types of 
large-scale protests aim to redress electoral fal-
sification or governmental reforms that are thin-
ly veiled attempts to maintain or consolidate 
political power. Both types of events are collec-
tive action problems, a class of political prob-
lem in which costly participation undermines 
the provision of the social good: a new election 
or a new policy framework, or even a new regime. 
Consistent with the social movement studies of 
mobilization this work largely stresses the role 
of organization, leadership, and other structural 
factors on individual participation. 
The debate around the causes and consequenc-
es of political mobilization in the color revolu-
tions has focused on the role of organization on 
the transformation individual-level beliefs and 
commitment to political change. Valerie Bunce 
and Sharon Wolchik (2010) explore the role 
of youth organization on campaign activity on 
popular expectations in electoral revolutions. 
By engaging Ukrainians through and electoral 
model of revolution that shapes popular ex-
pectations, activists can mobilize largely disen-
gaged citizens. In Russia in 2011-2012, Semenov, 
Lobanova and Zavadskaya (2016) show that 
marginalized opposition parties can play a role 
in protest mobilization.
In contrast, Mark Beissinger (2013) concludes 
that the lack of permanent mobilizing struc-
tures – often found in peasant revolutions such 
as Vietnam – was absent in Ukraine’s Orange 
Revolution. Individual-level analysis suggests 
that the nationalist, ethnic identity that sparked 
mobilization is best characterized as a distinct 
type of “urban revolution” and that this type of 
mobilization lacks the long-term organizational 
and ideational infrastructure to sustain political 
engagement and produce future activism. My 
own study of the linkages between participation 
in 2004 and 2014 suggest differentiation among 
the pathways to protest engagement and les-
sons learned from past activism. Using unique 
survey data, I find that some Orange Revolution 
participants did acquire activist or communi-
tarian identities that prompted re-engagement 
in the 2014 Revolution of Dignity.
In the Russian FFE protests, much of the de-
bate centered, not on the presence or absence 
of structure, but on the types of structure that 
prompted participation. Survey data provides 
evidence of micro-mobilization through fac-
tors such as personal networks, politicized in-
ternet networks, and campaign activity (Smyth 
and Oates 2016, Smyth forthcoming 2020). For 
some activists, these structures created direct 
contact and invitations to join the movement 
and provided different paths to activism—
through new media, organizational affiliation 
or affinity, or personal networks of close friends, 
family, and co-workers. Each of these factors 
shape different pathways to action as protest 
becomes an accepted activity to redress con-
crete grievances. 
Important new data collection strategies facili-
tate new studies of individual-level mobilization 
in illiberal contexts. During the 2004 Orange 
Revolution, innovative polling data drawn 
from the protest encampment by the Kiev 
International Institute of Sociology provided a 
means of testing individual theories of partici-
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pation. Scholars and research centers replicat-
ed the methodology in Russia’s 2011-2012 For 
Free Elections protest cycle (Smyth forthcom-
ing 2020), in Ukraine during the 2014 Revolution 
of Dignity (Onuch 2014), and in numerous stud-
ies of the 2012 Occupy Central Movement and in 
2019 protest in Hong Kong. My own (2018) sur-
vey of participants in the Revolution of Dignity 
events built on these studies, over-sampling 
participants using a screening question in order 
to ensure an adequate sample to analyze indi-
vidual-level variation in participation decisions.
Studies based on these data provide significant 
insights into political mobilization. First, struc-
ture does shape mobilization for some, but 
not all participants and may well play auxiliary 
roles such as producing credible leadership, 
frames, and activist identities. Under some con-
ditions, these factors can transform collective 
action into coordination. Joshua Tucker (2007) 
makes this argument in his characterization of 
post-election protest as a focal point designed 
to redress grievances. In an unpublished paper 
with John Hulsey (2009), I found that leader-
ship, defined in terms of the trust differential 
could transform collective action into an assur-
ance game. In this context, high trust in the op-
position leader and low trust in the incumbent 
elevated  the opposition leader, making him the 
guarantor in an assurance game, and resolv-
ing uncertainty about which strategy would be 
most efficacious. We confirmed the theory us-
ing individual-level KIIS data from the Orange 
Revolution.
What is missing in these analyses is the role of 
previous experiences in apolitical protest, or 
localized grassroots actions that redress the 
concerns of everyday life. A growing literature 
in Russia suggests that these informal actions, 
solved through coordination, provide a foun-
dation to solve political  collective  action prob-
lems and spark national mobilization.
Mobilizing from Scratch: Non-Political 
Protest
The work on non-political mobilization, creating 
activists from scratch, begins with the observa-
tion of the apolitical nature of society in illiberal 
regimes. Importantly, studies show that apoliti-
cal is not the same as apathetic or uninterested. 
In fact, much – but not all – of what participants 
consider apolitical protest focuses on core po-
litical issues, such as the assertion of rights, re-
distribution, or policy change. As Nina Eliasoph 
(1997) argues, in the culture of political avoid-
ance the concept of non-political action marks 
a difference in the scope of social demands. 
What is important is to understand the context 
in which residents come to experience and act 
on shared feelings of engagement. Zhuravlev, 
Savelyeva, and Erpyleva (2019) argue that apo-
liticism is a set of practices that facilitate collec-
tive action in everyday life, which also bounds 
its scope. 
Karine Clément pioneered the study of urban 
activism in Russia, focusing on the transforma-
tion among disengaged citizens, the ordinary 
people, into activists. Her starting point focus-
es on the Soviet legacy and a social context in 
which urban residents have little experience or 
knowledge of how to engage. Kleman (Clément), 
Demidov and Mirysova (2010) (see also Clement 
2009; 2015a; and 2015b) relied on Thévenot’s 
(2013) concept of “regimes of engagement” to 
show how daily interactions within a communi-
ty, through local micro-scale processes, trans-
formed attitudes and action. In a similar vein, 
Gabowitsch (2016) identified everyday objects—
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historic buildings, apartment-building court-
yards, parks, and forests in which Russians hunt 
mushrooms—as part of a grammar of personal 
affinity around which individuals encounter 
and respond to state action. Building on these 
insights, Gladarev (2011) argues that agency 
occurs when the state intrudes in everyday life 
and disrupts a shared understanding of reality. 
In short, non-political action is based a shift in 
understandings given a violation of the familiar. 
Juxtaposed with the analysis of coordination 
games above demonstrates these studies sug-
gest new comparative research to understand 
the context of non-political activism reduces 
uncertainty about who will protest and how they 
will do it.
From Apolitical To Political: A Model of 
Political Change?
The importance of non-political protest in 
Russia has fostered a growing literature on 
the reciprocal relationship between national 
protests and local actions (see Clément and 
Zhelnina 2019). In my own work, I demonstrate 
that growing experience with non-political ac-
tions generated activist identities, on- and off-
line networks, and shared grievances facilitated 
participation against election fraud in the FFE 
movement (Smyth 2020). Subsequently, FFE 
movement increased local actions. Based on 
impressive ethnographic work and interdis-
ciplinary research frameworks, these studies 
show that the FFE mobilization transformed of 
citizens’ understanding of electoral competi-
tion as a substantive concern in their daily lives 
and an expression of community that fostered 
new actions (Bikbov 2012, Gabowitsch 2017). 
Consistent with a foundational paper by 
McAdam and Tarrow (2010), both types of pro-
test also influence other types of political par-
ticipation. My work with Irina Soboleva (2016) 
on Alexei Navalny’s 2013 Moscow mayoral cam-
paign shows how the resources drawn from FFE 
—strategies, frames, and activists — transformed 
the contest. Similarly, Andrei Semenov (2020) 
explores three recent cases of collective action 
in Russia, concluding that these more recent 
actions are rely on more complex infrastructure 
including leadership, alliances with governmen-
tal and systemic actors, and clearly defined le-
gal claims. Dollbaum, Semenov, and Sirotkina 
(2018) show that the organizational mobiliza-
tion of young people within Alexei Navalny’s 
presidential campaign did not succeed as an 
electoral vehicle but did create a new genera-
tion of regional activists.
These studies reveal a pattern of development 
that not only transforms society and builds ca-
pacity but also changes how the state responds 
to popular challenges (see Morris, Semenov, 
Smyth forthcoming 2021). Viewed in the con-
text of theories of authoritarian responsiveness 
or patterns of resource distributions, this type 
of protest often politicizes participants, shift-
ing their focus on the cost of autocratic rule. It 
may also suggest a different kind of evolution-
ary model in which social capacity to makes 
demands on government increases and creates 
pressure for state structures evolve to respond 
to citizens’ demands.  
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Branding is an essential and understudied fea-
ture of urban politics.1 To see why, consider the 
theoretically generative comparison between 
political and commercial communication in 
the urban dimension. Over the course of time, 
and across spatial variation, both of these so-
cial interactions have adapted to changes in 
technology and contextual conditions. In much 
of the United States, for example, until the late 
1980’s the political activity of precinct workers 
naturally fit in with the rest of the door-to-door 
sale economy typical of the 1950’s, 1960’s, and 
1970’s. In politics, as well as in busi-
ness, people (rather than ads) were 
used to sell. In the political arena, 
candidates and mobilizing structures 
were tightly bound to the neighbor-
hood through patronage, whereby cli-
ents could be rewarded with benefits 
such as public employment, or pun-
ished with exclusion when they failed 
to deliver political support. 
In recent decades, both commercial and politi-
cal communication have changed dramatically. 
Increased political autonomy, coupled with a 
weakening of traditional programmatic parties 
1. This essay partially relies on excerpts from Pasotti (2009 2020).
and fiscal retrenchment, enabled a more fluid 
electorate, leading large-city mayors to shift 
from patronage-based mobilization to new 
forms of persuasion for both political compe-
tition and governance. As I showed in Political 
Branding in Cities (Pasotti 2009), instead of 
relying on party ideology and voter patron-
age, these mayoral candidates attract voters 
by shaping values – they develop a personal 
brand, a term derived from management where 
it refers to a product “made distinctive by its 
positioning relative to the competition and by 
its personality, which comprises a unique com-
bination of functional attributes and symbol-
ic values” (Hankinson and Cowking 1993, 10). 
Technological innovations greatly facilitated 
branding by lowering costs and increasing the 
repertoire of mass communication. 
A similar shift occurred in protest strategies. 
Instead of relying on traditional political divi-
sions, both city governments and protesters 
rely on the tenets of branding and increasingly 
build their connection with citizens by provid-
ing them with narratives and values that satisfy 
psychological needs for belonging, self-worth, 
or legitimacy. A surprising similarity emerges in 
Instead of relying on 
traditional political 
divisions, both city 
governments and 
protesters rely on the 
tenets of branding.
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how protestors and city governments compete 
to shape citizens’ subjectivity, with both sides 
embracing branding to mobilize support. 
We can therefore no longer grasp the strategic 
dimension of political communication without 
taking seriously the role of branding, and exam-
ining how political actors persuade supporters 
– not through material exchange, but rather with 
the provision of specific emotional experiences.
Branding is ubiquitous in shaping political 
communication among both institutions and 
civil society. This is especially visible in cities, 
because urban centers are critical sites of both 
power and contention, where the shift from 
door-to-door mobilization to mass messaging 
is most evident. Centers of economic growth are 
overwhelmingly in large cities, and urban rede-
velopment has become a widespread primary 
growth strategy for cities (Glaeser 2000; Sassen 
1994). Yet, cities are also key sites of protest; one 
reason for this is that urban institutions shape 
how civil rights are actually distributed and reg-
ulated. As Miller and Nicholls remind us, for in-
stance, a constitution might grant freedom of 
religion, but city officials can limit the exercise 
of that right by restricting the construction of 
worship sites with zoning regulations. Or, local 
zoning regulations for housing or transportation 
can be designed to sidestep equal-rights provi-
sions devised by a national government. In this 
way, countless “governance practices make cit-
ies key arenas of struggle shaping how rights are 
distributed, implemented, and violated” (Miller 
& Nicholls 2013).
As the examples above indicate, and political 
science scholars have long argued, power in cit-
ies is predominantly expressed through land use 
2. Gentrification involves at least four key elements: (1) reinvestment of capital; (2) local social upgrading by incoming high-income 
groups; (3) landscape change; and (4) direct or indirect displacement of low-income groups (Lees, Slater, & Wyly 2008).
and redevelopment, as cities compete to maxi-
mize their economic standing (Logan & Molotch 
1987; Peterson 1981; Stone 1989). Coalitions 
composed of business, cultural, and govern-
mental elites maximize rents and land values to 
capture the benefits of growth (as opposed to 
for example prioritizing neighborhood and envi-
ronmental protections), resulting in empirically 
ubiquitous “development regimes” (Altshuler 
& Luberoff 2004; Logan & Crowder 2002). Over 
the past two decades, these political patterns 
have intensified as city governments worldwide 
have shifted from facilitators to initiators of sys-
tematic redevelopment (Smith 2002; Uitermark, 
Duyvendak, & Kleinhans 2007), to the extent 
that much scholarship considers “contempo-
rary urban policy to be a form of state-led gen-
trification” (Lees 2003,  62).2 
Therefore, redevelopment and its associated 
displacement provide an especially suitable 
theoretical and empirical area for the inqui-
ry into the connection between branding and 
politics at the urban level. Not only is rede-
velopment the most common and influential 
policy expression of large city governments, its 
planning explicitly involves public and private 
actors. Further, planning choices are likely to 
reflect municipal priorities more reliably than 
other policy areas, making urban planning more 
amenable to international comparison. 
The inquiry into branding as a key dimension 
of political communication is focused on as-
piring global cities with regular and competi-
tive elections because this arena most acutely 
expresses the politics of branding, and the 
tensions behind redevelopment and displace-
ment. Aspiring global cities share an approach 
to urban political economy that is widespread 
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but not universal, and characterized by urban 
governments that prioritize economic com-
petitiveness. Competitiveness involves a com-
plex array of policies largely oriented toward 
attracting investment and high-skilled labor on 
international markets. No single or even handful 
of measures can entirely capture the phenome-
non, but existing indexes can be used to identify 
aspiring global cities (in my research I combine 
GaWC [2012] and EUI [2012]). Leaders in these 
cities are integrated into circuits of internation-
al competition, ambitious to raise their glob-
al status, and under pressure to identify and 
pursue high rent-gap areas for redevelopment. 
These factors make aspiring global cities espe-
cially theoretically salient and greatly assist in 
establishing comparability, even with extreme 
cross-regional variation. 
Mayors in aspiring global cities 
Mayoral candidates adapted to new conditions 
by shifting from precinct-based patronage to 
broader messaging. Showing the power of the 
parallel between commercial and political per-
suasion, they emulate marketing mavericks. 
Marketers draw consumers – and mayors, vot-
ers – by associating their campaigns with expe-
riences and values to which people aspire. 
Brand management capitalizes on the funda-
mental role that emotions play in shaping po-
litical views, cognizant that the latter are driven 
more by emotional processing and intuitions 
than calculation and reflection. Successful 
brand politicians therefore engage the heart be-
fore the mind of their voters. They create asso-
ciations between themselves, leadership, and 
good government that are so powerful they can 
mobilize support in previously untapped con-
stituencies, as well as across cleavages, there-
by weakening traditional organized opposition. 
These emotional bonds allow political candi-
dates to sidestep opposition promises based 
on material interest. To illustrate, Bogotá voters 
trusted mayor Antanas Mockus (1995-1997 and 
2001-2003), to the point where nearly 70,000 
met his invitation to pay 10 percent more than 
owed in taxes in order to support his policy im-
plementation (Pasotti 2009). 
While most cities continue to operate as growth 
machines, urban redevelopment recently tilt-
ed toward cultural and consumption-based 
strategies as governments increasingly focus 
on downtown recreation as the core of urban 
growth. The change reflects an identification 
of the knowledge economy as the main site of 
competition for global cities, which prescribes 
a shift from simply attracting investment to at-
tracting and retaining a mobile population of 
highly skilled knowledge workers with amenities 
that this “creative class” prizes (Florida 2002). 
Florida’s revolutionary growth prescription, 
quickly embraced worldwide, changed urban 
capitalism. Branding emerged as the key di-
mension, because politicians aimed to actually 
shape popular urban consumption. No longer 
just an illuminating parallel, commercial and 
political persuasion actually converged. 
This growth strategy also launched a new wave 
of redevelopment because the promotion 
of creative industries required socio-spatial 
transformations to provide experiences and 
leisure facilities that cities could market as hip 
and vibrant. Brand mayors sought constituency 
support for transformative urban redevelop-
ment through marketing operations that aug-
mented their personal cachet in conjunction 
with the status of their cities. Mauricio Macri’s 
government in Buenos Aires (2007-2015) offers 
a powerful illustration, as he imported brand 
management expertise from his previous stint 
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as chairman for Boca Juniors, an internation-
ally recognized football team. Government 
and place branding overlapped and reinforced 
Macri’s brand, down to the choice of golden 
yellow, Macri’s signature color, for all govern-
ment communication, buildings, vehicles, and 
venues. The brand invoked Buenos Aires as the 
cultural capital of Latin America, a message 
sustained by an explosion of city-sponsored 
cultural initiatives aimed to raise the city’s in-
ternational profile (often at the cost of local un-
derprivileged cultural consumption).
On the other side of the world, Seoul mayor Lee 
Myungbak (2002-2006) provided a similarly 
striking example when he moved city brand-
ing from an ad-hoc approach to a longer-term 
strategy. Lee connected his multiple iconic 
environmental interventions and Seoul’s nat-
ural and cultural heritage through the slogan “A 
Clean And Attractive Global City.” The campaign 
raised the city’s profile, dramatically increasing 
tourism and making Seoul the fifth city world-
wide for convention visitors.
Despite the different contexts, Macri and Lee 
shared an emphasis on branding and urban 
redevelopment. Typical of brand mayors, they 
built support for projects by branding them as 
key to the city’s future, thereby defining the le-
gitimate urban experience, the legitimate land 
use, and the target consumer and worker. For 
example, working-class neighborhoods were 
re-proposed as sites for gourmet dining, con-
temporary art, or high-tech hubs. The effect was 
a rise in global city rankings and a bond with 
voters that catapulted both mayors to the pres-
idency of their country - a glaring indication of 
the effectiveness of this political strategy.
Yet, these changes in urban governance have 
increasingly been matched by changes in re-
sistance. Governments seek support and legit-
imacy to pursue redevelopment plans, while 
protesters seek support and legitimacy to resist 
them. Governments and dissenters alike have 
reacted to the decline of traditional means of 
consensus building and mobilization by en-
gaging in forms of persuasion that target the 
individual citizen and are less mediated by po-
litical institutions. Both use communication 
strategies that include post-political images 
and slogans and exclude conventional politi-
cal messaging. Although these strategies have 
deep redistributive consequences, in rhetoric 
at least they often transcend previous cleav-
ages of contention.
Protest in the political branding era
To understand this shift in protest strategies, 
we need to consider the deep and widespread 
political, social, and technological changes of 
recent decades. Mobilizing structures that sup-
ported social movements until the 1980s no 
longer offer the same ideological, material, and 
organizational resources. Unions have declined 
in membership and influence (Baccaro & Howell 
2011; Murillo 2001). Programmatic mass parties 
of the left and far left have entered a protracted 
phase of deep crisis (Huber & Stephens 2001; 
Van Biezen, Mair, & Poguntke 2012). In some 
countries, austerity policies have given rise to 
new protest parties (Della Porta, Fernández, 
Kouki, & Mosca 2017). Yet the overall decline in 
references to class and labor facilitated a new, 
more individualized language in protests in line 
with fluid and atomized participation (Tarrow 
2013). These dynamics introduced significant 
obstacles to mobilization. While distinct pop-
ulations may suffer common grievances, they 
are fragmented because people lack and some-
times even reject membership in “integrative 
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structures” such as unions, parties, churches, 
or political groups that traditionally offer col-
lective identities, resources, and organizational 
structures (Bennett and Segerberg 2012).
These tectonic shifts are evident in urban rede-
velopment struggles, where essential elements 
of contemporary capitalism, such as conflicts 
over consumption, cultural production, and spa-
tial access, are revealed. Usually, communities 
facing redevelopment are too disadvantaged to 
mount organized protest. It is important to ex-
amine the cases in which residents are able to 
engage in resistance, especially among under-
privileged communities, because they are both 
rare and theoretically unexpected. 
In Resisting Redevelopment (Pasotti 2020), I 
show that protesters have adapted by deploy-
ing a set of instruments that I call “experiential 
tools.” Parallel to the strategic shift observed 
with the embrace of personal branding by may-
ors, this addition to the repertoire of contention 
(Tilly 1976) includes a wide range of activities 
designed to attract supporters by offering expe-
riences that their targeted participants will con-
sider defining and transformative. Participants 
are attracted to action by the psychic benefits 
of participation, often unrelated to the political 
goals of the protest; and persuasion happens 
not through speeches but rather through expe-
riences and self-discovery, in which emotions 
play a key role. Experiential tools can take many 
forms, but they are all instruments by which 
organizers seek to define and shape a commu-
nity of participants. They often take the shape 
of neighborhood festivals or similar communal 
events with hedonistic elements, and are some-
times combined with squatting or encamp-
ments. These activities attract large and diverse 
audiences, displaying clout and legitimacy to 
opponents and allies alike. As experiential tools 
have gained traction, artists have emerged as 
key economic and political actors due to their 
comparative advantage in creating seductive 
values and identities. 
In cities where traditional mobilizing structures 
still offer notable support to protestors, expe-
riential tools are less impactful. In Melbourne, 
unions have a tradition of joining protest ac-
tions at the request of and in support of resident 
groups, engaging in green and black bans that 
disrupt redevelopment. In Buenos Aires, unions 
are relatively strong, and organizations such as 
the Movement for Renters and Occupiers are 
actual union chapters – a linkage that provides 
renters and squatters with exceptional organi-
zational and mobilization resources. However, 
in most cities, unions are either weak or likely 
to side with redevelopment. Here, experiential 
tools can be a critical protest tool. 
Experiential tools do more than fill the gap left 
by union organizing, however. The shift from 
an industrial to service sector economy has 
important repercussions for contentious pol-
itics, because – especially in aspiring global 
cities - potential protest participants are more 
likely to be service providers. This means that 
they are inherently involved in the creation of 
experiences, whether for businesses (e.g. in fi-
nancial services or infrastructural support) or 
for consumers (e.g. in entertainment or educa-
tion). By the very nature of their jobs, service 
sector workers share a deep understanding of 
experience provision and therefore constitute 
an especially well-predisposed audience to be 
persuaded by experiential tools. Service sector 
workers and the creators of experiential tools, in 
a sense, speak the same language.
Experiential tools are not entirely new to social 
mobilization, but they are understudied, in-
creasingly prominent, and remarkably effective 
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at providing residents with political influence 
over redevelopment. What sets experiential 
tools apart from conventional moments of cel-
ebration in protest campaigns is that they are 
not the result of campaigns, as scholars have 
observed in the past, but rather the first tools of 
mobilization, deployed to grow and shape the 
base of support.
Experiential tools are not by themselves suffi-
cient for successful mobilization. They are most 
effective when combined with significant prior 
protest experience or dense organizational sup-
port networks – two variables long associated 
with mobilization. In over twenty-nine cases of 
protest in ten large cities across six continents, 
I find that the combination of experiential tools 
and either organizational networks or protest 
legacy emerges as necessary and sufficient 
for successful mobilization, even absent union 
support. 
Experiential tools manifest in four specific 
categories. Organized events are the most 
prominent type, as successful groups set out 
calendars packed with occasions for residents 
across different social groups to come togeth-
er. These typically light-hearted events, such as 
concerts, screenings of a documentary about 
the neighborhood, puppet shows, or commu-
nal meals, declare the appropriation of space 
by neighbors against the use intended by city 
government. 
Grassroots archives are a second type of expe-
riential tool. For example, in Santiago, residents 
came together in “memory workshops” to con-
struct the history of the barrio and elaborate 
its cultural significance. The resulting “heritage 
registry” consisted of an archive of local family 
histories, combining architectural with emo-
tional heritage – a critical linkage to legitimize, 
and thereby anchor, residents and small busi-
nesses in the neighborhood as they sought (and 
obtained) a heritage status declaration to stop 
redevelopment and displacement. The local 
archive included a barrio newspaper and oth-
er media, and culminated in the opening of a 
community museum. In a similar vein, protest-
ers in Hamburg devised an Archive of Desire, 
composed of ballot boxes allowing residents 
to express their collective aspirations for a 
threatened public space. A public housing es-
tate in Toronto illustrates experiential archives 
with a “memory wall,” developed as part of their 
Heritage Plan, which was meant to identify and 
communicate key historic, cultural and social 
references in order to integrate them in the re-
development of the estate. 
Two final types of experiential tools are neigh-
borhood tours and artistic performances. Both 
rely on the contribution of cultural producers 
and offer important platforms to attract media 
and institutional attention, as well as solidify 
mobilization. They often set the issue of rede-
velopment in an ironic context and offer a new 
way to talk about displacement, with a defamil-
iarization that stimulates awareness and crit-
icism. Most of these interventions are not cast 
as explicit protest, yet they constitute protest 
because they represent a conscious opposition 
to city plans.
Protestors’ experiential tools engaged with 
mayoral governance strategies in striking fash-
ion. For example, in Hamburg cultural produc-
ers skillfully deployed the government’s own 
branding discourse to acquire Gängeviertel, a 
large complex in a prime downtown area. The 
city had sold the lot for redevelopment – yet 
after protest, it purchased it back at a loss and 
gave it to protestors. Gängeviertel was gained 
through an occupation that was staged through 
an extremely smart experiential tool: an art 
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installation surprisingly turned, at the end of 
the evening’s event, into an “art-squat.” Police 
would have had to remove works of art rather 
than people, and this proved politically unsa-
vory given the government’s much-heralded 
embrace of culture-led growth. Protestors, 
based in the city’s alternative artistic milieu, 
devised the catchy slogan “Komm in die Gänge”, 
a play on words that means both “Come in the 
Alleys” and “Get Moving.” Their campaign was 
connected to a slick counter-branding cam-
paign called “Not In Our Name, Brand Hamburg” 
which reverberated nationally and interna-
tionally, and in which cultural producers stated 
their refusal to be pawns for the neoliberal cul-
ture-growth branding of the city. 
Typical of experiential tools, organizers em-
phasized grassroots control and activities with 
broad appeal. Squatters provided workshops, 
laboratories, and open spaces with low rents. 
Amateurs and professional artists were invited 
to utilize space next to each other, to produce 
an interesting, animated, and functional cul-
tural center. This inclusivity extended to chil-
dren, youth, seniors, people with disabilities, 
students, and freelancers interested in the arts. 
Network activation went well beyond the anar-
chist artist scene, as the group began to collab-
orate with art institutions throughout Hamburg. 
The innovative strategy was summarized by a 
leading activist: “We are less militant. We occu-
py with paintings. We protect ourselves with art. 
We try to get through differently, without black 
masks, by gaining sympathy instead” (interview 
with Nicole Vrenegor, journalist and activist, 
Hamburg, July 29 2011). 
This protest network launched several legisla-
tive initiatives, including rent caps, decriminal-
izing squatting, and eliminating discrimination 
against foreign-born applicants in public hous-
ing assignments. The campaign also influenced 
city electoral outcomes. Yet, developers also 
learned to appropriate experiential tools from 
activists, for example by plastering walls with 
posters that in aesthetics and language emu-
lated the protestors’ image-making. Passersby 
had to focus closely to recognize that the funky 
graphics and hip slogans in support of the proj-
ect were sponsored by the developer’s market-
ing campaign, and not by opposition activists. 
A further example is found in the Mullae Artist 
Village in Seoul, a decaying metalwork hub that 
recently attracted a vibrant artist community. 
Redevelopment and displacement in this area 
were prevented by using experiential tools for 
an extensive public outreach that legitimized 
the artists’ place in the neighborhood. As in 
Hamburg, the protestors’ discourse was per-
suasive because it paralleled the city’s own 
growth discourse. The narrative of revitalization 
through the convergence of industry and cul-
ture fit with an official position shared across 
the political spectrum. Both the leftist mayor 
Park Won-soon and the conservative president 
Park Chung-hee visited the Art Village in 2013, 
meeting with artists and ironworkers and prais-
ing the neighborhood as a model of an artist’s 
haven and artist-led regeneration. Just as the 
city branded Seoul as a hybrid of tradition and 
modernity, the artists’ narrative highlighted the 
ironworkers’ endangered historical legacy, and 
revived it through their innovation.
Branding is indeed an essential feature of con-
temporary urban politics. City governments rely 
on branding to legitimize and build support for 
their initiatives. Opponents find that branding, 
and especially experiential tools, are critical to 
raising awareness, including building collective 
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place-based identities, fostering participants’ 
commitment, publicizing concerns, and dis-
playing political clout to allies and targets – all 
key steps in a struggle’s mobilization and impact. 
Mobilization without the remarkable inventive-
ness and attractiveness of experiential tools 
faces obstacles that only significant institu-
tional support can overcome. Thus, experiential 
tools are especially precious to groups that lack 
such institutional connection, or that are new 
to protest – characteristics that are common 
among vulnerable residents facing evictions.   
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Economic development, migration, and ur-
banization, are transforming cities across the 
world, contributing to diversity along ethnic, 
religious, and socioeconomic lines. An array of 
social groups reside in cities like Berlin, Nairobi, 
Jerusalem, and Chicago. However urban seg-
regation, conceptualized as “the extent to 
which individuals of different groups occupy 
or experience different social environments” 
(Reardon and O’Sullivan 2004), limits inter-
group engagement.
In figure 1, I provide a descriptive account of 
residential segregation between migrants and 
European natives in Berlin, London, and Paris.1 
This figure demonstrates significant variation 
in the spatial distribution of groups within and 
across cities. Such variation in residential seg-
regation has been shown to have important 
political, economic, and social consequences 
(Kasara 2013; Trounstine 2016; Nathan 2016; 
Ejdemyr, Kramon and Robinson 2018; Tajima, 
Samphantharak and Ostwald 2018).
Indeed, urban segregation significantly shapes 
the most central phenomena that interest po-
1. Specifically, I divide each city into 100x100 meter cells, and calculate a commonly used diversity score (entropy index) for each 
cell. Data for these maps was provided by the Knowledge Centre on Migration and Demography, as well as the National Statistical 
Institutes DESTATIS (Germany), and INSEE (France). Replication materials can be accessed at: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/
dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/YLLX8V 
litical scientists, including: voting behavior 
(Enos 2016), public goods provision (Tajima, 
Samphantharak and Ostwald 2018), political 
violence (Bhavnani et al. 2014), elite favoritism 
(Ejdemyr, Kramon and Robinson 2018), discrim-
ination (Enos and Gidron 2016), and intergroup 
attitudes (Kasara, 2013). It follows that under-
standing the social and political attitudes and 
behaviors of citizens and elites, requires paying 
close attention to the distribution of those citi-
zens and elites across urban space (Enos 2017). 
Since physical and psychological barriers divide 
cities into neighborhoods and intensify social 
divisions, and since such social divisions impact 
multiple political and economic interactions, a 
first step towards understanding the multiple 
effects of segregation entails exploring its links 
with intergroup relations.
In this paper, I discuss the role of urban segrega-
tion in shaping intergroup relations. As depicted 
in Figure 2, I emphasize the central theoretical 
and empirical focus on residential segregation 
as a cause, and intergroup contact as a mech-
anism shaping intergroup relations (Kasara 
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2013; Bhavnani et al. 2014; Eric Oliver and Wong 
2003; Bazzi et al. 2019; Bowyer 2009; Sturgis 
et al. 2011).2 In doing so, I review studies from 
American and comparative politics which con-
sider how, why, and under what conditions does 
segregation affect intergroup relations.
I then turn to critically evaluate our current un-
derstanding of the links between segregation, 
contact, and intergroup relations. I suggest that 
2. Segregation has been shown to affect intergroup attitudes through psychological mechanisms which are orthogonal to inter-
group contact (Enos and Celaya 2018). However, in this short piece I focus on the role of direct interactions. For a rich psycholog-
ical theory of geography and intergroup relations which considers mechanisms other than intergroup contact, see Enos (2017).
an exciting avenue for future research on urban 
segregation entails unpacking the black-box of 
intergroup contact, which links residential pat-
terns with intergroup relations. Specifically, I 
propose that scholars of urban segregation can 
draw on recent advances in the study of social 
contact (Scacco and Warren 2018; Mousa 2020; 
Rao 2019; Weiss 2020), and develop theoretical 
and empirical frameworks which pay closer at-
tention to the types of contact yielded by res-
idential patterns, and their diverging effects on 
intergroup relations.
What do we know about residential  
segregation and intergroup relations?
Social scientists have long considered the distri-
bution of racial and ethnic groups across space 
Figure 1: 
Urban Residential 
Segregation of Natives 
and Migrants - The upper 
three panels map entropy 
scores for 100x100 meter 
grids in Berlin, London and 
Paris. Darker shades denote 
increased diversity, whereas 
lighter shades represent 
residentially segregated 
areas. The lower three 
panels plot the distribution 
of 100x100 cells from each 
city by their entropy score. 
Entropy scores closer to 
0 represent residentially 
segregated cells. Entropy 
scores are calculated based 
on census data recording 
the origin of residents from 
different countries in each 
100x100 meter grid using 
the diverse R package.
Figure 2: 
Theorized Relationship 
between Segregation, 
Contact and Prejudice
Berlin London Paris
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An exciting avenue for 
future research on urban 
segregation entails 
unpacking the black-box 
of intergroup contact, 
which links residential 
patterns with intergroup 
relations.
as a potent determinant of intergroup rela-
tions. These explorations are often linked to 
early theories of racial threat (Key 1949), and 
intergroup contact (Allport 1954). 
The racial threat framework suggests 
that whites’ racial animosity increas-
es with the share of Blacks in their 
population. The contact hypothe-
sis suggests that under favorable 
conditions, direct engagement with 
out-groups can reduce prejudice. 
At times, these frameworks are pit-
ted against each other as competing 
theories. However, it is important to 
acknowledge that to a great extent Key (1949) 
and Allport (1954) focus on different questions, 
causes, and mechanisms.
Building on these early frameworks, scholars of 
American politics have leveraged granular cen-
sus files, geocoded surveys, and voting records, 
in order to empirically examine the relations 
between segregation and intergroup relations 
(Giles and Hertz 1994; Oliver and Mendelberg 
2000; Enos 2017). There is evidence to suggest 
that residents of diverse neighborhoods devel-
op more tolerant attitudes (Oliver and Wong 
2003). However, recent studies of the second 
great migration in California, and the demolition 
of public housing in Chicago, suggest that prox-
imity to minority communities may engender 
conservative political preferences, and support 
towards racially charged policies (Enos 2016; 
Reny and Newman 2020).
At first, data limitations hindered compara-
tive explorations of segregation (Kasara 2013). 
Nonetheless, in recent years scholars overcame 
these challenges providing rigorous evidence 
regarding the links between residential patterns 
3. However, it is important to acknowledge that socio-economic conditions and social distance may be a cause of segregation. 
Therefore, empirically identifying their moderating effects introduces challenges relating to posttreatment bias (Montgomery, 
Nyhan and Torres 2018).
and intergroup relations in many different con-
texts, including: Kenya, Iraq, Israel, Indonesia, 
and Turkey (Weidmann and Salehyan 2013; 
Bhavnani et al. 2014; Enos and Gidron 2016; 
Hjorth 2017; Robinson 2017; Bazzi et al. 2019; 
Livny 2020). 
A groundbreaking analysis of segregation pat-
terns in Kenya, finds that residents of segre-
gated areas are less trusting towards members 
of other ethnic groups (Kasara 2013), and this 
in turn results in higher levels of intergroup vi-
olence (Kasara 2017). Similarly, analyses of 
cross- and sub-national survey data from Africa 
demonstrate that ethnic diversity paired with 
segregation results in lower levels of intergroup 
trust (Robinson 2017). In contrast, survey evi-
dence from India demonstrates that residential 
proximity increases group based preferences 
for co-ethnic leaders, and does not promote 
more tolerant attitudes (Spater 2020). Similarly, 
analyses of public opinion data from Britain do 
not find evidence for a strong relationship be-
tween segregation and generalized trust. Lastly, 
empirically grounded agent based models of 
violence in Jerusalem, suggest that segrega-
tion may actually reduce intergroup conflict 
when social distance between groups is large 
(Bhavnani et al. 2014).
Taken together, the existing evidence regard-
ing the effects of segregation on intergroup re-
lations is somewhat mixed. More so, multiple 
contextual variables including socio-economic 
conditions (Oliver and Mendelberg 2000), the 
salience of national rhetoric (Hopkins 2010), 
social distance (Bhavnani et al. 2014), and group 
size (Enos and Gidron 2016), are thought to 
moderate the effects of segregation on inter-
group relations.3 Therefore, one interpretation 
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of these conflicting findings may suggest that 
segregation has diverging effects across differ-
ent contexts. In other words, the mere fact that 
members of different groups share spaces, does 
not alone determine the quality of intergroup 
relations. Consequentially, scholars ought to 
consider the nature of intergroup relations 
which emerge in the shadow of segregation and 
integration (Varshney 2003).
Residential patterns, types of contact, 
and intergroup relations
As demonstrated in Figure 2, political scien-
tists often suggest that segregation affects 
intergroup relations through a mechanism of 
intergroup contact (Kasara 2013; Eric Oliver 
and Wong 2003; Bazzi et al. 2019; Bowyer 2009; 
Sturgis et al. 2011). The logic of this argument is 
as follows: Segregation limits intergroup con-
tact; therefore, in-groups in segregated envi-
ronments rarely get a chance to engage with 
out-groups and collect information and positive 
experiences which reduce prejudice. Despite its 
intuitiveness, several empirical patterns com-
plicate this notion:
1. Residential patterns are one determinant 
of contact. However, their centrality may 
be attenuated in urban contexts, if mobili-
ty and shared institutions connect citizens 
from different backgrounds.
2. Different residential patterns, as well as 
other urban characteristics, may account 
for divergent types of intergroup contact.
3. Different types of contact likely have het-
erogeneous effects on intergroup relations.
4. These different effects vary in their magni-
tude and duration.
The limited theoretical and empirical consider-
ation of contact as a complex mechanism which 
can either impair or improve intergroup rela-
tions is understandable. Indeed, until recently, 
evidence regarding the heterogeneous effects 
of different types of contact was rather limited. 
However, recent advances in the intergroup 
contact literature can help us make significant 
strides towards a robust understanding of the 
relations between segregation, contact, and 
prejudice.
Following calls to rigorously evaluate Allport’s 
theoretical framework (Paluck and Green 2009; 
Paluck, Green and Green 2019), a recent wave 
of experimental studies has demonstrated the 
heterogeneous effects of different types of con-
tact. Generally, we have evidence to suggest 
that collaborative intergroup contact reduces 
prejudice, whereas adversarial contact impairs 
intergroup relations (Lowe 2018). More specif-
ically, engaging with out-groups as part of soc-
cer leagues in Erbil and Qarqosh (Mousa 2020), 
or vocational programs in Kaduna (Scacco and 
Warren 2018), has been shown to promote more 
tolerant behavior. Similarly, diverse schools in 
Mumbai (Rao 2019), and Israeli medical clinics 
which facilitate intergroup contact between pa-
tients and doctors (Weiss 2020), contribute to 
favorable intergroup relations. These insights 
suggest that specific forms of engagement with-
in urban space may promote positive intergroup 
relations.
However, interactions with out-groups are not a 
panacea for intergroup relations. Indeed, brief 
exposure to Hispanic workers in Boston train 
stations (Enos 2014), and casual contact with 
out-group daily laborers in Afghanistan (Condra 
and Linardi 2019) have been shown to impair in-
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tergroup relations.4 Clearly, not all types of con-
tact improve intergroup relations, and absent 
meaningful engagement, diversity may enhance 
animosity between members of different groups.
Unpacking the blackbox of intergroup 
contact
Building on recent patterns in the social con-
tact literature, I suggest that scholars of segre-
gation unpack the blackbox of contact, which 
links between segregation and intergroup rela-
tions. As depicted in Figure 3, residential pat-
terns may lead to positive, negative, or neutral 
forms of intergroup engagement. These in turn 
will collectively shape intergroup relations in 
a complex fashion. By unpacking the blackbox 
of intergroup contact, researchers can get a 
richer understanding of the types of interac-
tions that occur in different segregated and 
integrated urban spaces. Consequently, these 
understandings will provide insight not only to 
whether segregation shapes intergroup rela-
tions, but also to why and under what condi-
tions does tolerance emerge.
4. In the immigration literature, recent studies demonstrate that brief exposure to migrants also promotes exclusionary attitudes 
and behaviors (Hangartner et al. 2019; Dinas et al. 2019).
Unpacking the blackbox of intergroup contact 
introduces a host of unexplored yet interesting 
questions for scholars of segregation:
1. Do different residential patterns lead to 
varying types of intergroup contact?
2. Can shared institutions (e.g. schools, asso-
ciational organization, hospitals) increase 
the share of positive interactions in segre-
gated urban spaces?
3. How do institutions which promote positive 
contact, moderate the general effects of 
segregation?
4. Do negative (or positive) experiences of in-
tergroup contact increase (or decrease) so-
cial sorting and preferences for segregation 
and social distance?
Answering these questions in a rigorous man-
ner is likely beyond the scope of any one indi-
vidual study. Still, future research should aim to 
draw more explicit links between the empirical 
study of residential patterns, and the emerging 
social contact literature. Specifically, schol-
ars of segregation can build on recent findings 
and ask, what types of engagement segrega-
tion promotes in the case(s) they are analyzing. 
Concurrently, scholars of intergroup contact 
may ask: how might micro-effects inform broad-
er patterns of segregation (Humphreys and 
Scacco 2020). These efforts will likely promote 
a stronger understanding of the links between 
segregation, contact, and intergroup relations.  
Figure 3: 
Opening the Blackbox: 
Segregation may cause 
different types of contact, 
which in turn shape inter-
group relations
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For comparativists interested in the determi-
nants of political behavior and the consequenc-
es of politics on ordinary citizens, capturing 
the experiences of urban informal workers is 
critical. Informal workers encompass 62% of 
global employment and generate one-third of 
GDP, and more than half of the world’s popula-
tion lives in cities (Kok and Berrios, 2019; World 
Bank 2019). There are also important questions 
specific to this population: How are urban infor-
mal populations politically mobilized? Under 
what conditions will they shift to more formal 
work? How does politics shape their business 
environment? 
However, conducting representative surveys 
of informal urban populations such as mar-
ket traders, slum residents, or informal work-
ers poses many challenges. The set of areas is 
not always obvious; identifying the universe of 
slums or markets can be difficult. Further, it is 
difficult to identify the population of interest, 
such as residents or traders or workers. For ex-
ample, government agencies rarely keep lists of 
markets, let alone lists of traders. Private associ-
ations are common, but they closely guard their 
membership lists. Rapid population movement 
in and out of cities and within-city migration 
cause further challenges (Auerbach et al. 2018). 
 Quick solutions can damage survey representa-
tiveness. For example, one strategy sometimes 
used for trader surveys is a city block sampling 
strategy, where enumerators are instructed to 
stand at the corner of a city block, face in a spe-
cific direction, and approach the Nth shop on 
the right or left. This strategy imposes a level of 
order on urban areas that is not always realis-
tic; many urban areas do not have a Manhattan 
grid-style structure to their streets. Some areas 
might have multi-story buildings, and it is not 
clear how this sampling strategy handles such 
idiosyncrasies. Importantly, the city block sam-
pling strategy permits enumerator discretion. 
Enumerators could count in such a way that 
allows them to approach a friendly or less busy 
trader.
How can researchers define a target population 
and create a sample frame for informal urban 
populations? How can we select respondents 
from a sample frame in such a way that mini-
mizes bias? Researchers commonly use a more 
sophisticated approach, what we term the “grid 
& random walk” approach. Here researchers use 
satellite imagery to impose a grid over an area, 
and sample cells from the grid (Auerbach 2017, 
Hummel 2017, Paller 2015). Enumerators then 
start from a randomly sampled point in the cell 
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and follow a random walk protocol. Variants on 
this include sampling buildings from cells using 
satellite imagery. This method can allow the re-
searcher to cover larger geographic areas, but 
minimizing enumerator discretion in 
which individual is surveyed can be 
resource intensive. 
In what follows we describe two strat-
egies that we think are relatively new 
to simplify the process of reducing 
enumerator discretion. We have 
employed these strategies in eight 
surveys of 3,208 traders in Nigeria and Benin 
between 2015 and 2019. We term these the “full 
census” and “grid & partial census” approaches, 
and describe the conditions under which each is 
more suited. Last, we discuss how ignoring shop 
sharing (when two distinct businesses share the 
same shop) and traders owning multiple shops 
can bias samples. 
Sampling strategies for informal 
populations
Full census
The first approach, the full census approach, 
involves creating complete listings for sampling 
units (like individuals or shops) in a sample 
frame, randomly sampling from these listings, 
and directing enumerators to specific respon-
dents.1 This method minimizes enumerator 
discretion, but the census itself can be resource 
intensive. If the population of interest covers a 
geographically large area, boundaries may need 
to be imposed to conduct the census, sacrific-
ing some breadth of coverage. Put differently, 
there may be less overlap between the popula-
tion of interest and the sample frame.  
1. For other examples of this approach see Aker (2010), Hardy and Mccasland (2019), and Thachil (2017).
For one of our projects, the Lagos Trader Survey, 
the population of interest was in a dense com-
mercial area, making the full census appropriate. 
The Lagos Trader Survey is a panel survey, now in 
its fourth round, focusing on wholesale traders 
of manufactured goods. We deemed a census of 
traders in plazas (small multi-story buildings) to 
be our best approximation of the population of 
interest. A common starting point for creating a 
sample frame of informal populations is to com-
bine government data with qualitative on-the-
ground research to identify the boundaries of 
slums or other types of communities, and we did 
just this. We started with a list of plazas from the 
Lagos Waste Management Authority. While us-
ing government data to create a sampling frame 
can be undesirable for studies of informal pop-
ulations, in this case, because the agency col-
lects trash from markets, and because the state 
government subsidizes the collection, its lists 
included even poorer markets. We then sup-
plemented this list substantially with additional 
scouting trips around the city, having research 
assistants map out plazas not already in our list-
ing. (See Figure 1 for an example of what these 
maps looked like for a similar survey.) Next, a 
team of research assistants counted all shops in 
every building from the trash agency list and our 
newly mapped areas (N=52,830 shops). They 
also noted what type of product the shop sold. 
After excluding shops selling food, or providing 
services and office spaces, we had a listing of 
24,159 shops.
The next step was more complicated. We could 
sample textile shop “number 2” on the third floor 
of a plaza, but “number 2” meant nothing, sub-
stantively. We only knew, for example, that that 
floor had two textile sellers. We wanted to di-
rect the enumerator to a specific one to reduce 
Conducting 
representative surveys 
of informal urban 
populations poses many 
challenges.
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enumerator discretion. But we could not provide 
additional information on the shop. We decided 
to randomly sample a number between 1 and the 
total number of textile shops on that floor, and 
then randomly sampled “left” or “right.” 
We then instructed enumerators to enter the 
third floor of the plaza, turn left, and approach the 
second textile shop. However, these instructions 
were imprecise; two enumerators could follow 
the instructions and end up at different shops if 
they arrived at the floor using different entranc-
es. Nevertheless, this did not matter, as the goal 
was for the enumerators to think we had pre- 
selected a shop. When enumerators asked about 
the multiple entrance issue, we advised them to 
use the main entrance. Ultimately, however, we 
were indifferent to which entrance they used, as 
long as they thought we had a pre-selected shop.
For this reason, policing the sampling strategy 
was not simple. We had auditors assess whether 
the interviewed trader could have been select-
ed by following the sampling strategy. Could 
this shop have possibly been the second tex-
tile shop from an entrance? This was not always 
straightforward. Sometimes shops are closed, 
and therefore it’s not possible to determine 
what they are selling. An enumerator might thus 
identify what she perceives to be the second 
textile shop, while the auditor counts it as the 
fifth if more shops were open when she visited. 
We therefore asked auditors to be generous in 
their assessment. But if the shop did not sell tex-
tiles or was on the wrong floor, for example, that 
indicated a violation of the sampling protocol. 
Because the sample frame was in a relatively 
dense area, auditors could audit sampling for 
five surveys a day. 
By reducing enumerator discretion, we are 
minimizing several data challenges. When enu-
merators approach traders who seem easier 
to interview, this could cause researchers to 
underestimate firm size, as less busy traders 
may have smaller businesses. Conversely, other 
forms of discretion could result in overestimat-
ing firm size: when sampling strategies do not 
account for buildings with multiple floors, enu-
merators may be more likely to survey traders 
on the ground floor, where rent is more expen-
sive. In some contexts firm size may correlate 
with partisanship, biasing political data. Further, 
by listing out the full sample, we reduce the like-
lihood of two enumerators surveying the same 
respondent, which could be a challenge with 
random walk protocols.  
Grid & partial census
While the full census approach made sense for 
a target population in such a dense area, we use 
a different strategy where the population of in-
terest is more dispersed. One of these projects 
is an ongoing study of used clothing traders dis-
persed across Abeokuta and Ibadan, two south-
western Nigerian cities. For this survey, we use a 
grid & partial census approach. 
We began with team members conducting 
scouting trips to each city, and in collaboration 
with locals who knew these cities well, identi-
fying the commercial areas that had the used 
clothing businesses we aimed to cover. Using 
Google Maps, we then shaded the parts of the 
city with these businesses. From there, we im-
posed a grid over the entire city, and randomly 
sampled an equal proportion of cells from the 
mapped area with a high density of eligible busi-
nesses, and from the non-mapped areas. Cells 
from the latter category allowed us to capture 
businesses in residential neighborhoods. We 
diverged from existing strategies in avoiding the 
random walk strategy; rather we asked enumer-
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Figure 1: 
TMG Consulting created a 
map for us of a used clothing 
market. Research assistants 
then used this map to create 
the listing by counting shops, 
and noting the product 
being sold, in each building. 
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ators to conduct a census of shops in each cell, 
and then attempt to survey 100% of traders in 
that cell who met the criteria defining our target 
population. 
These cell-level censuses aimed to minimize 
discretion that emerges with random walk pro-
tocols that lack strong auditing on the sampling 
procedure, within a sampling strategy designed 
to cover a broad geographic area. In the pilot for 
this survey, pairs of enumerators both conduct-
ed the census and conducted surveys in their 
cell. For the full survey, one team will conduct 
the census, and another will complete the sur-
veys. This will further limit discretion by disin-
centivizing strategically leaving certain shops 
off the census. Additionally, we have clear pro-
tocols for handling literal edge cases, like a shop 
that is between a sampled and unsampled cell.
Contextual factors may force modifications to 
the ideal version of the grid & partial census ap-
proach. For example, having one team conduct 
a census and another conduct the surveys is 
relatively straightforward when traders are in 
plazas on particular floors where shops have 
distinct attributes.   This was more complicat-
ed for a pilot survey we conducted in a Lagos 
used clothing market, where some traders were 
in nameless single-floor buildings, and others 
selling from permanent metal structures with 
roofs, but no door. It would be difficult for the 
census conductors to write out information that 
would lead an enumerator to one metal struc-
ture versus another. We experimented with 
using What3Words, an app that collects GIS 
coordinates, and transforms the coordinates 
into three words (like table.apple.blanket) that 
can be easily shared. But when enumerators at-
tempted to find shops with What3Words, poor 
cellular networks, combined with What3Words’ 
three-meter square bandwidth (and high mar-
ket density) made it difficult for enumerators to 
identify the unique business. In these types of 
markets, it may be necessary for enumerators 
to both conduct the census and the surveys to 
avoid these issues. 
Without the full-cell census, enumerators may 
be tempted to survey traders available to be sur-
veyed on the day they visit the area. This could 
lead researchers to underestimate firm size, as 
temporarily unavailable traders may be wealthy 
enough to travel within Nigeria, to other West 
African countries, or even to China or Dubai to 
purchase goods. Further, more marginalized 
traders may be more reluctant to be surveyed, 
and so to complete many surveys, enumerators 
may prefer to survey a different trader instead of 
following up with the reluctant trader later in the 
week. We mitigate these challenges by attempt-
ing to survey all eligible traders in each cell. 
Addressing sampling obstacles due to 
shop sharing and owning multiple shops
In our surveying, we have identified two 
firm-specific obstacles that we have worked to 
address. First, there is a phenomenon in West 
Africa, and likely elsewhere, of shop sharing. To 
avoid taxes and stay profitable during economic 
downturns, two or more traders may share one 
physical space. One does not work for the oth-
er, and they are not co-owners; they have sep-
arate businesses in the same small shop. We 
addressed this by having questions in the sur-
vey about shop sharing, taking time to develop 
a protocol for what counts as shop sharing so 
that the enumerator could help the trader de-
cide if they were a shop sharer. If a trader reports 
shop sharing, the enumerator creates a new 
tracking sheet for the second individual, and 
aims to survey that trader as well. Shop sharing 
is an extremely common phenomenon and it 
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is important for future surveys to capture this 
information: in surveys of used clothing traders 
in Lagos and Cotonou, 26% and 32% of traders 
respectively report shop sharing. 
The second phenomenon is of traders having 
multiple shops, and we have observed that this 
is common as well: in a representative survey of 
traders in plazas across Lagos in 2018 we found 
that 26% of traders reported having at least one 
other shop. Among those with other shops, 75% 
had one other shop and 25% had more than 
one other shop. It is unclear how previous firm 
surveys have dealt with this. Our solution has 
been to ask traders if they have any other shops, 
and if they do, to request that they answer all 
questions (e.g. questions about revenue) for all 
of their shops together. This has proven a lit-
tle tricky, as it is unclear if traders think in this 
way. We have also had to devise strategies to 
ensure that we do not survey what we think is a 
new business but is in fact a shop owned by a re-
spondent who we already surveyed. 
Asking about shop sharing and multiple shop 
ownership matters for correctly measuring firm 
size, an outcome of interest in many studies. In 
the absence of information about shop sharing, 
one could overestimate firm size; for example, 
researchers may use shop rent as a proxy for firm 
size, but two shop sharers may split the rent. In 
the absence of information about multiple shop 
ownership, researchers could under-estimate 
firm size if traders respond to questions about 
their business by only thinking about the shop 
they are currently in. 
Conclusion
In conclusion, we believe that our surveys have 
highlighted innovative tactics for sampling 
informal urban populations. We believe our 
strategies can help to minimize enumerator dis-
cretion and more accurately measure firm size. 
We hope that by describing the practicalities of 
various sampling strategies researchers will be 
better able to design their own. 
These sampling strategies have led to several 
important findings. In a World Politics article, we 
look at the determinants of private good gover-
nance in Lagos market associations (Grossman 
2020). While existing research often suggests 
that private good governance should thrive 
when predatory state actors keep their hands 
out of group affairs, we find that under some 
conditions the threat of state intervention moti-
vates private group leaders to conduct in-group 
policing and support trade. In the absence of 
these state threats, private group leaders may 
extort from their own traders. In another paper, 
Meredith Startz estimates the size of contract-
ing frictions traders face when importing their 
products, and shows that there would be large 
welfare gains to policies that facilitate market 
integration (2018).  
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How1 do people think about, relate to, and ex-
perience their local communities? What impli-
cations do such personal processes have for 
individuals’ political views and choices?  These 
questions are relevant for analyses of urban po-
litical behavior as well as the study of those who 
call suburbs, towns and villages home.  More 
broadly, these considerations should concern 
all students of political behavior and political 
outcomes, since a local lens can color the ways 
citizens perceive and engage in politics.   
Recent explorations into the local dimensions 
of political behavior across a range of countries 
have yielded critical insights into phenomena 
such as economic voting (Larsen et al. 2019), 
party support (Patana 2018; Baker et al. 2020), 
views on inequality (Newman et al. 2018), per-
ceptions of crime trends (Bessen and Fitzgerald 
2019), political engagement (Nelson-Nuñez 
2019), support for violence (Linke et al. 2018), 
and participation in forest restoration (Chang 
and Andersson 2019). As our locally-oriented 
knowledge of politics deepens, I propose that 
we stand to enhance our scholarly treatment of 
the subject in two main ways. First, we can de-
vote careful attention to the political behavior 
1. Many thanks to Eugene Finkel and Lisel Hintz for their thoughtful comments and suggestions. This essay is dedicated to three 
groundbreaking scholars: Susan Clarke, Nonna Mayer, and (the late) Sophie Body-Gendrot.
of the “locally embedded individual,” meaning 
that, in addition to studying contextual effects 
(as measured through community-level indica-
tors of a variety of local features and conditions) 
on citizens’ political behavior, we also consider 
the political implications of the ways individu-
als relate to their communities. Second, we can 
work to specify the conditions under which, and 
the processes through which, locally embedded 
individuals forge mental connections between 
their day-to-day local lives and the political 
arena. 
In this essay, I draw on classic and contemporary 
literature, as well as fieldwork I conducted in ru-
ral France—corroborated by statistical analyses 
of data from multiple countries—to sketch out 
a set of locally-based concepts that matter for 
political behavior. In my own research, I find 
that these factors influence support for radical 
right parties in national elections (Fitzgerald 
and Lawrence 2011; Fitzgerald 2018) and shape 
citizen attitudes on immigration (Fitzgerald 
2012; Bessen and Fitzgerald 2019).  Yet the po-
tential for these considerations to influence 
different aspects of political behavior, I suspect, 
are much more wide-ranging.  I therefore aim to 
Jennifer Fitzgerald 
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Political Science, University 
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LOCALLY EMBEDDED POLITICAL BEHAVIOR:  
“My Town Is My Steeple.” 1   
by Jennifer Fitzgerald 
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encourage comparative researchers to expand 
their thinking about individuals’ ties to their lo-
cal contexts and the resultant implications for 
myriad political outcomes across communities, 
across countries, and over time. By emphasiz-
ing the relatively general concept of the local, I 
invite scholars of urban politics to further ex-
plore the implications of embeddedness as it 
applies to residents of cities’ constitutive neigh-
borhoods and broader metro areas. 
Affective and structural community ties
Decades of scholarship demonstrate that local 
contexts shape many forms of political behav-
ior (e.g. Books and Prysby 1991; Huckfeldt et al. 
1993; Dancygier 2010; Boulding 2014; Charnysh 
2015).2  Yet our understanding of how, when, and 
where individuals’ ties to their communities 
matter for politics lags in comparison. 
One important distinction to make 
when attempting to unpack local ties 
is that feelings about a place or com-
munity differ from actual participa-
tion in it. This nuanced approach to 
studying local embeddedness has a 
distinguished intellectual pedigree, traceable 
back to LaPiere, who specified the attitude-be-
havior gap (1934): that one’s feelings or view-
points can be independent of, and possibly 
tension with, one’s actions.3
Putnam (1966) details the importance of this 
gap for the study of electoral politics, putting 
Campbell’s (1958) theorizing on the impor-
tance of community identification and percep-
tions of community norms for voter behavior 
into conversation with Berelson et al.’s (1954) 
2. Maxwell (2019) contributes an important counter-point to the local context literature, arguing that compositional effects trump 
contextual ones with respect to attitudes about immigrants among urban versus rural populations.  
3. Key works in comparative politics illustrate similar complexity through the study of public actions and their (debatable) links to 
people’s privately held views (see Scott 1990; Wedeen 1999).
emphasis on the role of social engagement and 
interpersonal networks in influencing citizen 
vote choice. Putnam writes:
“Whereas Campbell’s theory emphasizes a resi-
dent’s psychological attachment to his commu-
nity, the social interaction theory emphasizes 
the resident’s social involvement in the com-
munity.  Obviously, we would expect these two 
factors—psychological attachment and social 
involvement—to be related, but they are distinct, 
both logically and (it will turn out) empirically” 
(1966, 641).  
Fresh insights into individuals’ conceptual-
izations of their localities stem from Wong et 
al. (2020), who task research subjects with 
map-drawing and otherwise describing their 
communities, and Cramer’s (2016) exploration 
into place-based identities and politics.
 Similarly, my own research shows that the ways 
in which individuals relate to their local commu-
nities can have significant implications for their 
likelihood of supporting a radical right party in 
national elections (Fitzgerald 2018).  But I also 
find that there are major differences in the po-
litical implications of distinct kinds of local ties. 
Feeling connected to one’s local community 
(measured, for instance, as local belonging, lo-
cal attachment, or local identity) renders rad-
ical right parties more appealing.  In contrast, 
active engagement in one’s local community 
diminishes the attractiveness of radical right 
parties.  These insights further underscore the 
importance of distinguishing feelings about 
one’s community from actual social and orga-
nizational engagement in it, offering a small-
Feeling connected to 
one’s local community 
renders radical right 
parties more appealing.
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scale perspective on the notion of “imagined 
communities” (Anderson 2006 [1983]) that has 
divergent electoral effects when compared with 
in-person local interactions.  
For methodological purposes, I advocate ask-
ing individuals how they feel about their com-
munities and also detailing patterns of their 
engagement with others in their local lives.  In 
these ways we can enrich our comprehension of 
local contextual effects by seeing communities 
through residents’ own eyes. Statements elicit-
ed through just such an exercise conducted in 
France demonstrate the value of this approach. 
The quotations from my fieldwork that I supply 
in this essay come from small towns and villag-
es with relatively high levels of Le Pen (National 
Front, now National Rally) voting. Yet my inter-
view prompts were not specific to anything po-
litical; in this instance I asked about the nature 
of changes in the area in recent decades.
“We have 36,000 distinct communities in France. 
This is huge! We like our little communities. And 
we love our steeples. You know that we are a lit-
tle regionally biased and we love our home… we 
are all very attached to our commune. Yes, a 
great deal. That’s quite typical.  In general, the 
French, it’s ‘my steeple.’ There you have it.” 4
This villager professes his deep affection for the 
community he calls home, drawing attention 
to the profoundly impactful symbolism of the 
church steeple that serves as a landmark, a 
4. French communes are the lowest level of state administration, akin to municipalities elsewhere.
5. Astor’s study of anti-Mosque movements in Spain unearths a similar sentiment in the Greater Barcelona metropolitan area: 
“Catalonia means my neighborhood, my park, my street – they are not as nice as those in the center, but those are not mine. So if 
you take this away from me, what do I have left?” (2016, 115). 
6. A parallel conceptual distinction comes from Eulau and Rothberg, who offer an abstract depiction in the form of a series of pro-
gressively larger concentric circles to denote multiple, over-lapping life spheres in which an individual (the point at the circles’ 
center) is situated.  The authors separate out the notions of contexts and environments, clarifying that a context is “something 
that emerges out of interpersonal relations” (1986, 131).  In contrast, they explicate that “environments are more remote, more 
stable, and less contingent on changes in personnel than is context” (1986: 131). 
feature of distinction, and a source of pride.5  To 
distinguish feelings for community from active 
engagement in it, this individual later returns to 
the subject of the village steeple.  
“And I find this more and more. My town is my 
steeple. That’s it – we’re back to the steeple. 
People need a communal identity, even if they 
don’t participate.”
This is an astute observation about the ways the 
psychological and social dimensions of com-
munity engagement differ.6  That people may 
feel tied to a community in which they spend 
and invest little time reminds us of the complex 
nature of local ties.
Neighboring
Local social networks in general and neighborly 
ties more specifically can affect various polit-
ical orientations and actions (Bourdieu 1986; 
Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Mayer 1999).  Just 
as affective and social ties to communities mer-
it nuanced attention from researchers, local 
embeddedness involves similarly distinct as-
pects of neighborly relationships. Yet what po-
litical scientists have not done especially well is 
to separate out, conceptually and operational-
ly, the political implications of how people feel 
about their neighbors as compared to the ways 
in which they are actively connected to them. 
Community psychologists pioneered this prac-
tice, differentiating affective from social dimen-
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sions of neighboring in their research (Unger 
and Wandersman 1985). Sociology supplies 
similarly distinct concepts for latent versus 
manifest neighborliness.  According to Mann, 
“neighborliness is a twofold concept. On the 
one hand, there is what will be called ‘manifest 
neighborliness.’ This is characterized by overt 
forms of social relationships, such as mutual 
visiting in the home and going out for purposes 
of pleasure. On the other hand, there is what will 
be termed ‘latent neighborliness,’ which is char-
acterized by favorable attitudes to neighbors” 
(1954, 164).
My research connects individuals’ neighbor-
ly relations to support for radical right parties 
(Fitzgerald 2018).  Most of the evidence I supply 
on this point comes from Swiss panel data, which 
measure four distinct dimensions of neighbor-
ing over time: expecting receipt of emotional aid 
from neighbors, expecting receipt of practical 
aid from neighbors, number of neighbors with 
whom the respondent is on friendly terms, and 
frequency of contact with neighbors.  An index 
of these four measures in combination predicts 
invigorated support for the Swiss People’s Party 
(SVP) from year to year.7 Yet disaggregating the 
index shows that the positive feelings about 
neighbors (expecting emotional support and 
being friendly) drive SVP support. There is no 
discernible impact of interacting with neigh-
bors or expecting practical support from them 
on far-right support.
In qualitative terms, my village interviews in 
France help to flesh out some aspects of neigh-
boring that merit additional consideration. A 
relevant aspect of the local area is the spatial 
placement of homes.  One participant observes:
7. The neighboring index has no statistically significant influence on adoption of support for other major Swiss parties.  
“Because [our commune] perhaps is not repre-
sentative of the villages of France, we don’t re-
ally have a village center. We’re very dispersed: 
many little hamlets, little neighborhoods…there 
you go…so, we don’t meet up with each other…
one doesn’t see many people. They are dis-
persed. There are villages like that in France…” 
Another respondent laments changes in neigh-
boring patterns in their village over time: 
“…there are fewer interpersonal relationships be-
tween residents than there used to be.  Before, 
there was support when someone had difficul-
ties. There was a neighbor, friends, who would 
come to help them.”  
This last statement illustrates how powerful 
social memories can be for shaping individuals’ 
perceptions of their localities.  Feelings of nos-
talgia for a more vibrant local environment can 
leave an impression that fuels affection for a 
place that is disconnected from the actual peo-
ple who live there.  As my research shows, posi-
tive feelings for the locality without active social 
engagement present the best-case scenario for 
radical right parties’ electoral prospects. What 
other political outcomes might such a constel-
lation help to explain?
Work
Generations of scholars have connected work 
to politics.  One important stream of this re-
search details how certain social dimensions 
of people’s work lives shape their political be-
havior (Mutz and Mondak 2006).  Directing at-
tention to the theme of local embeddedness, 
certain dimensions of a person’s job can struc-
ture the nature and extent of integration into 
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her local community (Wikinson 1986; Cox and 
Mair 1988).  Thus, an important consideration 
when studying local ties is whether an individ-
ual works within her community or whether she 
commutes outside the locality for her job.  We 
know from research into community cohesion 
that high levels of commuting far from home 
for work fray the local fabric of communities 
(Putnam 2000; Mattisson et al. 2015).  
In researching radical right support with pan-
el survey data, Duncan Lawrence and I (2011) 
find that commuting relatively long distances 
is associated with lower levels of radical right 
support over time at the individual level. We 
also find aggregate evidence of this relationship 
(see also Fitzgerald 2018). When locals com-
mute outside of their communities or neighbor-
hoods of residence to work, we argue, they are 
less focused on life at “home” and this can have 
political implications.  Field work in rural France 
provides further insight into local connections, 
or lack thereof, in areas with significant out-
of-commune commuting populations.  When 
I asked whether residents were well integrated 
into the locality, an interviewee explains:
“Some, but there are those if you will, it’s like a 
dormitory town.8  They work outside [the com-
mune] and they come back later on: the week-
end or in the evening.  They arrive, it’s 6 or 7 pm, 
they stay at home. They come to sleep here, but 
they don’t have time [to engage in local life].”
Working and living in the same community can 
broaden and/or deepen local ties; commut-
ing for work can undermine these processes. 
When exploring the ways in which individuals 
are locally embedded—either psychologically 
or sociologically or both—commuting patterns 
8. Alternative translation: bedroom community.
and other aspects of daily work life merit careful 
attention.
Another work-related dimension of local em-
beddedness has to do with labor market par-
ticipation, or rather, its inverse: unemployment. 
Research on the connection between unem-
ployment and social exclusion underscores 
the importance of work for psychological and 
social dimensions of local belonging (see, for in-
stance, Keiselbach 2003; Body-Gendrot 2009; 
Clarke 2012). The classic study by Lazarsfeld 
and his colleagues on community life in a 1930s 
Austrian town plagued with unemployment 
is illustrative here (Jahoda, Lazarsfeld, and 
Zeisel 2002[1933]).   The flax factory that once 
dominated work life in the town was shuttered, 
gutting social and political life by causing depri-
vation, demoralization, and social isolation. 
Interviews with residents paint a stark picture of 
how local experiences had changed:  
“Well, it used to be magnificent in Marienthal 
before, just going to the factory made a change. 
During the summer we used to go for walks, and 
all those dances! Now I don’t feel like going out 
anymore.” -Frau P. (Jahoda et al. 2002[1933], 
36).  
Similarly, 
“I often used to go dancing with my wife. There 
was life in Marienthal then. Now the whole place 
is dead.” –Herr E.  (Jahoda et al. 2002[1933], 37).
Taking part in economic life can significantly in-
fluence the ways people behave in the political 
arena.  What Lazarsfeld and his colleagues dis-
covered in Marienthal was an unemployed pop-
ulation crippled by despair and disinterest (and 
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not, as some theories might predict, imbued 
with radical political purpose). Community 
residents beat a sad retreat from local life; 
Marienthal’s citizenry disconnected from each 
other.  Attention to what work looks like for indi-
viduals can enlighten a poorly understood part 
of local life and citizen politics.
Politicization of local embeddedness
Under what conditions does local embedded-
ness—in its variety of forms—become relevant 
for politics?  Surely, there is no obvious connec-
tion between links of various kinds to one’s com-
munity and political views and behaviors.  While 
there is not a single answer to questions about 
how such things become politicized, some evi-
dence can help to frame future analyses.  
In my own research I identified four factors that 
aid in connecting individuals’ local feelings and 
experiences to the political—and in particu-
lar the electoral—realm (Fitzgerald 2018).  The 
most straightforward of these is elite rhetoric 
that plays up themes of community, of belong-
ing, of certain conceptualizations of society 
in terms of “we” that tap into people’s feelings 
about their localities.  Through exploration of 
party manifestos and other partisan platform 
statements, I find that where and when radical 
right leaders cue feelings of belonging and drive 
home themes of small-scale community and 
nostalgia their parties do best.  
Second, I also find that local authority levels 
play a role in connecting community-based 
attachments to politics.  Where and when mu-
nicipal governments have significant levels of 
autonomy—relatively speaking—the link be-
tween community affect and electoral politics 
is strongest. Third, I find that where and when lo-
9. See Bessen and Fitzgerald 2019.
cal units have recently lost governing authority, 
local ties and considerations become more rel-
evant for vote choice, as well, taking the form of 
a locally-rooted grievance. The fourth factor, or 
set of factors, has to do with the nature and tim-
ing of local elections: what people vote on (do 
they choose their own mayor, do they elect po-
lice officials? 9) and how proximal the local vote 
is to a national election (are local and national 
elections held separately or simultaneously?). 
These kinds of politicizing factors and their at-
tendant mechanisms can enhance the electoral 
relevance of individuals’ local embeddedness.
Concluding comments
Scholars of localities big and small, bustling 
and sleepy, world-famous and inconspicuous 
can learn a great deal by analyzing the multidi-
mensional nexus between individuals and their 
communities. Here, I advocate a comparative 
behavioral agenda that unifies and deepens 
inquiry into local dimensions of politics.  This 
seems like a propitious moment for such an 
initiative for at least two reasons.  First, a fresh 
wave of scholarship marks renewed interest in 
local context (as I outline above) and also into 
the ways rural-urban divides structure political 
debate, competition, and outcomes (see, for 
instance, Maxwell 2019; Harding and Michelitch 
2019; Dahlum et al. 2019).  Second, trends that 
enhance the political salience of local ties, such 
as devolution and municipal amalgamation, are 
ongoing across a range of countries with scant 
attention to their implications for citizens’ polit-
ical orientations.  A focus on the locally embed-
ded individual can bridge the divide between 
what we know about localities and their poli-
tics and what we know about citizens’ political 
behavior.     
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COVID-19 and Health Systems 
Q&A with Ashley Fox, Assistant Professor of Public Administration and Policy,  
University at Albany, SUNY
Are certain national level healthcare 
systems better prepared to cope with 
the COVID-19 pandemic? What makes 
them more effective than others?
In general, no health system can ever be pre-
pared for the tremendous surge in need for hos-
pitalizations stemming from an outbreak such 
as this. The goal is to have an emergency re-
sponse plan and protocols in place that allows 
a health system to scale up its capacity rapidly 
in response to the threat. Health system “resil-
ience” is the buzzword that everyone is trying 
to measure these days with several recent sys-
tematic reviews on the subject (e.g., Nuzzo et 
al, 2019; Turenne et al, 2019; Fridell et al, 2019), 
though the consensus seems to be that there is 
still no consensus on how to actually measure 
this construct.
That said, some health systems may have had 
better existing capacity both in terms of avail-
able hospital beds and coordination as well as 
emergency preparedness protocols. It is like-
ly too soon for accurate lesson-drawing, but 
Korea stands out, for instance, for having a re-
sponse plan in place to rapidly scale-up testing, 
tracing and treatment, at least in part due to its 
recent experience with MERs and investments 
in developing a unit specifically devoted to co-
ordinating the response to future outbreaks. It 
also has a higher existing hospital bed capaci-
ty at  11.5 hospital beds per 1,000 people (as of 
2015), which is relatively high compared with 
the OECD average of 3.81 in 2013 and the US’s 
2.90 beds per 1,000 in 2013. However, with an 
estimated 10% of COVID-19 cases requiring 
hospitalization, even this relatively higher bed 
capacity would quickly become overwhelmed 
without measures to control the spread of the 
disease and flatten the curve.  Also, during an 
infectious disease pandemic where the disease 
is highly communicable, it is critical to separate 
parts of the health system designated for pa-
tients with the infectious disease while protect-
ing the ordinary capacity. This was a lesson from 
the West African Ebola outbreak where mortal-
ity from “endemic” health conditions, including 
maternal mortality, ultimately exceeded mor-
tality from Ebola since people were unable to 
access more routine health services (Powell & 
Faulkner, 2019). 
However, health systems around the world 
have started shifting away from expensive, hos-
pital-based in-patient care towards building 
more outpatient care with the result often be-
ing hospital closings and a reduction in hospital 
beds. Thus, being nimble (e.g., China’s ability 
to construct 3 massive emergency hospitals 
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over a week), rather than having excess hospital 
capacity per se, is probably more important in 
terms of reducing the case-fatality rate.
The United States faces distinct challenges 
stemming from the particularities of both our 
fragmented public-private health system and 
our decentralized local public health infra-
structure in terms of our ability to coordinate 
an effective response.  Testing, surveillance and 
contact tracing is an integral part of the public 
health response and is critical for disease con-
tainment whereas health system capacity is 
critical to reducing disease-related mortality 
and mitigation efforts. The U.S. appears inef-
fective on both fronts, with difficulties sharing 
information and supplies in ways compatible 
with either containment or mitigation.  The U.S. 
also stands out among high-income countries 
for the compounding effect of lack of universal 
health coverage with nearly 27 million people 
completely uninsured and reliance on employ-
er-sponsored health coverage in the midst of a 
combined health and economic crisis.  While 
the $2.2 trillion dollar stimulus package covers 
the cost of co-pays/deductibles associated 
with Coronavirus testing, out-of-pocket spend-
ing on treatment for complications from the 
Coronavirus may not be covered. For people 
without insurance, Kaiser Family Foundation 
estimates that the costs for a hospital stay for 
complications stemming from Coronavirus 
could be as much as $20,000. Even for peo-
ple with insurance, treatment could add up to 
$1,300 in out-of-pocket costs. How this cost 
structure affects people’s behaviors in seeking 
care, and feedback loops in attitudes towards 
government as health care bills roll in, remains 
to be seen. 
Thus, emergency preparedness, organizational 
resilience and the ability to rapidly coordinate 
efforts are likely more important to how effec-
tive a pandemic response will be than existing 
health system capacity or type of health sys-
tem/health system financing (e.g., National 
Health Service, National Health Insurance, 
Social Health Insurance, etc.). 
Are our current conceptual tools for 
analyzing and explaining healthcare 
systems and policies adequate for 
understanding responses to and coping 
with the COVID-19 pandemic? 
With many notable exceptions (e.g., Nathanson, 
2009; Balwin, 2005), there is probably a dearth 
of comparative politics literature that focuss-
es on explaining differences in public health 
systems and responses across countries as op-
posed to health care systems. Also, IR scholars 
have perhaps been more engaged in the liter-
ature on pandemics, owing to the notion that 
“diseases do not respect borders” and in their 
study of international institutions like the WHO. 
Yet, the study of comparative responses to 
other pandemics have revealed the critical im-
portance of national political responses to epi-
demic control (e.g., Lieberman, 2009; Patterson, 
2006; Price-Smith, 2009).  
I think there is more room to better integrate 
the comparative political economy literature 
focused on economic policy differences across 
states with health responses as this pandemic 
has revealed the critical importance of safe-
ty-nets of all stripes in supporting an effective 
public health response. We cannot effectively 
socially distance without aligning systems that 
promote economic security with our health 
and public health systems. Past pandemics 
have shown the social, economic and political 
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effects of pandemics to be as profound as the 
health impacts themselves. 
But in terms of conceptual tools, we have many 
in comparative politics to help us to understand 
state responses to disease pandemics.  The 
literature on governance/state capacity/state 
strength, boundary institutions/ethnic fraction-
alization, federalism/ decentralization, elector-
al incentives and policy responsiveness seem 
promising as a first cut.
Which political factors affect health 
policy responses to the COVID-19 
pandemic? 
There is already some good emerging schol-
arship starting to try to answer this question. 
Sofia Fenner has identified several factors in 
a Duck of Minerva blog post that appear useful 
in explaining some of the different national re-
sponses and how successful they have been in 
curbing the epidemic so far- regime type, lead-
ership, state capacity, public buy-in. She argues 
that regime type on its own is too crude to pre-
dict the effectiveness of the response, but when 
combined with a proactive leadership response, 
state capacity and the degree of public buy-in, 
can explain some of the observed differences. 
“Political commitment” is a loose term associat-
ed with leadership that is frequently invoked in 
the public health literature but that is under-the-
orized in comparative politics, that would likely 
benefit from greater conceptual attention (Fox 
et al, 2011). Fenner describes the reason for this 
inattention to leadership in the comparative 
politics literature as follows “[leadership] pos-
es a problem for comparativists, who generally 
prefer to theorize the structural features of so-
cieties, states, and economies rather than the 
choices of individual leaders.” Yet, idiosyncratic 
leadership choices have proven important in 
explaining disease responses- for instance for-
mer President Mbeki’s AIDS doubting policies- 
although these can possibly also be explained 
by electoral incentives as appealing to science 
doubting may resonate with certain constituen-
cies (Fox, 2014). 
Healthcare policies at which level— 
national or subnational—are more  
important for understanding 
responding to and coping with the 
pandemic?
I think this likely depends on the country, but 
certainly in the US context, our decentralized 
federal structure has not been an asset in this 
pandemic. In containing a pandemic, coor-
dinated action is key and porous inter-state 
borders allows the virus to continue spread-
ing. The differential timing of lock-downs and 
re-opening of the economy will allow the virus 
to continue to spread even when it has been 
contained in one locale, especially with the 
failure to bring testing to scale.  Much of the 
pandemic response is being carried out by the 
2,800 local health departments that implement 
public health policy across the country, many of 
which are underfunded and understaffed. More 
theorizing and research on the role of local pub-
lic health departments in ensuring the public’s 
health is likely warranted. 
On the other hand, decentralized decision-mak-
ing and implementation could mitigate the im-
pacts of a poorly planned centralized response. 
More effective responses appear to have oc-
curred in more centralized regimes with proac-
tive leadership, though federalist Germany also 
stands out for its effective response to date.  
Perhaps equally important, though separate, 
might be to consider how “hollowed out” the 
state is- both in terms of the outsourcing of 
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domestic production as well as contracting out 
to the private sector as a dimension of state 
strength/weakness. Countries that are cap-
tured by private interests (i.e., the US) seem 
less supple in being able to respond quickly to 
emerging threats compared with countries that 
can quickly mobilize the state apparatus. 
How the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to 
affect healthcare policies and politics 
in the US and elsewhere in the short- 
and medium-terms?
This is the big question. Will we learn from this 
pandemic or will we be doomed to repeat 
the past neglect of pandemic preparedness? 
Following the 2014 West African Ebola outbreak, 
a bevy of articles came out calling for reform of 
the WHO and setting out a series of concrete 
recommendations that governments and the 
international community could implement, and 
yet the global community was unprepared and 
repeated many of the same mistakes. Certainly, 
the fate of WHO once again hangs in the balance.
One conceptual framework that I find particu-
larly useful for thinking through this question is 
Price-Smith & Porreca’s (2014) Fear-Apathy cy-
cle, which describes the oscillation we seem to 
regularly observe between moments of panic in 
the midst of an outbreak, leading potentially to 
excessively draconian and undemocratic reac-
tions, followed by long periods of total inaction 
thereby hampering preventive actions. This 
cycle repeats with frightening accuracy due to 
cognitive biases that affect decision-making 
processes.  Re-reading this and related articles 
written in the aftermath of the West African 
Ebola outbreak has proven the almost prophet-
ic prescience of this literature as well as the 
many unheeded warnings.
However, in contrast with previous pandemics, 
Coronavirus has not remained confined to low- 
and middle-income countries, nor to low- and 
middle-income people, at least initially. By af-
fecting centers of power and infecting powerful 
leaders, pandemics are no longer something 
that political elites can easily ignore. Most im-
portantly, the potent and far reaching economic 
effects of this pandemic, which are not isolat-
ed to a particular world region gives me some 
hope that further investments in pandemic 
preparedness will be forthcoming. However, the 
exact nature of those investments and whether 
they will be adequate is an open question as well 
as whether this pandemic will elicit a retreat 
from globalization both in terms of production 
and travel. 
In terms of healthcare politics in the US, many 
are asking whether the millions of people losing 
their jobs and their employer-sponsored health 
insurance coverage in the midst of a pandemic, 
will impact the political calculus over Medicare 
for All. I am presently designing a survey exper-
iment to be fielded shortly to try answer this 
question. As of yet, it is hard to say.   
APSA-CP Newsletter Vol. XXX, Issue 1, Spring 2020     page 120
C O V I D-19 A N D H EA LT H SYST E M S  (CONTINUED)
References 
Baldwin, Peter. 2005. Disease and Democracy: The Industrialized World Faces AIDS. Milbank Memorial Fund. 
Lieberman, Evan. 2009. Boundaries of Contagion: How Ethnic Politics Have Shaped Government Responses to AIDS. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Fenner, Sofia. 2020. “State, Regime, Government, and Society in COVID-19 Response: Establishing Baseline 
Expectations,” Duck of Minerva blog: https://duckofminerva.com/2020/03/state-regime-govern-
ment-and-society-in-covid-19-response-establishing-baseline-expectations.html#more-39252 
Fox, Ashley. 2014. “AIDS policy responsiveness in Africa: Evidence from opinion surveys,” Global Public Health, 9(1–2): 
224-248.  
Fox, Ashley, Goldberg, Allison, Gore, Radhika, Baernighausen, Till. 2011. “Conceptual and methodological challenges 
to measuring political commitment to respond to HIV,” Journal of the International AIDS Society, 14(Suppl 
2):S5-S18. 
Nuzzo JB, Meyer D, Snyder M, Ravi SJ, Lapascu A, Souleles J, Andrada CI, Bishai D. 2019. “What makes health systems 
resilient against infectious disease outbreaks and natural hazards? Results from a scoping review,” BMC 
Public Health.19(1):1310. 
Patterson, Amy. 2006. The Politics of AIDS in Africa. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Powell, J. & Faulkner C. 2020. “Flattening the Curve,” Duck of Minerva blog: https://duckofminerva.com/2020/03/flat-
tening-the-curve.html
Price-Smith, Andrew T. 2009. Contagion and Chaos. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Price-Smith Andrew and Porreca Jackson. 2016. “Fear, Apathy, and the Ebola Crisis (2014-15): Psychology and 
Problems of Global Health Governance” Global Health Governance special issue on Ebola. 
Turenne CP, Gautier L, Degroote S, Guillard E, Chabrol F, Ridde V. 2019. “Conceptual analysis of health systems resil-
ience: A scoping review,” Social Science & Medicine 232(C):168-180. 
Fridell My, Edwin Sanna, von Schreeb Johan, and Dell D. Saulnier. 2020. “Health System Resilience: What Are We 
Talking About? A Scoping Review Mapping Characteristics and Keywords,” International Journal of Health 
Policy and Management 9(1): 6–16. 
APSA-CP Newsletter Vol. XXX, Issue 1, Spring 2020     page 121
 
APSA | COMPARATIVE POLITICS
THE ORGANIZED SECTION IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS 
OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
B AC K TO  S U M M A RY
COVID-19 And the Lessons from Earlier  
Pandemics in Africa  
Q&A with Kim Yi Dionne, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California, Riverside 
What lessons from earlier pandemics 
– like AIDS and Ebola – should we be 
drawing for the COVID-19 pandemic?
There are two lessons that I think are really im-
portant. First, pandemics are particularly chal-
lenging for government response because they 
require the coordination of multiple actors 
across levels of governance (Benton and Dionne 
2015; Dionne 2018). These actors represent the 
interests of multiple – often not overlapping – 
constituencies. Ultimately, the success of multi-
tiered interventions like the global response to 
COVID-19 will rely on the decisions of ordinary 
people to change how they regularly go about 
their lives in order to stop the disease’s spread.
On citizen behavior, the second lesson that we 
can learn from earlier pandemics is about citi-
zen trust. Both the AIDS and Ebola pandemics 
in Africa have shown that citizens who do not 
trust their governments may be less likely to 
accept public health campaign messages and 
adopt the behavior change necessary to stop 
the spread of infection (Blair, Morse, and Tsai 
2017; Arriola and Grossman forthcoming). To be 
effective at promoting behavior change, health 
interventions can employ agents that citizens 
trust, such as religious leaders and local leaders, 
the latter including headmen, chiefs, or other 
traditional authorities (Seay 2013; Dionne 2018; 
Arriola and Grossman forthcoming).
Did previous pandemics influence 
African states’ responses to the 
COVID-19 pandemic? In which ways?
While the average person might think of African 
states as under-resourced, African experiences 
navigating recent pandemics also meant there 
was some capacity to respond to COVID-19 that 
other, better-resourced states might not have. 
Take the example of HIV/AIDS intervention in 
South Africa as preparation for COVID-19. It 
was on March 5, 2020 that the first COVID-19 
case emerged in South Africa. The government 
implemented a 21-day national lockdown that 
commenced on March 27, 2020 – the same day 
South Africa recorded its first COVID-19 death. 
South Africa has employed mobile HIV testing 
(often coupled with tuberculosis screening) for 
over a decade. At the start of the national lock-
down, South Africa’s health ministry deployed 
community health workers and at least six 
mobile screening and testing vehicles in four 
of South Africa’s nine provinces, with plans to 
deploy 20 more mobile units across all provinc-
es in April. Comparing the South African case 
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to better-resourced states in the global north 
shows a much more rapid response and one 
that seemed to have greater capacity to coordi-
nate community-level testing. 
How have African states been working 
to insulate themselves from a pan-
demic that had at first predominantly 
affected other locations?
Many African states closed borders. For exam-
ple, Uganda shut its borders to all but cargo 
(and only under certain conditions) after its first 
COVID-19 case emerged when a Ugandan na-
tional returned from Dubai with a fever. 
Because COVID-19 cases first emerged in China, 
the initial response involved curtailing travel 
from China. However, as the pandemic spread, 
a greater threat to African states were travel-
ers coming from Europe and North America. 
Benton (2020) points out how early in the out-
break many “African” cases of COVID-19 were 
visitors from the U.S. and Europe, who have 
great freedom of mobility across borders. As 
cases emerged on the continent, African states 
began curtailing travel from heavily-affected 
countries like the U.S., Italy, and the U.K. 
Before closing borders and curtailing incom-
ing flights, the relatively recent experience of 
travel-introduced Ebola infections prepared 
many major African airports – working with 
their respective ministries of health – to screen 
passengers arriving by air. Unlike in the U.S. for 
example, where government travel restrictions 
early in the COVID-19 pandemic led to over-
crowding in airports absent rigorous medical 
screening, multiple African airports had health 
workers questioning and taking temperatures of 
inbound travelers. 
Do you see any regional or regime 
type based patterns of response to the 
pandemic in Africa?
There are multiple disturbing reports of soldiers 
and police officers using deadly force to enforce 
national curfews and lockdown orders. In Kenya’s 
capital city Nairobi in late March, residents of the 
Mathare neighborhood reported police officers 
fired tear gas, shot guns in the air, and beat peo-
ple with canes to enforce a dusk-to-dawn curfew. 
By mid-April, a human rights commission had is-
sued a report that more Nigerians had died from 
aggressive enforcement of COVID-19 lockdowns 
than from the coronavirus itself (National Human 
Rights Commission 2020).
African states that have engaged more regu-
larly in violent repression may use the threat of 
COVID-19 to justify using deadly force, poten-
tially targeting opposition or activist organiza-
tions. Just like states can draw on their previous 
experiences and relevant capacity to handle 
epidemics, states can also draw on their pre-
vious experiences and capacity to repress citi-
zens in the name of health security. 
The earlier scholarship on regime type and 
health (see e.g., Lake and Baum 2001) should 
lead us to expect citizens in democracies may 
get more or better health services during the 
COVID-19 pandemic than their counterparts in 
autocracies. To be sure, it is too early to specu-
late which regime type will be more effective at 
both curtailing COVID-19’s spread and caring for 
those who become infected and ill. Comparing 
early responses to COVID-19 beyond Africa, 
however, suggests openness and transparen-
cy has worked better than coercion (Kavanagh 
2020). Future research could examine in the 
current pandemic to what extent democra-
cy and more specifically, levels and forms of 
democratization matter for public health in 
African states (Grépin and Dionne 2013).    
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COVID-19 And the Media
Q&A with Elizabeth Pertner, PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science,  
George Washington University
How does viewing COVID-19 through a 
media lens shape our understanding of 
governmental and societal responses? 
Thinking about COVID-19 through the frame of 
media raises questions such as state control of 
information and how today’s emergency mea-
sures will impact future media conditions. These 
issues are intimately connected to public trust 
in leaders, media, expertise and science, insti-
tutions, and democracy. Across the world, gov-
ernment and media approaches to COVID-19 
illustrate varying levels of public trust in experts. 
For example, in the United States, President 
Trump has directly contradicted and sidelined 
medical experts. In Turkey, where the purges 
of civil society and higher education following 
the 2016 coup attempt removed many aca-
demics and closed civil society organizations, 
religious authorities’ directions for COVID-19 
receive welcome media platforms. In countries 
with low levels of confidence in the government 
and media, such as Turkey, there is a danger of 
the public disregarding public health recom-
mendations. This distrust can have particularly 
devastating effects in regions that are already 
experiencing economic, social, and/or political 
crises, such as in the Kurdish regions of Turkey 
and refugee camps throughout the region.
Does regime type impacts media 
responses to the pandemic? If yes, in 
which ways? 
We have seen a wide variety of civil and politi-
cal liberty restrictions in COVID-19 responses. 
Governments always face a tradeoff between 
the free flow of information and control over the 
narratives, and this is heightened during crises 
such as the current pandemic. With free media, 
governments can more effectively share vital 
public health information, such as symptoms, 
emergency assistance, and protection mea-
sures. Bureaucrats also have better access to in-
formation essential to emergency policymaking, 
such as economic indicators. A free flow of in-
formation also provides platforms for criticism 
and misleading or false information. Increasing 
state control over mainstream media can pos-
sibly prevent the spread of dangerous fake 
news and preempt social panic or fearmonger-
ing. Yet in societies with a long history of media 
control, audiences may already be distrusting 
of information shared by the government and 
more likely to discount government-authored 
content. 
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You are a scholar of Turkey. Is the US 
media handling of COVID-19 similar 
to or different from the Turkish media 
coverage? If yes, how do you explain 
these differences?
Leaders see the crisis as directly linked to their 
political futures, and especially their success 
in upcoming electoral challenges. Media do 
the same. In the U.S., media across the politi-
cal spectrum weigh President Trump’s actions 
against 2020 election predictions. The relative-
ly positive coverage in Turkish media reflects the 
dominance of pro-government voices in main-
stream outlets. The next election (presidential 
and parliamentary) is scheduled for 2023, leav-
ing a small buffer between this year’s COVID-19 
and the next vote. Yet Turkey faces particularly 
damaging economic consequences as a result 
of the pandemic, which is already straining an 
economy weakened by the 2018 currency crisis 
and persistent unemployment problems.  
COVID-19 threatens to further weaken Turkey’s 
already embattled independent press. In the 
early weeks of March 2020, watchdog orga-
nizations reported a total of 9 journalists al-
legedly detained by police for reporting on the 
government’s lack of transparency regarding 
the number of cases. The state broadcast regu-
lator (RTÜK) has criticized several mainstream 
television channels for their COVID-19 reporting. 
The 47 journalists imprisoned as of March 2020 
are increasingly concerned about the high pos-
sibility of an outbreak in prisons. The economic 
fallout of the pandemic will hit small media out-
lets, especially print media, particularly hard. An 
economic recession will likely force the closing 
of cash-strapped independent media outlets, 
which are often barred from lucrative public ad-
vertising revenue.
Does Turkey’s regime type and the 
government’s relations with the media 
help or hinder effective response to the 
pandemic? Are there any generalizable 
lessons and insights that can be 
applied to other semi-authoritarian/
hybrid regimes?
Media monitoring NGOs have documented 
threats to media during COVID-19 in Azerbaijan, 
China, Egypt, Honduras, Hungary, Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, Turkey, and Venezuela. Many of these 
restrictions have been justified as necessary 
in order to successfully respond to the crisis. 
China is already arguing that state control over 
information during the pandemic has been a 
key aspect of their response. Looking forward, 
the question is how these changes will impact 
media conditions in the future. Many of these 
governments are defending media restrictions 
by pointing to expanded executive powers un-
der state of emergency declarations. Will lead-
ers roll back these powers after the pandemic? 
Leaders in countries with greater media free-
dom and leaders with wider censorship powers 
alike are turning to familiar tactics of blaming 
an external foe for the crisis. President Trump’s 
insistence on referring to COVID-19 as the 
“China virus” seeks to clearly place the blame on 
China. This rhetoric directly contradicts WHO 
virus naming procedures, which name viruses 
based on their genetic makeup rather than geo-
graphic origin in an attempt to prevent discrim-
ination against affected populations. China has 
responded by criticizing the US response to 
COVID-19 and launching a public relations cam-
paign championing the Chinese response to 
the pandemic. Columnists in pro-government 
Turkish media have blamed COVID-19 disinfor-
mation, particularly accounts that cite a much 
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wider spread of the virus than the official data 
recognizes, on the Gülen movement, the PKK, 
and Western media.
History tells us this much about blaming some-
one else for an epidemic: such claims are of-
ten factually inaccurate. The 1918 flu epidemic, 
widely known as the Spanish flu, did not origi-
nate in Spain. The virus had already spread in 
the U.S. and France, both of which quickly used 
war powers to censor reporting of the growing 
epidemic in military and civilian populations. 
The Spanish press, operating without war cen-
sors, published the story and became the first 
association with the flu for many, and ultimately, 
the name for the pandemic.   
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COVID-19 And the Military
Q&A with Tanisha Fazal, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota
There are constant comparisons to war 
time mobilization for the current fight 
against COVID-19. Is this the correct 
way to think about this? Why/why not?
My read is that the comparisons to wartime 
mobilization have to do with the fact that the 
COVID-19 pandemic requires a whole-of-soci-
ety approach, and we (in the US at least) have 
few analogies to work with aside from war. But, 
I see at least three big issues with the wartime 
analogy. The first is that there is a strategic en-
emy in war; a virus does not strategize in the 
same way groups of people do. Using the war-
time analogy suggests an enemy, which in this 
case has led to attacks against Asians (includ-
ing, in the US, Asian-Americans) and heightened 
tension with China. In this sense, the wartime 
analogy can be counterproductive. Second, as 
Danielle Lupton and Jessica Blankshain argue, 
the language of war eases invocation of certain 
domestic rules and procedures that may be dif-
ficult to roll back. The third issue with the war-
time analogy, at least in the US case, is that the 
US has not had to mobilize as a society for war 
since World War II. Our military is comprised 
of volunteers, and is significantly smaller (as a 
share of the population) than during the World 
Wars. By invoking the wartime analogy, there-
fore, it’s not clear what we’re invoking. Relatively 
few Americans today have any recollection of 
what civilian life was like during World War II. 
From a comparative perspective, it would be in-
teresting to think through the aptness (or not) of 
the wartime metaphor for those countries that 
have experienced civil war. Aisha Ahmad’s essay 
in the Chronicle suggests some interesting con-
nections. But there are still important differenc-
es, especially along the lines of who has what 
kind of control over levels of exposure.
There has been extensive critique of the 
militarization of pandemic response. 
Would you be able to describe any 
efforts that you have seen that are 
only made possible by military 
organizations?
I think of the response more in terms of the se-
curitization of health than of militarization. The 
military has an advantage in terms of its logis-
tics capabilities, but not necessarily its medical 
capacity. What remains to be seen is whether 
the securitization of health will lead to more or 
less international cooperation, infringement on 
individual rights, and what the effect on democ-
racy will be globally.
 
APSA | COMPARATIVE POLITICS
THE ORGANIZED SECTION IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS 
OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
B AC K TO  S U M M A RY
APSA-CP Newsletter Vol. XXX, Issue 1, Spring 2020     page 128
C O V I D-19 A N D T H E M I L I TA RY  (CONTINUED)
How have militaries’ role in medical and 
scientific innovation contributed to the 
role that they are playing during the 
COVID-19 pandemic?
I don’t know that we’re seeing too much – yet – 
in terms of military contribution to the science 
around COVID-19, although there have cer-
tainly been efforts along these lines. But there 
are many precedents for military innovations 
under stress. War is a crucible for medicine. 
Advancements in war include everything from 
Henri Dunant’s founding of the Red Cross to 
the use of whole blood for transfusions to the 
United States’ Joint Trauma System.
How is the pandemic likely to affects 
militaries and military medicine in the 
US and elsewhere?
Militaries of advanced industrial countries have 
been increasingly attentive to medicine over 
time. As a result, we no longer see death by dis-
ease in the military outstripping battle deaths 
(at least in war time). In the US, there have 
been a number of efforts to decrease funding 
for military medicine. I wouldn’t be surprised if 
these are rolled back. We’re also seeing China 
becoming more involved in health diplomacy 
as a result of the pandemic. Some portion of 
Chinese health diplomacy over the past number 
of years has been carried out by the PLA, and I 
expect that the US military medical community 
will ramp up its efforts to engage in similar levels 
of health diplomacy.   
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COVID-19 And Europe
Q&A with Julia Lynch, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania
What explains the variation in the 
EU member states’ responses to the 
pandemic?
This is indeed a puzzling question, and I suspect 
that comparativists will be grappling with this for 
a long time to come. With a relatively small num-
ber of member states, it’s easy to devolve into 
speculative “theories” that are really just ad hoc 
explanations for individual cases. I think at this 
point it makes most sense to try to generate a 
list of possible explanations that we have good 
grounds to think MIGHT be related to state-level 
responses, and then evaluate their explanatory 
power jointly.  A number of the “usual suspects”—
type of public health or health care system, type 
of welfare regime, pre-pandemic fiscal capacity, 
partisanship of government, region of Europe—
don’t seem on their own to be explaining a lot 
of the variation. But we should also be thinking 
about levels of trust in government and in fel-
low citizens (both of which are like to affect how 
policy-makers think about what types of social 
distancing or quarantine policies are likely to be 
effective); the degree to which epidemiologists 
are integrated into policy-making circles; the 
openness of policy-making elites to European-
level influences (e.g. from WHO Europe or the 
EU); state capacity; the influence of pharma-
ceutical and medical device manufacturing lob-
bies; etc.
How do pre-COVID-19 social, labor 
market and healthcare policies 
influence West European states’ coping 
with the pandemic?
The timing of the arrival of the pandemic clear-
ly had its own impact on how governments 
responded, with countries hit earlier taken by 
surprise and often faring worse. And at this 
point we really don’t have reliable, cross-na-
tionally comparable data on the health effects 
of the pandemic (see below). But based on what 
we know about how social policies generally im-
pact population health, we can be pretty confi-
dent that pre-COVID-19 social policies have an 
impact on how many and who are exposed to 
the virus in a population, and how much they 
suffer conditional on that exposure. 
Where social (and labor market) policies do 
more to protect people from job and income 
loss if they take time off from work; allow greater 
access to health care services; and make it easi-
er to socially isolate (e.g. by providing social ser-
vices to the elderly), the spread of the pandemic 
seems to be easier to contain. Social and labor 
market policies also mediate the effects of mar-
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ket-generated inequality on health, and so they 
affect who is most likely to die conditional on 
exposure to the virus. Robust social policies 
tend to be associated with lower rates of the 
kinds of complicating conditions like asthma, 
diabetes, cardiovascular disease, and exposure 
to particulate air pollution that are otherwise 
concentrated among lower-status groups and 
that make death from COVID-19 more likely. 
Health policies are also likely to shape the re-
sults of the pandemic at the country level. While 
the type of health care system (single- versus 
multi-payer, share of public versus social in-
surance financing, mainly public versus mainly 
private providers, etc.) probably doesn’t matter 
all that much, health system capacity clearly 
does. Countries that experienced deep cuts to 
public hospitals during the 1980s-2010s, often 
under the guise of New Public Management and/
or austerity philosophies, have had to scramble 
to come up with enough slack in their systems to 
accommodate a very rapid rise in the demand 
for public health surveillance, laboratory facili-
ties, intensive care beds, and nursing staff.  
Has Brexit affected the UK pandemic 
responses?
Dreams of Brexit do seem to have affected the 
British government’s initial response to the 
pandemic in a few ways, though it’s hard to be 
sure. Brexit thinking very likely affected the de-
cision of Boris Johnson’s government to opt out 
of joint EU arrangements to buy ventilators and 
PPE in bulk, even though it could have done so 
during the Brexit transition period. One of the 
companies that received a contract from the UK 
for its own supply of ventilators is run by James 
Dyson, a key advocate of Brexit – although I 
don’t know if there is any significance other 
than symbolic to that fact. It also seems plau-
sible that the government’s reliance on a small 
group of British scientists pushed them to adopt 
the controversial “herd immunity” strategy rath-
er than enacting the social distancing measures 
that were taken up by most EU countries.
It’s clear, though that Brexit will make it much 
harder to fight the pandemic. The departure 
of EU nationals working in the NHS will reduce 
the health care system’s capacity, and the UK 
government has announced that it does not 
plan to maintain its membership in European 
health organizations that oversee surveillance 
of communicable diseases, new drug licensing, 
and clinical trials. This means UK patients will 
likely experience delays in getting access to 
new treatments, in addition to missing out on 
any European economic support packages for 
pandemic recovery.
Are our current conceptual tools 
for analyzing and explaining health 
system differences adequate for 
understanding responses to and coping 
with the COVID-19 pandemic across 
countries? 
The main focus of scholarship on health in po-
litical science has always been health care 
systems, by which we usually mean systems 
of insurance and provision of curative medi-
cal services.  Political science has not invested 
nearly as much in understanding variation in 
the functioning of public health systems in dif-
ferent settings, or in the determinants of pop-
ulation health. Both of these tendencies put us 
at a disadvantage as we try to understand why 
different countries respond differently to the 
crisis, and the ultimate effects on the well-being 
of populations in the face of the pandemic.  
If I want to understand how governments are re-
sponding to this crisis, I’m going to want to know 
why their public health services look the way 
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they do, why they have the capacities and or-
ganizational cultures that they do, why they in-
teract with other branches of government in the 
way they do – and there isn’t to my knowledge 
much work in political science that examines 
the origins of or contemporaneous variation in 
public health care systems.
Lack of attention in political science scholarship 
to the social determinants of health, including 
how fundamental causes of health inequalities 
like socioeconomic inequality and racism are 
related to population health, also makes it hard-
er for us to understand how public policy may 
affect the pandemic’s outcomes for population 
health. The good news is that there is nothing to 
stop us from learning from other social scien-
tists with expertise in this area, including social 
epidemiologists, who have devoted consider-
able attention to just these kinds of questions.  
At this point, however, I think the most import-
ant obstacle to analyzing cross-national varia-
tion in coping with the pandemic is the fact that 
we simply don’t have good comparative data on 
either the incidence of the disease or the out-
comes for e.g. mortality. Very significant cross-
unit differences in testing and in how deaths are 
recorded, as well as the more common differ-
ences in the recording of relevant information 
about patients (e.g. sex, race/ethnicity, class 
or occupation), mean that it’s not possible at 
this point to make any claims about cause and 
effect. It’s likely that the data will never be truly 
comparable, so we will always need to be some-
what circumspect in the claims that we make.   
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COVID-19 And the Politics of Expertise
Q&A with Jeremy Shiffman, Bloomberg Distinguished Professor of Global Health Policy,  
Johns Hopkins University
Has regime type been a major influence 
on the effectiveness of national 
responses to the pandemic?  Have 
countries with authoritarian political 
systems been able to mount stronger 
responses than those with democratic 
systems?
Regime type does not provide a strong expla-
nation for divergence in the effectiveness of 
national responses. Some democratic coun-
tries have performed well: New Zealand, Taiwan 
and Korea, for instance. Others have performed 
poorly, including the United States and the 
United Kingdom. Some countries with more au-
tocratic systems have performed well, at least 
initially: Singapore for instance. Preliminary ev-
idence suggests Vietnam also has so far effec-
tively contained the virus. By contrast, China’s 
initial response was weak: its national leader-
ship covered up the outbreak in Wuhan, thereby 
missing a potential opportunity to prevent the 
virus’ global spread.
Prior preparation for pandemics, health sys-
tems capacity and respect by national leaders 
and citizens for epidemiological and medical 
expertise seem to be more influential factors 
than regime type in shaping the effectiveness 
of national responses. Another likely factor is 
historical precedent. Taiwan faced SARS in 
2003.  Korea faced MERS in 2015. These experi-
ences prompted their governments to prepare 
for potential new outbreaks. Other countries 
that have not faced severe infectious disease 
outbreaks recently were not geared up to take 
threats as seriously.
How have claims to expertise shaped 
national responses to the pandemic?
The pandemic has given rise to interesting dy-
namics pertaining to the politics of expertise—
the question of who knows, and who claims to 
know, what public policy responses are needed. 
People are coming out of the woodwork to speak 
up on what to do. I am not convinced this has 
been a good development, because it crowds 
out the space for the Anthony Fauci’s of the 
world—the ones with the requisite expertise—
to be heard. One of the most egregious exam-
ples of crowding out is Brazil, where President 
Bolsonaro has consistently downplayed the 
seriousness of the epidemic. He fired his pop-
ular health minister, Luiz Henrique Mandetta, 
who had called for sensible policies, including 
social distancing. Fortunately, many Brazilian 
state governors have defied Bolsonaro and are 
enacting policies that accord with guidance by 
epidemiologists. Another egregious example of 
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false claims to expertise, of course, is President 
Trump, who made the dangerous assertion that 
people might try drinking disinfectants to kill 
the virus, prompting several individuals to at-
tempt to do so.
What are the implications of COVID-19 
for future pandemic preparedness?
The world is stuck in a dangerous cycle of crisis 
and complacency with respect to pandemics. 
Many governments jump into action when pan-
demics arise, then neglect to prepare for the 
next pandemic. COVID-19 is not likely to be the 
last crisis of its kind: we need to be ready when 
the next pandemic hits. Doing so will require 
establishing better mechanisms for cross-na-
tional surveillance and collaboration, including 
shoring up the capacity of the World Health 
Organization, which is chronically underfunded.
Do you see any neglected lessons with 
respect to COVID-19?
The devastating public health and economic 
effects of the pandemic have led many people 
to lose sight of the fact that COVID-19 is hardly 
the only global health problem we face. Weak 
national health systems, mental illnesses, in-
juries, newborn mortality and antimicrobial re-
sistance are among the many neglected health 
problems that cause enormous suffering and 
fail to get the attention they deserve. Moreover, 
COVID-19 has hampered our capacity to ad-
dress these and other global health issues. For 
instance, in many countries routine immuniza-
tion for vaccine-preventable diseases among 
children, such as measles and polio, has been 
disrupted. Even as we address COVID-19, we 
cannot neglect these other pressing global 
health problems.   
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COVID-19 And Health Data
Q&A with Kevin Croke, Assistant Professor of Global Health, Harvard University
Are the existing data collection 
methods and tools adequate 
for analyzing and responding to 
the COVID-19 pandemic?
There are definitely big challenges on data col-
lection for comparative politics work, which 
often has a strong fieldwork component. Not 
being able to travel obviously makes this diffi-
cult, and while interviews can still be done re-
motely, fieldwork is always better in person. On 
the quantitative side, I think there has been a lot 
innovation in quickly generating new sources 
of quantitative data on the COVID-10 pandem-
ic and response, including various state and 
country policy and response trackers, mobility 
data for mobile phones, as well as researchers 
conducting mobile phone surveys to get quick 
snapshots of attitudes and responses at pop-
ulation level.  I think in some ways the bigger 
challenge for research right now is that, in com-
parative politics, we want to understand vari-
ation in how well countries have dealt with the 
crisis, but we won’t know what worked until the 
pandemic is over.   
If not, how these deficiencies can 
be overcome in the short- and 
medium-terms?
On the fieldwork question, in the medium term, 
we will (I hope!) be able to travel again and work 
in other countries. In the short term, strong re-
search partnerships with researchers and insti-
tutions on the ground in the countries where we 
work can definitely help. 
What other, currently not collected 
or underutilized data should medical 
providers, public health professionals, 
and social scientists be requesting?
This is a tough one because a lot of the data that 
we really want would be from population sur-
veys, and we cannot do in-person surveys right 
now. I am working with colleagues on a large RCT 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and 
we have retooled our survey plans for that proj-
ect and are now trying to collect relevant data 
via mobile phone surveys, but mobile phone 
penetration (both phone ownership and net-
work availability) is still low in large parts of rural 
DRC. Looking forward, at some point, large scale 
serological testing should be feasible, and when 
it is, I think social scientists will want these sur-
veys to be large enough so that we will be able 
to say something about disease prevalence at 
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disaggregated levels, not just at national level, 
and to have social science-relevant variables 
collected in these questionnaires.  
Are there any data collection 
challenges specific to the Global South/
developing countries?
I think there are two big challenges here for de-
veloping countries. The first is that for health 
research, you need to have accurate data about 
the health outcomes, and many developing 
countries don’t have complete vital registration 
systems, so it is going to be hard to know the 
COVID-related mortality burden with any great 
precision. Second, administrative data in health 
systems (usually called the Health Management 
Information System, HMIS) is usually very in-
complete in the lowest income countries. So 
the data that we would like to have on the fine-
grained geographic and temporal variation 
in cases (which you would normally get from 
these sources) is likely to be lacking or else very 
incomplete.  
How the pandemic is likely to affect 
future health data collection practices?
For developing countries, administrative data 
and early warning (surveillance) data has al-
ways been underinvested in, so ideally that 
would change. I think there is a good chance 
that we get some funding for surveillance sys-
tems of respiratory infections. The challenge is 
to make sure that it is done in a way that contrib-
utes to stronger institutions and stronger health 
systems, rather than being a siloed project just 
focused on respiratory disease. The next pan-
demic might not look like this one, so we should 
really think about strengthening health systems 
more broadly.   
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COVID-19 And the Middle East
Q&A with Melani Cammett, Clarence Dillon Professor of International Affairs, Harvard University
You’ve written before on how and why 
political parties in the Middle East 
engage in service provision. How is the 
COVID-19 pandemic likely to impact 
this phenomenon?
In some countries in the Middle East, South Asia 
and other regions, political parties are integral 
to welfare regimes as providers or as brokers 
for access to services. Some of my own work 
focuses on the case of Lebanon, where sectar-
ian political parties and politicians are the key 
actors in and beneficiaries of a power-shar-
ing system characterized by corruption and 
poor governance. The “October Revolution” in 
Lebanon, spurred deteriorating socioeconom-
ic conditions, pins the blame for decades of 
government mismanagement on these parties, 
whose patronage networks are dwindling as a 
result of a severe economic crisis. 
Although the public sector is notoriously un-
der-resourced, the system as a whole has thus 
far managed to control the spread of the virus 
relatively effectively. On the one hand, govern-
ment hospitals and Ministry of Public Health 
officials have proactively addressed the pan-
demic. On the other hand, the sectarian par-
ties, whose welfare provision and brokerage 
activities have long fueled their patronage and 
clientelist networks, have taken advantage of 
the pandemic. By rolling out their own efforts 
to control the spread of the disease and provide 
support to citizens, they have tried to show-
case their “good governance” credentials. The 
shutdown of the country in response to the pan-
demic bought a temporary reprieve for the sec-
tarian parties but protestors have returned to 
the streets to denounce corruption, the failure 
to provide adequate public services, and ongo-
ing economic mismanagement. 
Do you observe variation in how 
states in the Middle East deal with 
the pandemic? Are there any general 
patterns that you observe?
The spread of the Coronavirus has elicited 
normatively disturbing praise in some circles 
for the ability of authoritarian regimes to re-
spond quickly and decisively to the pandemic. 
Renowned for its large concentration of authori-
tarian regimes, the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region will enable us to explore this 
claim when we gather more information on 
country-level responses to the pandemic. Thus 
far, the efforts of MENA authoritarian govern-
ments to combat the disease confirm two wide-
ly cited trends: On the one hand, autocrats have 
taken advantage of their control over the media 
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to try to limit information on the spread of the 
disease or to manipulate coverage of their poli-
cy responses to their favor. (This is by no means 
unique to the region, as the cases of China, 
Russia and other countries attest.) For rulers 
who bank on “performance legitimacy,” the cri-
sis provides an opportunity to make the case for 
the superiority of strong man rule to face crises 
effectively. On the other hand, a defining fea-
ture of authoritarianism – coercion – arguably 
enables autocrats to enforce lockdown orders 
more effectively than regimes that place greater 
stock in safeguarding civic and political liberties. 
Yet MENA regimes – including authoritarian re-
gimes – vary in important ways, inviting us to 
unpack responses to the pandemic in more nu-
anced ways. Authoritarian regimes in the region 
deploy different levels and types of coercion, 
differ in the degree to which they aim to project 
a facade of political openness, and have diver-
gent levels of fiscal and administrative capacity 
(in part shaped by different per capita resource 
endowments), among other factors. Their wel-
fare regimes also feature different levels of reg-
ulatory capacity, social protection policies, and 
mixes of public, non-state and private actors 
involved in the financing and delivery of social 
services. 
Since compliance with measures to prevent 
the spread of the Coronavirus involves both 
the supply of policies as well as citizen uptake 
of these policies, it is also important to exam-
ine variation in political and social trust. Mass 
willingness to comply with public health direc-
tives, such as stay-at-home orders or vaccina-
tion campaigns, requires trust in government. 
Furthermore, the scope and level of social trust 
shapes solidaristic sentiments, which in turn 
affect individual and communal willingness to 
make sacrifices for the greater good. In places 
with more politicized ethnoreligious divisions, 
for example, it may be harder to elicit broad 
compliance on a voluntary basis. Both forms of 
trust vary across MENA states, inviting empirical 
investigation of how they shape citizen behavior 
in the face of the pandemic. 
In short, a systematic analysis comparing MENA 
responses to the Coronavirus must account for 
these state and societal sources of variation. 
How does the COVID-19 pandemic 
affect vulnerable populations in the 
region, especially refugees/displaced 
persons or people residing in conflict 
zones and the states’ policies dealing 
with these populations?
The Middle East is a conflict-affected region, 
with ongoing war and violence in Libya, Syria, 
Yemen, parts of Iraq, and Palestine. War and 
resultant refugee crises affect responses to 
the pandemic. Violent conflict undercuts the 
capacity of states and other actors to address 
public health threats by reducing resources 
and destroying infrastructure. In addition, war 
often gives rise to distinct zones of governance, 
hindering coordination across political authori-
ties to limit the spread of the virus. At the same 
time, refugee populations often reside in dense 
areas, with limited access to sanitation and hy-
gienic supplies, hindering their ability to comply 
with measures to control the pandemic.  The 
fact that refugees often face social stigma and 
marginalization in host countries may also limit 
their access to services and resources needed 
to meet their basic needs. However, some of 
my recent research on displaced Syrians sug-
gests that, paradoxically, negative stereotypes 
depicting refugees as “vectors of disease” may 
increase local efforts to control the spread of 
disease among this population.
APSA-CP Newsletter Vol. XXX, Issue 1, Spring 2020     page 138
A N D T H E M I D D L E EA ST  (CONTINUED)
The militarization of the pandemic is 
particularly relevant for the Middle East. 
As we move forward, what do you think 
are the big trends in this realm that 
scholars should be studying?
As I noted above, autocrats generally have more 
leeway than their democratic counterparts to 
marshal coercive capacity to enforce lockdown 
orders, among other measures – a capacity that 
some cite as a potential “advantage” of author-
itarianism in responding to public health crises. 
In many countries in the region, the army and 
security forces have been deployed on streets 
to ensure citizen compliance with public health 
guidelines. If citizens perceive that such mea-
sures were successful in controlling the pan-
demic, then trust in the coercive forces may 
increase. Indeed, populations in Egypt and other 
Arab countries expressed decreased trust in de-
mocracy and more support for strong-man rule 
in the wake of the Arab uprisings, which some 
associated with instability and economic de-
cline. Autocrats are aware of the political utility 
of threats to deflect public attention away from 
governance failures and shore up their support. 
In this vein, the pandemic can benefit autocrats, 
at least in the short-term before their shortcom-
ings in the economic realm and suppression of 
civil and political liberties return to the forefront 
of popular consciousness. 
Widespread corruption has long 
affected the efficacy of Middle Eastern 
health systems. Are there ways that 
public health authorities are now 
working to overcome these issues? 
What variation is there between states?
This question underscores why political scien-
tists need to engage with public health and vice 
versa. As in other regions, MENA health sectors 
are sites of corruption, whether in terms of mac-
ro-level expenditures and contracts or in more 
micro-level bribery and clientelist exchanges 
enabling access to health services and related 
resources. In virtually all countries in the re-
gion, private, for-profit providers are the fastest 
growing element of national health systems. 
Even if corruption is less endemic in the pri-
vate sector (and that itself is an open question), 
for-profit providers are financially out of reach 
for most citizens, who instead rely on public 
sector facilities to meet their health care needs. 
In some places, such as Lebanon, non-state ac-
tors linked to political parties and politicians, 
religious organizations and NGOs, are integral 
to health care provision. Although it may vary 
across provider types, corruption comes in 
the form of preferential access to services 
and financial support for health care needs for 
co-partisans, as well as credit claiming for brok-
ering access to de jure citizen entitlements on a 
discretionary basis. 
Regardless of health system type, dedicat-
ed technocrats in health ministries and other 
government agencies are working within the 
constraints of their respective welfare regimes 
to improve the quality of services and expand 
access to services for needy segments of the 
population. The degree to which they are suc-
ceeding is an empirical question for political 
scientists, who are well equipped to analyze 
how politics and social inequalities affect both 
the functioning of welfare systems and access 
to services. But the key point is that there is only 
so much that technocrats can do if larger polit-
ical structures perpetuating corruption and in-
equalities remain in place.   
APSA-CP Newsletter Vol. XXX, Issue 1, Spring 2020     page 139
COVID-19 And Group Relations
Q&A with Prerna Singh, Mahatma Gandhi Associate Professor of Political Science and  
International Studies, Brown University
What is the impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic on intergroup relations?
From a biomedical perspective Covid-19 does 
not discriminate against different groups. But 
inter-group relations are of tremendous sig-
nificance for the ongoing, as also for previous 
pandemics.  On the one hand, because of our 
common vulnerability to them, pathogens 
such as the novel coronavirus remind us of our 
shared humanity. In a world of nation-states, 
microbial threats are, however, viewed through 
national lenses. Much like wars, contagious dis-
eases are seen to pose a threat to the nation as 
a whole. Analogous to an invasion by an invad-
ing army, they invoke the idea that we must all 
rally together to counter this attack by a much 
stealthier, but potentially more deadly patho-
genic enemy. 
Outbreaks of infectious diseases thus hold the 
potential to blur subnational, including ethnic 
boundaries. Yet outbreaks of contagious dis-
eases also bring up, reinforce and even create 
group boundaries. This has important implica-
tions for how states and societies respond to 
these outbreaks. 
For one, group boundaries influence percep-
tions who is seen to be at risk, and conversely, 
who is to be protected. While pathogens do not 
explicitly target particular groups, membership 
in certain groups can increase or decrease one’s 
vulnerability to a disease. 
As compared to the young and healthy, for ex-
ample, COVID-19 is likely to be more lethal in 
the elderly and in those with pre-existing condi-
tions.  In large part because of structural racism, 
ethnic minorities are likely to be overrepresent-
ed in this latter group. In a neoliberal econom-
ic system, these demographic, and medical, 
intertwined with ethnic, boundaries become 
quickly charged with the labels of ‘productive’ 
vs. ‘unproductive’. As public health measures 
necessitated by the pandemic have ground the 
economy to a halt, questions have been raised 
about whether the lives of this ‘unproductive’ 
group are ‘worth’ the economic cost. In the US 
the Lieutenant 
Governor of Texas Dan Patrick suggested that 
grandparents would be willing to sacrifice 
themselves for the sake of the economy. 
Economic boundaries have also structured 
vulnerability to the consequences of COVID-19. 
Across the world economically marginalized 
groups have borne the brunt of the conse-
quences of the ongoing pandemic. In India 
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hundreds of thousands of migrant workers were 
left stranded by the government’s abrupt lock-
down in late March. Many were forced to walk in-
human distances from the cities to their homes 
in the countryside. Others have been prevented 
from returning to their home states. The urban 
poor who often live in cramped, squalid con-
ditions do not have the luxury of being able to 
socially distance, and are thus more vulnera-
ble to infection. It is also the poor, and those 
employed in the informal economy, temporary, 
blue-collar jobs who are likely to face the most 
brutal financial consequences of the pandemic. 
Is this impact similar to or different 
from that of past pandemics? 
Similar dynamics of boundaries of risk intersect-
ing with group boundaries and in turn effecting 
societal and state responses, have played out in 
previous pandemics. In his important book, The 
Boundaries of Contagion, Evan Lieberman ar-
gues that where the formal and informal institu-
tions in a country make ethnic distinctions, and 
the boundaries between ethnic groups are con-
sequently strong, the risk of infection from HIV 
is refracted in ethnic terms. The AIDS epidemic 
comes to be seen not as a shared problem for 
society as a whole, but as that of a particular 
ethnic group, usually a minority. Members of the 
ethnic majority come to see themselves as ‘safe’ 
from the disease and are unlikely to support 
public health policies that they think will pro-
tect a stigmatized ethnic minority that brought 
the disease onto themselves through their be-
havior. This contributes to a situation in which, 
despite the intensity of the AIDS epidemic, the 
state does not prioritize it.
There is emerging evidence that the 
pandemic has led to an increase in 
xenophobia. Is this new or different 
from past pandemics? 
Group boundaries not only structure bound-
aries of vulnerability to, and protection from 
infectious disease. They also influence the 
boundaries of blame. This is evident with 
COVID-19 in the blaming and associated xeno-
phobia against ethnic Chinese and those with 
Asian features. But this scapegoating of groups 
is sadly an ugly pattern as old as infectious dis-
eases itself. During the deadly bubonic plague 
of the fourteenth century, Jewish communities 
across Europe were blamed and resultantly, be-
came victims of often horrific violence. In the 
US Irish immigrants were blamed for outbreaks 
of cholera in the 1800s. 
In the 1900s Italian immigrants bore the brunt 
of blame for the outbreaks of polio in New York 
City. Falling back on the racist trope of European 
colonizers’ demonization of the colonies as 
heartlands of tropical disease and natives as 
‘unhygienic’ ‘dirty’, the British media has, at 
times of public health scares, whether it was 
smallpox or tuberculosis, consistently depict-
ed Indian and Pakistani immigrants as carriers 
of germs. More recently, Haitians and gay men 
were infamously held responsible for HIV-AIDS 
in the 1980s. 
What is the role of politicians in 
promoting this increased xenophobia? 
As the present situation is sadly bringing out, 
political leaders and the media play a key role 
in this dangerous finger-pointing against par-
ticular groups. Even prior to the outbreak of 
COVID-19 right-wing nationalist populist lead-
ers across the world were blaming migrants for 
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bringing in diseases. During the Syrian refugee 
crisis European news outlets erupted with re-
ports, including graphic photographs, of how 
Syrian refugees were bringing deadly diseases 
including a “flesh-eating disease” into Europe. 
According to the reports these diseases would 
infect populations across Europe and strain 
publicly-funded medical systems. So prom-
inent was the fear that the WHO’s Regional 
Office for Europe issued a statement clarifying 
that Europe has a long history and continues to 
experience a range of communicable diseases 
independent of the recent influx of refugees, 
that Leishmaniasis (the “flesh eating disease”) 
is not transmitted from person to person and 
can be effectively treated, and that the risk for 
importation of exotic and rare infectious agents 
into Europe from the Middle East was very low. 
The Polish President Kaczynski declared that 
immigrants carry “parasites and protozoa.” 
Trump infamously accused Mexicans of being 
responsible for “tremendous infectious disease 
… pouring across the border”.
COVID-19 has been regularly described by 
President Trump and other political leaders as a 
‘Chinese virus’. Influential media outlets across 
the world have used terms such as “yellow peril” 
and “the sick man of Asia” in their coverage of 
COVID-19, bringing up at once a psycho-cultur-
al perception of  an existential danger from the 
East to the Western world, as well as a pejorative 
image of a weakened, ailing nation. This has un-
leashed a nasty rash of racism across the world 
against those with Mongoloid features. In the US 
the xenophobia against Asian Americans has 
shown how quickly the idea of a “model minori-
ty” can be turned on its head.
Ethnic minorities have also been singled out for 
irresponsibility in failing to heed public health 
advice and thereby contributing to the spread 
of COVID-19. In India, for example, a number 
of religious figures and gatherings have been 
associated with the spread of COVID-19 in the 
weeks immediately before, and leading into 
the lockdown. A Sikh preacher, who later tested 
positive and succumbed to Covid-19 attended a 
large festival ignoring post-travel quarantine re-
quirements. Hindu temples and religious lead-
ers encouraged devotees to attend festivals 
suggesting that their faith would protect them 
from the virus. And a large Muslim missionary 
gathering in Delhi congregated participants 
from multiple countries. Yet building on and 
further reinforcing the ruling Hindu nationalist 
regime’s anti-Muslim ideology, it is Muslims who 
have been the blamed, by leaders, in the media 
and in social media campaigns, for the spread of 
the virus. In Sweden, a country that has adopted 
a provocatively relaxed approach to the pan-
demic, ex-chief epidemiologist Johan Giesecke 
pinned the failure to protect the elderly on im-
migrants who were unable to understand the 
public health directives. As countries across the 
world are instituting a range of punitive mea-
sures, from fines to arrests, to encourage com-
pliance with public health directives, there is 
growing evidence that these punitive measures 
will target and disproportionately burden eth-
nic minorities and the poor.   
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